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Despite the fact that the recent rice policy has been moving to a strategy of self-
sufficiency while the status quo of the national rice economy remains ambiguous, Malaysia has 
made an extreme policy decision to pursue an autarky economy in its rice sector, thus closing 
borders from the international markets in the future. The goal of this dissertation research is to 
comprehensively evaluate a deep-rooted rice policy in Malaysia and analyze the holistic impacts 
of the self-sufficiency and international trade policies at the national and farm-household levels, 
utilizing economic frameworks. The protectionist policy measures using a Policy Analysis 
Matrix reveals that Malaysia is not a competitive rice producer since domestic production is 
unprofitable at the comparable world price level which leads to significant losses without 
providing subsidies and producer price support by the government. Since a comparable world 
price is lower, Malaysia has no comparative advantage in rice production, hence the ongoing 
interventionist policy approach causes inefficient market outcomes as a result of policy 
distortions. The analysis of spatial, partial equilibrium model indicates pursuing self-sufficiency 
would effectively punish consumers due to tremendous increase in prices, thus reducing demand 
for consumption. The government suffers from the self-sufficiency due to substantial 
requirements on additional subsidies, land inputs, and technological inefficiency which leads to 
economic losses. With affordability is a key pillar of food security, self-sufficiency policy 
strategy does not guarantee food security, instead, free trade allows a more food secure economy. 
These findings are supported by a farm-household model that shows free trade decreases poverty 
rates by allowing greater rice consumption. Rice farmers would benefit from self-sufficiency, yet 
losing from the international free trade, without subsidies. The impacts of protectionist, self-
sufficiency, and free trade policies are often misconstrued to focus only on the production side 
protecting rice farmers’ livelihoods and welfare. The government must consider the policy 
effects on the economy as a whole, including farmers’ and consumers’ welfare, and agricultural 
economic efficiency. While political economy dominates policy outcomes relative to the goal of 
economic efficiency, this study provides key insights and empirical measures for non-
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1. Rice Policy Outlook 
The severe aftermath of the 2007/08 food crisis has strained many rice-deficit regions, 
primarily in Asia where rice is the basic food staple. These countries have moved towards a self-
sufficiency approach, primarily due to food security concerns. Having relied on rice imports for 
many years due to inadequate domestic rice production, and now having become one of the 
largest rice importers globally, Malaysia has made the same move. The food crisis in 2007/08 
caused a food supply crunch due to spiraling high rice prices in the global markets, reflected in a 
tremendous cost increase of rice imports to Malaysia. This placed financial strains on both the 
government and consumers. In addition, the rice exporting countries imposed more shipment 
restrictions and even stopped supplying rice due to pressure from their domestic demands (Dawe 
and Slayton, 2010). The Malaysian government tightened security on the national food reserve 
by tremendously increasing the national rice buffer stocks. This essentially worsened the 
situation of the world market price for rice1(Dawe, 2010). Subsequently, in the most recent 
policy goal reformulation, the government has decided to pursue and aim to achieve total rice 
self-sufficiency by the year 2020. This target date has been recently extended to 2050 under the 
new masterplan, the National Transformation 2050 (2020-2050), thus the government seeks to 
eliminate rice imports in the future (The Sun Daily, 2016; News Straits Times, 2014). The self-
sufficiency strategy not only concerns food security, but also rice farmers’ welfare, since poverty 
mitigation among poor farmers has been the goal since the origins of this national rice policy. 
                                                     
1 The Malaysian government decided to immediately expand the national rice buffer stocks by 
six-fold which was administered by BERNAS, an import monopoly (Dawe, 2010).  
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Despite having contributed a relatively marginal share to the national income, rice 
remains a crucial agricultural food crop in Malaysia which holds a stake in Malaysian economics 
due to not only being a primary food staple for the nation, but also providing livelihood to local 
farmers. Relative to the major agricultural cash or plantation crops, palm oil and rubber, rice has 
made an essentially minor contribution to the national gross domestic production (GDP) value, 
ranging between US$ 737 and US$ 625 million in 2009 – 2013 (Food and Agriculture 
Organization, 2014) (Figure 1.1) from the total GDP of US$ 323.3 to US$ 202.3 billion in the 
same period (Department of Statistics, Malaysia). 
 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization. 
 
Figure 1.1: Gross production value of major agricultural crops (US$ Million).
 
The Malaysian rice industry largely exists in rural economies, subject to small-scale 
production, and unattractive returns for farmers which is characterized by the majority of rice 
farmers living in poor households. The biased development approach to encourage the cash 
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highly shaped and influenced the current national rice development policy. Intended or not, this 
colonial plantation policy neglected small agricultural industries, leaving local and rural 
smallholders to grow food crops such as rice, vegetables, and fruits living in poor households. 
Consequently, rice receives special attention by the government in Malaysia, although it has no 
clear comparative advantage and competitiveness (Abu, 2012; Mohamed Arshad et al., 2011). 
The interventionist rice policy regime has taken a deep root in Malaysia to guarantee that 
the self-sufficiency goal is achieved. Massive public investment and expenditures have occurred 
to realize the self-sufficiency goal primarily through input subsidies, followed by output subsidy 
and price support programs at the production level that consist of distorted prices of rice seeds, 
fertilizers, pesticides, chemicals, wages subsidies, output and paddy yield improvement 
incentives, and producer price support (the details of these subsidies are provided in Appendix 
Table 1.1). For instance, the Malaysian Department of Agriculture (DOA) reported that the 
government spent around RM 839 million (US$ 246.76 Million) for only input subsidies to boost 
domestic rice production in 2010 (DOA, 2010). In addition, the government has implicitly 
subsidized infrastructural requirements and the maintenance of irrigation, drainage, and water 
system facilities and supplies, especially for the designated regions (also known as Malaysian 
granaries). Thus, rice production in Malaysia has been highly subsidized (Rajamoorthy, 2015; 
Abu, 2012; Abdullah et al., 2010; Nee, 2008; Dano and Samonte, 2005) and regulated by the 
government. The designated rice production regions and their granaries play an important role in 
the Malaysian rice industry, and the country is highly dependent on these areas to achieve self-
sufficiency goals. The granary regions produce 72.9% of domestic rice from 57% of the total 




     Source: Department of Agriculture (DOA), Malaysia.  
 
Figure 1.2: Planted rice area and production in Malaysia. 
 
Currently, there are 12 designated regions, of which the majority were historically 
developed in Peninsular Malaysia (Figure 1.3). New areas are extended into Sabah (IADA Kota 
Belud) and Sarawak (IADA Batang Lupar). The designated regions which can also be referred as 
a “rice bowl” to the country, are managed and maintained by the government. Rice is mostly 
grown on irrigated or wetland rain-fed lowland ecosystems. The suitability of the agricultural 
land is clearly one of the crucial constraints in the rice industry that forces the government to 
practice multiple cropping methods to achieve the national production goal. The rice cropping 
intensity now reaches as high as 180% in major areas and 170% in the rest. The high cropping 
intensity and the limiting soil requirements for irrigated rice gave rise to the development of non-
irrigated rice varieties which include hybrid rice and upland rice2.  
                                                     
2 Upland (Aerobic) rice is a production system in which especially developed “aerobic rice” 
varieties are grown in well-drained, non-puddled, and non-saturated soils. The varieties are the 
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             Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Agro-based Industry (MOA), Malaysia. 
 
Figure 1.3: Designated national rice producing areas in Peninsular Malaysia. 
 
2.  Significance of the Study 
A twofold and long-standing rice policy goal in Malaysia is 1) to improve food security 
and 2) to alleviate poverty among rice farmers. This largely dictates why the Malaysian 
government constantly mandates rice self-sufficiency as a crucial national policy measure 
(Ibrahim and Siwar, 2012; Tobias et al., 2012; Tey, 2010; Mohd Arshad and Abdel Hameed, 
2010; Dano and Samonte, 2005). With limited agricultural land and high production costs, the 
government intervenes heavily into the domestic rice industry through substantially providing 
subsidies and price support programs to increase domestic production. These efforts are not only 
to attain a high degree of self-sufficiency, but also to ensure economic welfare of both rice 
farmers and consumers (Tey, 2010; Athukorala and Wai-Heng, 2007; Najim et al., 2007; Dano 
and Samonte, 2005; Mustapha, 1998). Despite these supports, rice productivity has improved 
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SEMERAK 
8) IADA KETARA 
9) IADA PEKAN 
10) IADA ROMPIN 
1) MADA 







5) IADA BLS 
6 
 
slowly, and the nation has only produced between 65% to 70% of domestic requirements over 
many years. Rice production grew slightly as the total production marginally increased by 
0.87%, which comes from a yield improvement of 0.52% and an increase in area harvested of 
0.32% in 2015/16 (Figure 1.4). 
 
 Source: Production, Supply, and Distribution (PS&D), USDA. 
 
Figure 1.4: Rice production, area harvested, imports and yield in Malaysia. 
 
Many studies have concluded that this marginal production growth has resulted from 
inefficient policy strategies, which critically threatens overall food security3 (Siwar et al., 2014; 
Abu, 2012; Vengedasalam et al., 2011; Mohamed Arshad et al., 2011; Mohamed Arshad and 
Abdel Hameed, 2010; Tey, 2010; Athukorala and Wai-Heng, 2007; Dano and Samonte, 2005; 
                                                     
3 Food security refers to when all people at all times have physical and economic access to 
sufficient food to meet their dietary needs for a productive and healthy life. Food security has 
three dimensions: availability of sufficient quantities of food of appropriate quality, supplied 
through domestic production or imports; access by households and individuals to adequate 
resources to acquire appropriate foods for a nutritious diet; and utilization of food through 
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Mustapha, 1996). A simulation study by Md. Amin (1989) found that the fertilizer subsidy 
programs provide a significant positive impact to improve rice yield, and thus increase the rice 
production output, yet the input subsidy programs have failed to reduce cost of production due to 
an upward trend in input market prices. With Malaysian farmers not likely to spend on additional 
fertilizer if the subsidies are eliminated (Ramli et al., 2012), the removal of these subsidies might 
negatively affect domestic rice production. It has also been argued that input subsidies are 
capitalized into the cost of production, raising the value of fixed inputs such as land, and 
paradoxically augmenting the cost of production. In addition, the price support policy was 
discovered as an ineffective and a non-sustainable approach to increase rice production 
(Mustapha, 1998; Baharumshah, 1991).  
With these negative outcomes of the policy programs, the current sectoral performance 
shows that the national rice self-sufficiency goal is still unachieved (Table 1.1).  
 
Table 1.1: Discrepancy between target and achieved rice self-sufficiency in Malaysia, 1966 
– 2016. 




First Malaysia Plan 1966 – 1970 n.a 80.0 
Second Malaysia Plan 1971 – 1975 n.a 87.0 
Third Malaysia Plan 1976 – 1980 90.0 92.0 
Fourth Malaysia Plan 1981 – 1985 65.0 76.5 
Fifth Malaysia Plan 1986 – 1990 65.0 75.0 
Sixth Malaysia Plan 1991 – 1995 65.0 76.3 
Seventh Malaysia Plan 1996 – 2000 65.0 71.0 
Eighth Malaysia Plan 2001 – 2005 65.0 71.0 
Ninth Malaysia Plan 2006 – 2010 90.0 72.0 
Tenth Malaysia Plan 2011 – 2015 90.0 65.0 
Eleventh Malaysia Plan 2016 – 2020 100.0 65.0* 





The policy goal to attain rice self-sufficiency has failed, hence the stimulative policy measures 
have not achieved the desired goals (Siwar et al., 2014; Abu, 2012; Vengedasalam et al., 2011; 
Mohamed Arshad et al., 2011; Mohamed Arshad and Abdel Hameed, 2010; Tey, 2010; 
Athukorala and Wai-Heng, 2007; Dano and Samonte, 2005; Mustapha, 1996). Despite the 
government’s failed efforts, if the country attempts to achieve rice self-sufficiency, it would 
come at a high cost both in terms of financial as well as societal costs (Mohamed Arshad et al., 
1983 and Abdullah et al, 2010). The interventionist instruments have also been debated in terms 
of long-term sustainability which have resulted in a high budgetary burden to the government, 
misallocation of resources, and demands for market liberalization. With the domestic 
consumption continuing to grow in the future, rice remains significant for the entire Malaysian 
population (Figure 1.5). 
 
Source: International Rice Outlook (Wailes and Chavez, 2016). 
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Self-sufficiency is not a new strategy in Malaysian rice policy history. In fact, it has been 
emphasized since the 1930s, when the government began subsidizing domestic production to 
attain a high self-sufficiency level in order to prevent rapidly escalating food import bills and 
consequently release the country from the vulnerability of depending on external rice supplies. 
The self-sufficiency strategy was not only continued to address food security, but also has been 
used to measure national food security level (Ibrahim and Siwar, 2012; Tobias et al., 2012; Tey, 
2010; Mohd Arshad and Abdel Hameed, 2010; Dano and Samonte, 2005). While self-sufficiency 
and food security are somewhat separate concerns, the government and policy makers have often 
misinterpreted food security to self-sufficiency. The perception of food security in Malaysia is 
narrowly interpreted as the ability of the country to provide adequate food entirely through 
domestic production, which implies the government’s stance on food security is largely referred 
to as complete dependence on domestic production without supplement from external sources. 
Thus, this misconstrued standpoint calls to redefine food security to not only rely on self-
sufficiency through subsidizing and regulating with various policy programs, but also requires 
the integration of capital, energy, technology, and experienced management into sustained efforts 
to heighten the efficiency of rice production (Alavi et. al, 2012). Self-sufficiency has been 
revealed as an inefficient, a costly, and a counterproductive path to food security (Alavi et al., 
2012), while also proving to be a large challenge to policymakers. Even if a self-sufficiency 
strategy is technically feasible, it would require for massive efforts and expenditure (Overton, 
1999). In addition, the drive for food self-sufficiency may not be an appropriate or an efficient 
policy strategy for the rice sector in Malaysia (Overton, 1999).  From a household perspective, 
rural households may be forced into food self-sufficiency by lack of market access. With the 
market accessibility as a key concept of food security, encouraging households into self-
10 
 
sufficiency is not a useful strategy to either achieve food security objectives or to reduce poverty 
(Galero et. al., 2014). Because of this, self-sufficiency in rice is more likely to be more a political 
strategy rather than a poverty-reducing rational (Timmer, 2010).  
Having limited competitive rice production (Najim et al., 2007), Malaysia struggles to 
achieve a rice self-sufficiency level, due to food security issues, financial burden, trade 
agreements, and competition with industrial crops throughout the years. Malaysia embarked on 
an ambitious goal to achieve self-sufficiency in the rice sector (Goldman, 1975) through heavy 
government interventions. Tey (2010) suggested that the country certainly needs to reexamine 
the current policy approach due to costly intervention, particularly on subsidy programs. 
Furthermore, food self-sufficiency approach has been widely criticized as a misguided policy 
decision and furthermore that it seeks to achieve food security that reflects political priorities 
over economic efficiency (Clapp, 2017). The goal of self-sufficiency which means to food 
security is a political goal while economically is distorted, costly, and inefficient, and thus the 
Malaysian rice policy has become a political delusion (Dano and Samonte, 2005). 
Future Malaysian rice production and supply are going to be more uncertain and may 
result in more volatile prices (Ibrahim and Siwar, 2012; MOA, 2011). Even compared to the 
widely accepted standard of sustainable agriculture4, the recent agricultural policies in Malaysia 
are not supportive to sustainable agricultural practices (Murad et al., 2008). According to the 
                                                     
4 (1) Improved farm-level social and economic sustainability enhances farmer’s quality of life, (2) 
increases farmers self-reliance, (3) sustains the viability/profitability of the farm, (4) improved 
wider social and economic sustainability improves equity socially supportive and meets society's 
needs for food and fiber, (5) increased yields and reduced losses while minimizing off-farm inputs, 
(6) minimizing inputs from non-renewable sources, (6) maximizing use of (knowledge of) natural 
biological processes and promoting local biodiversity/environmental quality (U.S Farm Bill, 1990; 
Pretty, 1995; Ikerd, 1993; Hodge, 1993; Swedish Society for Nature Conservation, 1999). 
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International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), “the global rice market, which is relatively small 
compared with that of other major food crops such as wheat, maize, and soybeans, is likely to 
become even smaller if rice-consuming countries vigorously pursue self-sufficiency strategy. A 
consequence of a smaller market is greater price volatility and, the smaller the market size is, the 
more prices have to move in response to any supply and demand shock” (IRRI, 2016). 
The typical policy responses by the net rice importing countries after the food crisis 
generally involved the reduction of import duties, the building up of extra reserves, the reduction 
of import restrictions, price controls through subsidies, and more importantly, the promotion of 
self-sufficiency (Chandra and Lontoh, 2010). To a large extent, policy responses at the national 
level have not only contributed to further global food price volatility (Slayton, 2009), but also 
have undermined the food security situation in the region (Chandra and Lontoh, 2010). An ex-
post analysis of the 2008-food crisis found that government policies and panicky responses were 
the key factors behind soaring rice prices (Alavi et al., 2012).  There were also arguments that 
the recent food crisis could have stemmed from a shift in policy towards heavy governmental 
intervention to boost food production, control food prices, and provide more reliable access for 
poor households, since the interventions involved significant costs (Timmer, 2010; Dawe, 2010). 
The catastrophe of the crisis revealed the urgent need to reexamine and reform policies that 
trigger not only the immediate catastrophe, but also the potential for recurrence. Unfortunately, 
“The government interventions seem simply like attempts to recycle the past, harking back to 
self-sufficiency5, while also reconsidering internal market emphasis during the 1960s and 1970s, 
which fostered large productivity gains, improved crop yields, disease-resistant seeds, food 
                                                     
5 In the context of food security, the self-sufficiency ratio is indicated by the ratio of a country’s 




supply chain revolution, and so forth” (Alavi et al., 2012). Instead of needing to be developed for 
the next phase of competitive capability, the rice sector has been pulled backwards, focusing on a 
self-sufficiency strategy and pushing local rice production. While Malaysia often associates food 
security with complete self-sufficiency as well as its dependency on government programs, food 
security cannot easily be achieved through domestic production.  
With the domestic production having been stagnant for many years, the elimination of 
subsidies could potentially increase net welfare and government revenues (Vengedasalam et al., 
2011), but with changing the current import policies. Some research hypothesized that the price 
support policy might have been justified on grounds of income distribution or the government’s 
favor for political interests (Dano and Samonte, 2005; Baharumshah, 1991). In addition, the 
authorization of BERNAS as a sole importer and distributor in the Malaysian rice sector would 
not hide political reasons behind the sound of economic rationale (Dano and Samonte, 2005). A 
“single-desk” import policy instrument can also threaten food security as the domestic support 
price is staked above the world price under a monopsony market structure and the failure of the 
government to control market price instability, resulting in severe inflation (Vengedasalam et al., 
2011). Thus, the policy decision of authorizing a sole importer has trade-distorting effects as the 
government provides a privilege to be a monopsony rice buyer (Abu, 2012; Vengedesalam et al., 
2011).  
Malaysia has been a net rice importer for many years and is expected to remain 
dependent on rice imports in the future to support a domestic shortage supply. The baseline 
projections using the Arkansas Global Rice Model (AGRM) indicate that Malaysia is likely to 
import around 1.6 million tons in 2025 (Wailes and Chavez, 2016).  Despite the call for a more 
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liberalized market by the World Trade Organization6 (WTO) since the 1960s, the importation of 
rice reflects a trade-off of self-sufficiency for financial sustainability as imports are considered to 
be cost saving (Mohamed Arshad et al., 2011; Tey, 2010; Mustapha, 1996). Malaysia’s 
participation in free trade agreements (FTAs) suggests that opening to freer trade and elimination 
of tariffs on rice is a key strategy going forward but also in conflict with the rice self-sufficiency 
goal.  
Alternatively, trade openness improves each dimension of food security, increasing food 
availability through enabling products to flow from surplus to deficit regions (OECD, 2014). A 
previous study projected that Malaysia would be able to sustain the maximum of 70% of self-
sufficiency in the long-term due to complying with trade agreements (Mohamed Arshad et. al, 
2011). In theory, trade expands rice markets, and thus opens access to additional sources that 
could be a remedial approach to domestic production scarcity, so that rice supply and demand 
would be met. In fact, trade balances the deficits of net food importers with the surpluses of rice 
exporting countries. In the absence of trade, food prices would be higher in net importing 
countries in order to bring national supply and demand into equilibrium, potentially worsening 
the food security status quo in those countries. In addition, rice imports may help lower food 
prices for poor, low-income, and undernourished groups, which is crucial in times of disruptions 
to and uncertainty of domestic production, from climate change, crop diseases, and so forth. 
According to the World Bank, the liberalization exercise contributes to a reduction in poverty 
incidence among farm households without exacerbating income inequality and thus generates 
gains to the poor (Ganesh, 2005). Durand-Morat and Wailes (2011) postulated that Malaysia has 
                                                     
6 The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only global international organization dealing 
with the rules of trade between nations, primarily the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by 
the bulk of the world’s trading nations and ratified in their parliaments. The goal is to help 
producers of goods and services, exporters, and importers conduct their business. 
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the potential to be a food secured nation resulting from rice trade liberalization through a 
significant decrease in consumer prices. Regional trade agreements are hypothesized to receive 
positive responses from participants. “Since the issuance of the ASEAN Integrated Food 
Security framework in 2008 and the further successful adoption of the ASEAN Trade in Goods 
and Agreement7 (ATIGA) in 2009, rice deficit countries within the region would prefer to hang 
tenaciously on their long-held goal of rice self-sufficiency” (Alavi et al., 2012). The Trans-
Pacific Partnership8 (TPP) agreement also seeks to open trade initiatives among the members, 
particularly major rice exporters – Vietnam and Australia – thus contributing to food security 
(Malaysia International Trade Industry, 2015). Given that the self-sufficiency strategy in 
Malaysia’s rice sector is misconstrued towards food security as well as rice farmers’ and 
consumers’ welfare, it is crucial to evaluate and analyze the national rice development policy 
comprehensively. 
 
3.  Purpose of Research  
The general objective of this study is to examine deep-rooted national rice policy 
strategies in Malaysia. This encompasses the evaluation of a long-held self-sufficiency policy 
strategy to address food security and poverty concerns in light of the country’s regional and 
bilateral trade participations. The specific objectives below will be achieved in comprehensive 
studies in Chapter II, III, and IV: 
                                                     
7 ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA) aims to achieve free flow of goods in the region 
resulting to less trade barriers and deeper economic linkages among members, lower business 
costs, increased trade, and a larger market and economies of scale for businesses (ASEAN, 
2017). 
8 The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement is a trade agreement between Australia, Brunei, 
Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, and the 




1) To measure the profitability, competitiveness, and the efficiency at production level of rice 
industry in Malaysia using a Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM) framework. 
2) To estimate the impact of rice self-sufficiency and international trade policies in Malaysia at 
the national level using a partial, spatial equilibrium model. 
3) To measure the impacts of international trade policy on rice production and consumption, 
poverty, and farmers’ welfare at the household level on individual rice farmers in Malaysia 
using a Farm-Household model.  
This research will address these overarching questions: 
1) Should Malaysia maintain the current policy to pursue self-sufficiency in rice? (in both 
political and economic perspectives) 
2) What are the consequences and welfare impacts of pursuing self-sufficiency in rice to 
farmers, consumers, and the government? 
3) If Malaysia anticipates eliminating rice imports, how could the country achieve self-
sufficiency in rice with respect to policy requirements? 
4) What are the impacts of allowing free trade in rice on farmers, consumers, and the 
government?  
5) How does the free trade policy affect individual rice farmers with respect to rice production 
and consumption, poverty, and welfare? 
These policy evaluations and analysis would help to identify holistic impacts of the self-
sufficiency and international trade policies on rice farmers, consumers, and the government at 
both the macro and micro levels.  
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4.  Research Approach 
This dissertation research evaluates rice policy interventionist strategies, and the impacts 
of self-sufficiency, international free trade, and food security at the national and farm-household 
levels to address the rice policy concerns in Malaysia. A comprehensive evaluation will be 
conducted covering the rice policy from the production level to the market, through conducting 
different research analyses and using different quantitative methods to measure the impact of rice 
policies holistically on farmers, consumers, and the government. This study begins with 
evaluating the competitiveness and efficiency in rice production policy using the Policy Analysis 
Matrix approach. The impact of self-sufficiency and international trade policies is presented in 
Chapter III using the RICEFLOW model to simulate alternative outcomes. Chapter IV analyzes 
the impact of international trade policy on rice farmers using the Farm-Household model. The 
results of the study will reveal the (in)efficiency of the food security policy. 
 
4.1 Competitiveness and Efficiency in Rice Production 
 While limited studies attempt to measure competitiveness and efficiency of the rice 
industry in Malaysia, a few studies concluded that the industry has no clear comparative 
advantage. The evaluation at the production level visualizes the production performance given 
current technologies and policies. Using the Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM), originated by 
Monke and Pearson (1989), this study quantitatively measures the impact of the interventionist 
policies on profitability and the efficiency of resource used in the rice production system, and 
thus the competitiveness and the comparative advantage of the rice industry can be analyzed. 
PAM is a recognized approach and has been widely applied in the agricultural sector to 
implement an analytical process and to act as an empirical method for measuring the effects of 
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policy on the rice sector. PAM provides a helpful framework to understand the effects of policy 
and serves as a useful tool to measure the magnitudes of policy transfers. Therefore, PAM can 
address and investigate crucial policy concerns, dealing with the competitiveness of production 
systems, which are associated with farm incomes, the efficient allocation of resources in 
agriculture and the comparative advantage, and the effects of policy and market failures with the 
allocation of investment to the agricultural sector (i.e. policy transfers).  
 
4.2 Evaluations and Analysis of Self-sufficiency and International Trade  
With the production status quo having been estimated in the PAM analysis, this study 
estimates deeper policy consequences of self-sufficiency and international trade policies on the 
rice sector at the macro level. The simulated estimations focus on the producer prices, consumer 
prices, domestic production, and rice imports under the self-sufficiency and free trade scenarios. 
From the self-sufficiency scenario, we then measure the subsidy, production factor, and 
technological efficiency requirements. From these measures, the government revenue or losses 
can also be identified and estimated. As the government recently decided to pursue self-
sufficiency through removing bilateral rice trade, the impact of the self-sufficiency strategy has 
become extremely important to be determined which could provide a useful perspective for the 
government and policymakers in rice policy decisions. This study utilizes a partial, spatial 
equilibrium model, developed by Durand-Morat and Wailes (2010) that is based upon a spatial 
price equilibrium model specified by Takayama and Judge (1964). The model is identified as a 
spatial partial equilibrium of the global rice economy which simulates the behavior of the entire 
rice supply chain, from input markets to final consumption in multiple regions.  
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4.3 Evaluations and Analysis of International Trade on Farm-Household  
The price estimations from the RICEFLOW simulation analysis are then applied at the 
micro level to measure the impact of rice policy to individual rice farmers at the household level, 
since farmers play an important role in achieving the rice policy goal. In addition, rice policy has 
aimed to improve livelihood and welfare, and to alleviate poverty among rice farmers for 
decades, thus determining the impact of rice policy at the farm household level is crucial. This 
study measures the impact of free trade policy on rice farmers. Although Malaysia actively 
participates in free trade agreements at both bilateral and regional levels, rice has been excluded 
from the agreements as it is identified and classified as a sensitive commodity. The government 
stance has been to favor rice farmers on an individual level without consideration being given 
how the policy affects the economy as a whole. On a purely theoretical level, free trade does hurt 
local rice farmers, yet, the magnitude of the impact requires a comprehensive study so that the 
effects can be quantitatively measured. This study develops a farm-household model for the 
individual rice farmers in Malaysia to measure the effects of the free trade on rice farmers with 
respect to poverty and welfare.  
The three studies are organized to begin with: 1) the evaluation at the production level 
through evaluating the protectionist rice production policy in Chapter II, 2) the impact of self-
sufficiency and international trade policies at the national level in Chapter III, and 3) the impact 
of international trade policies at the farm household level in Chapter IV.  The policy implications 
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Appendix Table 1.1: Current rice subsidy and policy programs in Malaysia. 
Policy Program Description 
Agricultural 
Input  
Fertilizer subsidy of Federal 
Government Scheme 
4 bags/ ha @ 20 kg/bag of Urea 
12 bags/ha @ 20 kg/bag of Compound (NPK) 
Paddy production incentive of 
additional fertilizer 
5 bags/ha @ 20 kg/bag of Organic, or 
6 bottle/ha @ 1 liter/bottle of Foliar 
Rice production incentive for 
National Food Security Policy 
Additional NPK: 6 bags/ha/season; 25 kg/bag 
Pesticides: RM200/ha/season 
Chemical: 3 Mt/ha (Once in 3 years) 
Paddy seed incentive 
RM 1.03/kg (Paddy seed producers receive the 
value for supplying rice seeds) 
Labor  
Paddy production incentive 
(plowing) 
 
RM 100/ha (Farmers receive the value for 




Paddy price subsidy 
RM 1,200/Mt (Farmers are paid at a producer 
price support) 
 
Paddy production subsidy 
 
RM300/Mt (Farmers receives the value from 
output production) 
Yield increase incentive 
RM 650/Mt (Farmers receive the value for 
yield increase) 
Consumption Rice subsidy 
 




ASEAN Trade in Goods 
Agreement (ATIGA) 
20% ad valorem tariff of rice imports from 
most favored nations (MFN) 
 
Agreement on Agriculture9 (AoA) 
of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) 
40% ad valorem tariff of rice import 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Agro-based Industry, Malaysia; Ministry of International 




                                                     
9 The Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) was negotiated during the Uruguay Round of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and entered into force with the establishment of the WTO on 









Despite having exerted distorting effects on not only rice markets, but also production 
input and factors markets, protectionist policies remain the most favored government’s policy 
strategy in Malaysian rice industry. A wide range of policy programs have been mandated, which 
mainly embrace input and output subsidies, and producer support price in line with the self-
sufficiency goal. Despite its small contribution to the national income, rice receives special 
attention and has been given a priority in series of the national development policies and 
resources due to a crucial and sensitive political issue to maintain rice farmers’ livelihoods and 
welfare. Using the policy analysis matrix approach, this study measures the extent to which rice 
policies have distorted domestic markets and the impacts of the interventionist policies on rice 
production in Malaysia. The results reveal that without domestic supports, rice production is 
significantly unprofitable. Despite having been protected by the government, the rice production 
system is not competitive, and the protectionist strategy leads to policy distortions. Relative to 
rice imports, domestic rice has no comparative advantage since the imported rice indicates much 
lower at the comparable world price. Therefore, the government’s interventionist policy 
instruments significantly have failed to drive competitiveness in the rice sector. In fact, policy 
distortions would induce unnecessary efficiency losses to realize the national self-sufficiency 
goal. Hence, the government policies should focus on the economic development at the macro 
level instead of stimulating policies to highly subsidize the rice economy. This study provides 
key measures of the effects of rice policies on the Malaysian rice production system that could be 
a guideline for policy decisions.  
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1.  Introduction  
While having no clear comparative advantage in rice production, Malaysia has continued 
supporting domestic rice primarily due to long-held policy objectives – to increase local farmers’ 
livelihoods and to address food security concerns, which subsequently tend to realize the national 
self-sufficiency goal. A wide range of policy programs, especially at the level of production have 
been implemented to constantly support the rice industry, which mainly includes subsidy 
provisions of both inputs and outputs, farm infrastructures (including irrigation and water 
systems) and maintenance, and credit facilities using substantial public investment. As a result, 
rice has become a highly subsidized and protected food crop in Malaysia. In fact, rice is given a 
priority in the series of the national development policies and the government’s funds for many 
years. However, the competitiveness of the rice industry and the efficiency of policy programs 
have been debated since the domestic production indicates a stagnant performance over many 
years, while use of subsidies has become the most favored policy strategy in national rice policy.  
Currently, over half of the rice production cost is subsidized by the government which 
includes the majority of input costs for seeds, fertilizers, chemicals, and pesticides. For instance, 
fertilizer subsidies were 63.7% or RM 1.2 billion (US$ 300 million) from the total RM 1.9 
billion (US$ 475 million) subsidy and incentive spending on rice farmers in 2016 (Mstar, 2016). 
Other subsidies include supports for production output and producer price. A projection showed 
that the elimination of producer price subsidies would negatively affect the local rice industry, on 
average decrease domestic production by 13%, decrease cultivated area by 13%, and reduce 
producer price by 20%, yet demonstrated no impacts on rice consumption because imports are 
allowed to fill the gap (Suleiman et al., 2014). The current producer price is highly protected and 
regulated above the world price to encourage rice farmers to boost their output as domestic rice 
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sector has not been able to compete in an open market (Mohamed Arshad et al., 2007). The 
government also regards the subsidy programs as a crucial and sensitive political issue to 
maintain support of the rural sector since poverty is relatively high among rice farmers who 
mostly are Malays (Mohamad Arshad and Mohayidin, 1990).  
In spite of government efforts to achieve a high degree of rice self-sufficiency, over the 
past several decades, rice production can only satisfy between 65% and 70% of domestic 
consumption each year. Several studies have found that the unfavorable outcomes stemmed from 
inefficient policy strategies due to the emphasis on self-sufficiency. Although studies also 
suggested significant positive effects of fertilizer subsidies on rice production, a substantial 
amount of subsidies would be reflected in costly use of tax payers’ dollars and higher 
consumers’ prices, yet since domestic production has been dormant for years, elimination of 
subsidies could potentially increase the economic net welfare and government revenues 
(Vengedasalam et al., 2011). Malaysia has practiced a price support policy in the rice sector 
since 1949, perhaps due to colonial roots, to purportedly guarantee the welfare of both rice 
farmers and consumers, claiming that this offers a fair price to both sides. The domestic producer 
price has recently increased to RM 1,200 (US$ 300) per metric ton paddy basis while the current 
world market rice price was US$ 280 per metric ton (United Nation, 2016). Despite having 
shown positive impacts to self-sufficiency, food security, and production sustainability, the 
producer price subsidy led to losses for the government (Mustapha, 1998). In addition, the Public 
Accounts Committee of Malaysia (PAC) reported significant difficulties administering the most 
recent subsidy, which were misappropriated during the reimbursement process to the appointed 
private vendors due to the management and supervisory deficiencies that resulted in a 
discrepancy in government accounts (Berita Harian, 2016).  
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Given those shortcomings, why does the government continue subsidizing rice farmers? 
Although the government is often motivated to provide production subsidies for farmers’ 
livelihoods and welfare, it is possible that subsidies, which are supposed to be an economic 
effort, have been inappropriately abused and misused by interest groups and those seeking 
patronage, thus turning them into a political tool. It has been argued that, using taxpayers’ 
dollars, the subsidies acted as an ‘exchange’ for political votes, hence rice in Malaysia becomes a 
political commodity. Often, monolithic political interests intrude on policy decisions, causing the 
government to constantly intervene in the rice domestic rice industry. This study evaluates and 
analyzes the impact of government protectionist policy on the rice sector and industry in 
Malaysia.  The specific objectives are: 1) to measure the profitability of rice production at a 
private and social level of production costs; 2) to measure the competitiveness and efficiency that 
are reflected in policy transfer; and 3) to provide useful economic perspectives to the government 
and policymakers.  
 
2. Theoretical Framework of Interventionist Policies 
Government intervention, mainly subsidy and trade barriers have affected input and 
output prices that causes domestic prices to differ from international market prices. The 
interventionist policies drive a wedge between the world and the domestic price, restrict imports, 
and thus raise the domestic price above the world price. Either of those policies are intended to 
support producers, a subsidy and trade barrier transfer costs to consumers and the government 
resulting in welfare losses. The price changes would create policy distortions in some ways: 1) 
the quantities of the commodity that are produced, consumed, and traded (imported or exported), 
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2) the income transfers to/from producers, consumers, and the government budget, and 3) the 
efficiency losses in production and consumption.  
The graphical description of input subsidy policy implication is shown in Figure 2.610. 
This figure indicates that the market price for rice (P1) shifts down from the equilibrium price 
(Po), Po to P1, which implies consumers pay a lower price when production inputs are being 
subsidized, thus encouraging farmers to produce more outputs. Both farmers and consumers are 
better off from the input subsidy as both producer and consumer surpluses increase. Change in 
producer surplus is a gain of area a and b. Change in consumer surplus is a gain of c, d, and e. 
The total cost of subsidy is area a, b, c, d, e, and f, while f indicates the deadweight loss. The 
subsidy leads to a net economic loss to the country and an income transfer from taxpayers to 
consumers and producers. The government loses from the input subsidy policy, paying the input 






     
 
              
 
     
     Figure 2.6: Welfare effects of domestic production subsidies. 
                                                     
10 The graph does not follow the exact scale and coordinate, and therefore the affected areas do 




















A producer price support policy raises the producer price (P1) above the original market 
equilibrium price. This figure implies that consumers pay for the price support. The consumers 
surplus loss is the area below the demand curve and between P and P1 (a + b). The producer 
surplus gain is the area above the supply curve between the P and P1 (a, b and c). The surplus 
production Q2 – Q1 has a market value where Q2 intersects the demand curve. However, if the 
government pays for the price support then the market price will fall where the Q intersects the 
demand curve benefitting consumers. The government loses from the guaranteed producer price 
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3.  Data and Method 
3.1 Data Integration 
This study utilizes secondary data from the government reports and databases from 
various institutions which include production budgets for rice and import prices. The production 
budgets were obtained from the annual reports by the Malaysian Department of Agriculture 
(DOA) and Farmers’ Organization Authority (LPP) in production years 2014 and 2015. These 
production budgets were obtained for the major rice producing regions in Peninsular Malaysia, 
which are the largest rice subsidy recipients and are highly regulated by the government. 
Therefore, the costs and revenues data from these regions are considered the most accurate 
sources to be analyzed and thus represent the observed data for the effect of policy transfer 
analysis in the Malaysian rice production system. The CIF (cost, insurance, and freight) and the 
FOB (free on board) prices are obtained from the Malaysian Department of Statistics (DOSM) 
and the United Nation Comtrade database for 2014/15 marketing year. These prices are used to 
estimate the world comparable price at social level. The transportation, handling, and distribution 
costs of rice imports are obtained from BERNAS, the solely rice importer. With these data, both 
private and social valuations can be estimated.  
3.2 Policy Analysis Matrix 
To estimate private profits, social profits, and the effects of divergences, the principal 
analysis of this study employs the policy analysis matrix (PAM) approach which can also 
measure the competitiveness and the efficiency of rice production in Malaysia. PAM which was 
developed by Monke and Pearson (1989), is widely used and recognized as a useful method to 
analyze the impact of government policy on the profitability of agricultural systems and on the 
efficiency of resource use (see example: Yao, 1997; Ekasingh et al., 2000; Elbadawi et al, 2013; 
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Ude et al, 2013; Kanaka and Chinnadurai, 2013; Akramov and Malek, 2012; Basavaraj et al., 
2013; Dibrova and Chan-khi, 2013; Mamza et al., 2014; Mantau et al., 2014; Pearson et al., 
2003; Rae and Kasryno, 1993; Martinez et al., 2008; Olowa, 2014; Zheng et al., 2013; Khai and 
Yabe, 2013). PAM can also identify the effects of efficiency of interventionist policy which 
incurs any efficiency losses associated with a distorting policy. PAM is a quantitative economic 
analysis which utilizes a budget-based method, and thus allows one to evaluate and analyze 
development projects of public investments which stimulate the government policy programs in 
the agricultural sector (Monke and Pearson 1989; Gotsch et al., 2003). The production budgets 
are initially valued to further measure private and social profitability of a production system. 
Private budgets are based on current market prices paid and received by farmers, while social 
budgets are based on social prices that account for government policy programs that affect the 
market prices due to subsidies or taxes. “PAM approach to agricultural policy analysis can 
provide decision-makers and analysts with both a helpful conceptual construct for understanding 
the effects of policy and a useful technique for measuring the magnitudes of policy transfers” 
(Monke and Pearson, 1989). 
PAM has two major parameter identities: 1) profitability and 2) divergence, which are 
measured across the matrix. Profits are defined as the difference between total (per unit) sales 
revenues and costs of production. They are measured at two different prices – private and social 
prices. The revenues represent the receipts that producers received from a production system, 
while production costs are the expenditure of the tradable intermediate inputs (i.e. fertilizer, 
pesticides, seed, transportation, etc.) and factors of production (i.e. labor and land). The 
divergence is estimated as the difference in revenues and costs between private and social prices, 
which then implies the effects of distorting policies and market failures. The analysis which 
34 
 
utilizes an accounting matrix procedure also measures the extent of transfers that affected by the 
set of implemented policies and the inherent economic efficiency of a production system. Table 
2.2 shows the structure of PAM and how parameters are measured. 
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Source: Monke and Pearson (1989). 
where   𝑝𝑛  and 𝑞𝑛 denotes price and quantity of output for commodity 𝑛,  𝑝𝑖 and 𝑞𝑖 is price and 
quantity of tradable inputs per unit,  𝑤𝑗 is price of domestic factor 𝑗, 𝑙𝑗 is quantity of 𝑗 per unit of 
output, a superscript 𝐷 indicates the observed values under private prices, a superscript 𝑆 
indicates the observed values under social prices, and 𝑡 is production year. 
 
 
3.2.1 Private Profitability 
The determination of private profit requires data of the actual or observed revenues and 
costs involved in a particular production system given current technologies and policies. The 
private, or actual market prices thus incorporate the underlying economic costs and valuations 
and the effects of all policies and market failures (Monke and Pearson, 1989). Private entries (the 
first row of the matrix) measures the competitiveness of the production system. The estimation 
of private profit (D) can be quantified as: 
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𝜋𝐷 =  (𝑝𝑛𝑡
𝐷  𝑞𝑛𝑡








]                              [1] 
A negative private profit implies producers receive a deficient rate of return and thus the 
production system is not competitive while a positive profit indicates reasonable returns and 
have a potential for business expansion. 
3.2.2 Social Profitability 
Social profits are measured from social prices which indicate the comparative advantage 
(efficiency) measures of the agricultural commodity system while the efficient outcomes are 
achieved when an economy’s resources are used in activities that create the highest levels of 
output and income. The profits are also the measure of efficiency because both outputs and 
inputs are valued in prices that reflect scarcity values or social opportunity costs (Monke and 
Pearson, 1989). The social profits (H) is estimated as: 
𝜋𝑆 =  (𝑝𝑛𝑡
𝑆  𝑞𝑛








]                                  [2] 
Social price is referred to as a border price of a tradable commodity. This indicates the 
price that exporters would deliver the commodity to a domestic market or the price that 
importers would pay to obtain a commodity to their markets. The comparable world price is the 
most accurate measure for the social opportunity cost of an imported commodity. For an 
importable good, the import price implies the opportunity cost of obtaining an additional unit to 
satisfy a country’s domestic demand.   
36 
 
The choice of social prices has a significant impact on the estimation of the analysis that 
reflects social opportunity costs. Social prices are difficult to attain since the actual world prices 
may not reflect the impacts of the domestic country’s market power. In the absence of actual 
imports or exports of the domestically produced commodity, world price equivalents must be 
estimated. To be correctly equivalent, the prices must consider the effects of international 
transport costs and the differences of quality in a commodity.  
Comparative advantage that determines the ability of an agricultural system to compete 
without distorting government policies can be strengthened or eroded measures the shifts in a 
system's competitiveness that occur over time because of changes in economic parameters 
especially long-run world prices of tradable outputs and inputs, social opportunity costs of 
domestic factors of production (labor, capital, and land), and production technologies used in 
farming or marketing (Monke and Pearson, 1989). Subsequently, the measure of social prices has 
significant impacts on the analysis, and the valuation entails calculation of world price 
equivalents for the domestic product.  
 
3.2.3 Effects of Divergence 
 
Divergence is the second identity of analysis that represents the differences between 
private and social parameters (revenues, costs, and profits). It is vertically measured in the matrix 
and the values describe any divergences between the private price and the estimated social price 
must be explained by the effects of policy or by the existence of market failures. The effects of 
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where 𝛼 is the effects of divergence of output (output transfer), 𝛽 is the effects of divergence of 
tradable inputs (tradable input transfer), 𝛾 is the effects of divergence of domestic factors (factor 
transfer), and 𝛿 is the total divergence effects (net transfers).  
 
3.2.4 Analysis of Policy Transfers 
From the results of both profit and divergence identities, the analysis can be extended 
which allows the estimation of policy transfer which can indicate whether a farming or 
production system satisfies agricultural policy parameters competitively and effectively. The 
estimations are the nominal protection coefficient output (NPCO), nominal protection coefficient 
of tradable input (NPCI), domestic resource cost (DRC), effective protection coefficient (EPC), 






Nominal Protection Coefficient Output (NPCO): 
 
𝑁𝑃𝐶𝑂 =
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
=
∑ 𝑝𝑛𝑡




𝑆                      [8] 
  
The 𝑁𝑃𝐶𝑂 is the ratio of the domestic market price of a product to its social price at a 
farm-gate. A value greater than one (𝑁𝑃𝐶𝑂 > 1) indicates implicit a nominal protection or 
subsidy, and the value less than one (𝑁𝑃𝐶𝑂 < 1) implicit nominal tax.  
 
Nominal Protection Coefficient of Tradable Input (NPCI): 
 
𝑁𝑃𝐶𝐼 =
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠  








𝑖   
               [9] 
 
The 𝑁𝑃𝐶𝐼 is the ratio of the private to the social values of all the tradable inputs (seed, 
fertilizers, herbicides, pesticides). A 𝑁𝑃𝐶𝐼 ratio greater than one (𝑁𝑃𝐶𝐼 > 1) indicates that 
producers are taxed for the inputs and 𝑁𝑃𝐶𝐼 less than 1 (𝑁𝑃𝐶𝑂 < 1) indicates inputs are 
subsidized. Both 𝑁𝑃𝐶𝑂 and 𝑁𝑃𝐶𝐼 imply distortions of government policy in a production 
system.  
 
Effective Protection Coefficient (EPC): 
 
𝐸𝑃𝐶 =
(𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 − 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠) 𝑖𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠
(𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 − 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠) 𝑖𝑛 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠
=  
𝑝𝑛𝑡









    [10] 
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The 𝐸𝑃𝐶 measures the degree of policy transfer from product market-output and 
tradable-input policies. The coefficient represents the value added in private prices to value 
added in social prices, which indicates the combined divergences on outputs and tradable inputs. 
An 𝐸𝑃𝐶 greater than 1 (𝐸𝑃𝐶 > 1) indicates positive protection of value added and the EPC less 
than 1 (𝐸𝑃𝐶 < 1) indicates the effective taxation of value added by producers. The EPC equal to 
one implies neither intervention nor impact of distortions in both the input and product markets, 
which results in a neutral effect on value-added. 
 
Domestic Resource Cost (DRC):  
 
𝐷𝑅𝐶 =
(𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡) 𝑖𝑛 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠












                                        [11] 
 
The 𝐷𝑅𝐶 ratio measures the social costs of a domestic resources relative to social profits. 
A ratio greater than one (𝐷𝑅𝐶 > 1) implies a production system is not competitive and not 
desirable relative to the social prices. The ratio smaller than one (𝐷𝑅𝐶 < 1) indicates the 
production system is socially desirable and competitive. The 𝐷𝑅𝐶 is an important indicator to 
determine comparative advantage of a particular commodity. The lower value of 𝐷𝑅𝐶 indicates a 
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𝑆          [12] 
 
𝑆𝑅𝑃 measures the extent of subsidy in a production system. The ratio addresses the same 
measure as a proportion of the total social value of the system output as it measures the net 
transfer to the production system as a proportion of the total social income. A higher ratio of 
𝑆𝑅𝑃 indicates a subsidized and an uncompetitive system. 
 
4.  Empirical Results and Discussions 
Prior to the analysis, the quantity of input and output, private prices, and social prices of 
rice production system (see Appendix Table 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3) are established to construct the 
private and social budgets. After estimating private and social budgets, we can measure the 
private and social profits as well as the effect of divergences for rice production in Malaysia. 
 
4.1 Private Profits  
Using private prices and the physical quantity of inputs and outputs, we can examine the 
production budget at private values (i.e. observed values) which presents revenue and 
expenditure for the rice production system. This private budget represents the revenue and 
production costs for rice per hectare using the direct-seeded approach of irrigated lowland rice 
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farms in major producing areas in Malaysia11. At the private price, all domestic support policies 
are applied, and thus each subsidy and producer price support are explicitly presented. From the 
production budget, total subsidies account for 59.1% of the total rice production cost (per 
hectare), which implies that rice in Malaysia is heavily subsidized at farm level. These subsidies 
are applied to a range of subsidy policy programs, the majority of which include production 
inputs – seed, fertilizers, chemicals – while the rest are applied to wages and the output price 
incentives. 
The current subsidies at farm level are provided in physical products, monetary form 
(direct payment), and farm infrastructure payments (water, drainage, and irrigation systems and 
maintenance). From the total rice production cost of RM 4,349.8 (per hectare), these subsidies 
are valued and account for RM 2,571.3 (per hectare) which encompass fertilizers (RM 1,772.0), 
pesticide (RM 200.0), labor (RM 100.0), other chemicals (RM 250). The revenue is estimated 
using the producer price at RM 1,200 (per metric ton) in paddy basis12. With the total production 
cost accounting for 86% of the total revenue, and at a 4.2 crop yield on average, indicates a profit 
of RM 703.36 (per hectare) at private price level (Table 2.3). 







Subsidy: seed price RM 1.03/kg  154.50    
Fertilizers:    1,772.00  
Subsidy: Urea   92.00    
Subsidy: NPK   312.00   
Subsidy: Organic or  120.60   
Subsidy: Foliar   122.40   
                                                     
11 Relative to upland rice, irrigated or wetland rice farm is the largest planted area in Malaysia, 
and direct-seeded planting approach remains the most common practice and approach since the 
transplanting is a costlier method. 
12 Paddy basis is defined as dried and cleaned paddy and measured at the storage moisture 
content (MC) (IRRI). 
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Table 2.3 (Cont.) 
 
 
Input-Output Items Costs (RM) Total (RM) 
Tradable Inputs 
Subsidy: GML   720.00   
Subsidy: Additional NPK   405.00    
Chemicals:    709.80  
Herbicide  314.00    
Insecticide  260.80    
Fungicide  117.00    
Pesticide  18.00    
Subsidy pesticide (direct payment)   200.00    









Labor: 1,928.00 1,928.00 
Subsidy: GML (Direct payment)  250.00    
Subsidy: plowing (Direct payment)  100.00    
Capital:    1,502.04  
Tractor services   300.00    




Total Revenue     5,053.20  
Total Cost  
 
 4,349.84  
Net Profit     703.36  




4.2 Social Profits  
Social price is more complex to estimate in constructing a policy analysis matrix because 
it must be estimated from other economic data and cannot be not directly observed as is the 
private price. According to Monke and Pearson, world prices are the most accurate indicators of 
social valuation for tradable commodities since the prices represent social opportunity costs for 
the domestically produced commodity (Monke and Pearson, 1989). In addition, the choice of the 
social price of rice depends on the assessments of grain classifications, rice grades, and the 
propensity that the commodity will continue to be traded. Therefore, a price adjustment using a 
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world price equivalent that includes international transportation and handling costs is required. 
Since rice is a tradable output with the largest current rice imports by Malaysia is the Vietnamese 
long grain white rice (10% broken) relative to other exporting regions, grain classifications, and 
rice grades, this import price of rice is considered to be the best equivalent to the Malaysian long 
grain white rice (10% broken. Therefore, the import parity price for the Vietnamese white rice, 
which is equivalent to the farm gate price, is the most accurate for social valuation.  
Using the CIF import price of Vietnamese long grain white rice in the marketing year 
2013/14, which was recorded at US$ 464.84 per metric ton (Department of Statistics, Malaysia), 
the social valuation process also requires the transportation and handling costs (including price 
margins) from ports to milling plants, distribution centers, and farms, so that the equivalent farm 
gate price can be accurately estimated. The transportation and handling costs of long grain white 
rice (10% broken) from Malaysian ports to rice farms are estimated at RM 150 (per metric ton) 
(BERNAS). Using the average conversion factor for Malaysian rice at 65% (from paddy form to 
milled basis) (BERNAS) and the average currency exchange rate at RM 3.50 (US$ 1) in 
2013/2014 (IMF), to be consistent with the price data timeline, the import parity value is 
estimated at RM 943 per metric ton or RM 0.943 per Kg (Table 2.4). This value is then applied 
as the producer price to estimate the social profits in the production budget of the social 
valuation. 
Table 2.4: Import parity value of long grain white rice in Malaysia. 
Adjustment of International Prices Long Grain White 
C.i.f. Malaysia (US$/Mt)  464.840  
Exchange rate (MYR/USD)  3.500  
C.i.f. Malaysia in domestic currency per Mt (RM/Mt)  1,626.940  
Weight conversion factor (Kg/Mt)  1,000.000  
C.i.f. Malaysia in domestic currency per Kg (RM/kg)  1.627  
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Table 2.4 (Cont.) 
 
Adjustment of International Prices Long Grain White 
Transportation and handling costs to distribution centers (RM/Kg)  0.100  
Value before processing (RM/Kg)  1.527  
Processing conversion factor (%)  0.650  
Import parity value (RM/Kg)  0.993  
Distribution costs to farms (RM/Kg)  0.050  
Import parity value at farm gate (RM/Kg)  0.943  
Source: DOSM; BERNAS; UN Comtrade Database. 
 
Using the equal physical input-output data (Appendix 2.1), and the estimated social 
prices of tradable inputs and domestic factors (Appendix 2.3), we can estimate the production 
budget of rice at social prices. The technology and resource supplies (including land rental and 
transportation services) are assumed to be constant, which implies equal crop yield in private 
production budgets. The social production budget for rice is presented in Table 2.5, which 
represents rice prices without any subsidy, accounting for the major differences between social 
and private prices. With the absence of subsidies for tradable inputs, domestic factors, and 
infrastructures, the price production cost at social prices is estimated at RM 6,953.2 (per hectare). 
The social revenue is measured at RM 3,968.91 (per hectare) using the import parity price at RM 
943/Mt and the average crop yield at 4.2 Mt/ha. With the tremendously high total production 
cost at social prices over the total revenue, the social budget indicates a high loss at RM 2,984.3 
(per hectare). As rice proves to be very costly to grow in Malaysia, removing subsidies at the 
production level would lead to significant losses for local rice farmers. This result also suggests 





Table 2.5: Social budget (in local currency RM) for rice production in Malaysia. 
Input-Output Item Costs (RM) Total (RM) 
Tradable Input 
Fertilizers:   1,649.60 
Urea  92.00   
NPK  312.00   
Organic or 120.60   
Foliar  122.40   
GML  720.00   
Additional NPK  405.00   
Chemicals:   909.80 
Herbicide 314.00   
Insecticide 260.80   
Fungicide 117.00  







Labor 2,278.00 2,278.00 
Capital:  1,502.04 
Tractor services 300  
Land rental 1,202.04  
Revenue 
Total Revenue  3,968.91 
Total Cost  6,953.24 
Net Loss  (2,984.33) 
Source: Results are measured using import parity price. 
 
4.3 Policy Analysis Matrix  
 
The empirical analysis of the policy analysis matrix is the principal result in this study, 
which measures the effects of divergence between private and social valuations as presented in 
Table 2.6. Both private and social estimates from the production budgets are used to construct 
the matrix, allowing analysis of the competitiveness and efficiency of rice production in 




Table 2.6: Policy analysis matrix of rice production system in Malaysia. 







Labor Land Capital 
 




3,968.9 2,923.9 2,278.0 1,202.0 300.0 (2,735.0) 




The divergences between private and social revenues indicate RM 1,084.3. This positive 
value implies that the producer price policy for domestic rice appears higher than the world 
price. In addition, this policy raises private prices which leads to a private revenue 21.5% greater 
than social revenue. The net transfer, the sum of all divergences that cause private profits to 
differ from social profits, is estimated at RM 3,438.4. With social profits having negative value, 
the policy transfers of the illustrated rice production system in Malaysia is the result of distorting 
policy. The positive profits, which indicate positive policy transfers imply that the government is 
providing support to the domestic rice production system. Because social losses that amount to 
RM -2,735.0 (per hectare), rice in Malaysia could not be profitably produced without any 
support to policy transfers. “The negative social profit indicates the country is wasting resources 
by allowing inefficient production, which occurs because of distorting policies” (Monke and 
Pearson, 1989). The net transfer of RM 3,438.4, raise the profits received by farmers and millers 
from RM -2,735.0 to RM 703.4. With these results, rice is not competitive to produce in 
Malaysia relative to rice imports. In addition, rice is highly challenging to produce without any 
domestic support from the government. This analysis is extended to measure the policy transfers 
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in terms of the effects of the protective, competitive, and comparative advantage (efficiency) 
from the implemented rice policies in Malaysian rice production.  
 
4.4 Protectionist Policy Measures  
The previous analysis in PAM reveals that Malaysian rice production is highly protected, 
which leads to policy distortions. Table 2.7 presents the results of the policy analysis transfer 
from the protectionist rice policy in Malaysia using the nominal protection coefficient on output 
(NPCO), the nominal protection coefficient on input (NPCI), and the effective protection 
coefficient (EPC) measures. These results are measured from the equations [8], [9], and [10]. 
The NPCO allows a comparison between the production output of different prices at 
private and social levels. From the equation [8], the ratio of the private to social price of long 
grain white rice, the NPCO shows a value of 1.2732; the fact that this value is higher than one 
reveals that rice production output in Malaysia is highly protected. The current policies on the 
protective production output, which mainly refer to the imposition of import tariffs for rice trade 
coming from international markets, and the producer price support for local rice farmers to 
constantly maintain a value higher than the world rice prices by the government, allow outputs at 
private prices to be 27.3% higher than social prices (i.e. prices without the support policies). 
 
Table 2.7: The policy transfer analysis of protectionist rice policies in Malaysia.  
 Revenues Input Costs NPCO NPCI EPC 
Private Prices 5,053.20 919.80 
1.2732 0.3146 3.9554 Social Prices 3,968.91 2,923.90 
Effects of Divergences 1,084.29 (2,004.10) 




The NPCI measures the effects of distorting policies on tradable input costs in the rice 
production system. The coefficient indicates a positive transfer of 0.3146 with the input 
production costs are lowered by domestic subsidy support policies. This result implies that the 
domestic policies reduce the input costs by 68.5% from the social price, causing the input costs 
at private prices to be lower than social prices. Therefore, the input policies on domestic 
production for seed, fertilizer, and pesticide cause policy distortion in a production system. With 
the difference input costs of RM 2,004.1 (per hectare) which also refers to the current input 
subsidies, rice farmers have to pay RM 919.8 (per hectare) for the input costs, rather than RM 
2,923.9 (per hectare) with the absence of domestic support policies. 
The different effects of output and input protection policies can be simultaneously 
measured in the EPC coefficient. The EPC ratio of 3.95 represents the net impact of the input 
and output policies affecting the rice production system. This result implies that both output and 
input policies allow value added in private prices to be 295% higher than in social prices. The 
result of EPC reveals that the highly protected outputs and inputs lead to a distorted Malaysian 
rice production system.  
The analysis of protection policy transfer for rice production policies in Malaysia reveals 
that rice sector at farm level is highly distorted. Policy distortions in output and input markets are 
complex to reconcile with the pursuit of economic competitive objectives, such as the self-
sufficiency goal (Vousden, 1990). As the government’s decision is to achieve rice self-
sufficiency, both input and output policies are heterogeneously distorted. These distortions 
stimulate some unnecessary economic losses to achieve the goal of self-sufficiency. If the 
government removes trade barriers on rice imports allowing free trade, the producer price would 
decrease from the private to the social level. At this lower price, the country would increase rice 
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imports, decrease domestic production, and thus increase rice consumption. While rice import 
prices are cheaper, the status quo forces consumers to pay a higher price for rice due to high 
subsidization of domestic production. Hence, the protectionist policies lead the country to give 
up potential gains from international trade.  
 
4.5 Competitiveness and Efficiency Measures 
With the PAM results, we can analyze the level of competitiveness and comparative 
advantage which refers to the efficiency of the implemented rice policies. These measures are 
analyzed using the domestic resource cost (DRC), the subsidy ratio to producer (SRP), and the 
profitability coefficient (PC). These results are measured from the equations [11], [12], and [13], 
shown in Table 2.8.  
DRC is an important analysis which measures the efficiency of the entire a production 
system as it serves as a proxy measure for social profits. The DRC coefficient indicates a value 
greater than one (𝐷𝑅𝐶 > 1), 3.62, which demonstrates that Malaysia has no comparative 
advantage in domestic rice production. Lacking international competitiveness, which currently 
refers to the Vietnamese long grain white rice, the current protective rice policies are not 
efficient. With the government’s policies continuing to emphasize domestic rice production to 
achieve the self-sufficiency goal, mainly through largely subsidizing inputs and outputs, these 
interventions would cause a significant inefficiency to the whole system of rice production. 































Divergences 1,084.29 (2,004.10) (350.00) 3,438.39 
Source: Results are measured using PAM. 
SRP measures net transfers across different systems of production as it allows for the 
comparisons between policies which subsidize production systems, and gauges the 
disaggregation into component transfers to show the distinct effects of policies on output, input, 
and domestic factors. SRP shows a significantly high ratio at 0.8663 (close to one), meaning that 
the divergences have highly distorted by the policies, which also means that gross revenues of 
the production system are increased by 86.6%. This ratio shows the net transfers from 
divergences largely result from social revenues. The ratio also implies that if policies on tradable 
inputs and domestic factors are eliminated, the rice production system’s NPCO would have to be 
increased from 1.27 to 1.86 to maintain the same degree of private profit.  
4.6 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
The main purpose of sensitivity analysis is to examine the efficiency of policy transfers 
using the major analysis with changes in significant factors. Using the results of production 
inputs and crop yield effects from the international free trade policy at the farm-household level 
in Chapter IV, two scenarios are analyzed: 1) a decrease in production inputs by 16.2% and 2) a 
decrease in rice yield by 4.8%. The results of sensitivity analysis are presented in Table 2.9. In 
the first scenario, the DRC coefficient remains a value greater than one, 2.5061, which indicates 
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that domestic rice production remains inefficient with reduction of production inputs. The EPC 
shows a lower 2.00 ratio than the baseline which demonstrates both output and input policies still 
allow value added in private prices to be 100% higher than in social prices, yet it is less 
protective than the baseline. The SRP shows a significantly lower ratio from the baseline at 
0.4366, meaning that the divergences have still distorted by the policies, but in a lower degree, 
43.6%, after the reduction of production inputs. In the second scenario, the DRC, EPC, and SRP 
measures indicate that rice production system in Malaysia remains protective and inefficient 
policy transfers when the crop yield reduces by 4.8%. 
Table 2.9: Sensitivity analysis of policy analysis matrix. 
Scenario DRC EPC SRP 
Baseline Scenario 3.6172 3.9554 1.2732 
Decrease in production inputs by 16.2%  2.5061 2.0054 0.4366 
Decrease in rice yield by 4.8%  4.4674 2.6362 0.4601 
Source: Results are measured using PAM. 
 
 
5.  Conclusions  
The lack of competitiveness and comparative advantage of domestic rice production in 
Malaysia has been shown since the rice sector has been highly intervened, protected, and 
supported by the government for decades. A wide range of policy programs have been realized, 
most of which include input and output subsidies and regulated producer price with the goal 
being to achieve total self-sufficiency in rice. Although it barely contributes to the national 
income, rice still receives special attention and has been given priority in a series of the national 
development policies in Malaysia. While subsidies have been the most favored policy strategy 
for many years and have involved substantial public investment, the domestic rice outcomes 
remain stagnant and only satisfy between 60-65% of the growing demand each year. In fact, the 
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revised national rice policy provides additional input and output subsidies which burden 
government expenditure while the government seriously pursues self-sufficiency approach and 
aims to eliminate all rice imports in the near future. Therefore, it is crucial to evaluate and 
analyze the competitiveness and the efficiency of domestic rice production as well as the effects 
of policy transfer in the current Malaysian rice production system. 
This study applies the policy analysis matrix (PAM) to measure the competitiveness and 
comparative advantage of the rice sector in Malaysia. The data on a production level which 
represents the costs of production and revenues in major producing areas is utilized. Prior to the 
analysis, production budgets at private price and social price levels are established. Then, the 
costs and revenues from the production budgets are applied to the PAM analysis to measure the 
profitability and divergence effects at both price levels. Further, the analysis is extended to 
measure the effects of the policy transfer. Despite having received substantial efforts and 
attention by the government, especially through realizing various domestic support programs, 
rice production in Malaysia suffers from comparative advantage relative to rice imports. The key 
results indicate that rice policy in Malaysia is highly distorted, as number of policy programs, 
that include subsidies, incentives, and price supports have raised private revenues and profits, 
and thus lead to socially unprofitable rice production. In addition, the protection measures also 
imply that the current policies are reducing the actual input costs while increasing the revenue 
through subsidizing inputs and imposing higher domestic prices than market prices. The effects 
of the divergences indicate that average rice farms generate a relatively low profit at private 
prices while producing losses at social prices when the opportunity costs of all the domestic 
factors involved in rice production are employed. The divergence is caused by government 
policies that distort the pattern of production, moving it away from the most efficient use of 
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domestic resources and international trading opportunities. The competitiveness analysis proves 
that the government’s decision in pursuing self-sufficiency through highly protecting the 
domestic rice industry lead to significant market failures since the international rice price 
(Vietnamese long grain white rice) is lower than local rice.   
The government’s interventionist policy instruments significantly failed to drive 
competitiveness in the Malaysian rice sector, hence leading to policy distortions. These 
distortions induce unnecessary efficiency losses to realize the national self-sufficiency goal. The 
government usually enacts distorting policies to favor particular interest groups, consciously 
trading off the consequent efficiency losses against their perception of such non-efficiency gains 
as changes in income distribution and improvement in the country’s ability to feed its nation. 
With implementing protectionist policy, the government does not only distort the rice market, 
but also each agricultural input market which include seed, fertilizer, pesticide, and other 
chemicals.  As rice in Malaysia is mostly operated by small farmers, it would be highly 
challenging to become a competitive industry and would require significant financial support by 
the government. This study provides key measures of the effects of rice policies on the 
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Appendix Table 2.1: Physical input and output of rice production system in Malaysia. 
























Seed (kg) 150.0 
Fertilizers:   
Urea (kg) 80.0 
NPK (kg) 240.0 
Organic (kg) or 100.0 
Foliar (liter) 6.0 
Ground Magnesium Limestone (GML) (mt)  3.0 
Additional NPK (kg) 150.0 
Chemicals:   
Herbicide   
Basta (Liter) 4.0 
Clincher (mililiter) 500.0 
Sindex (gram) 1,000.0 
Insecticide   
Evisect (kg) 1.0 
Confidor (mililiter) 500.0 
Actara (gram) 600.0 
Fungicide   
Score 250L (mililiter) 250.0 
Fujicone (liter) 1.0 
Pesticide   
Matikus (kg) 18.0 
Irrigation and drainage (M3) 277.0 
Soil fertility - GML (RM/ha) 250.0 
Rice straw cleaning (RM/ha) 78.0 
Plowing (RM/ha) 220.0 
Irrigation and drainage (RM/ha) 150.0 
Rice-field mice control (RM/ha) 20.0 
Weed control (before planting) (RM/ha) 50.0 
Seed sowing (RM/ha) 50.0 
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Replanting (RM/ha) 80.0 
Preparing working tracks (RM/ha) 80.0 
Pest and disease control (RM/ha) 150.0 
Fertilizing (RM/ha) 200.0 
Weedy rice control (RM/ha) 300.0 
Harvesting (RM/ha) 500.0 
Capital:   
Tractor services (RM/ha) 300.0 
Land (ha) 1.0 
Output Yield (paddy basis, dried and cleaned) (Mt/ha) 4.21 




















Appendix Table 2.2: Private prices of rice production system in Malaysia. 
























Certified seeds (kg) 1.40 
Fertilizer:    
Urea (kg) 0.00 
NPK (kg) 0.00 
Organic (kg) or 0.00 
Foliar (liter) 0.00 
Ground Magnesium Limestone (GML) (mt)  0.00 
Additional NPK (kg) 0.00 
Chemicals:   
Herbicide:   
Basta (Liter) 32.50 
Clincher (mililiter) 0.21 
Sindex (gram) 0.08 
Insecticide:   
Evisect (kg) 70.00 
Confidor (mililiter) 0.21 
Actara (gram) 0.14 
Fungicide:   
Score 250L (mililiter) 68.00 
Fujicone (liter) 49.00 
Pesticide:   
Matikus (kg) 18.00 
Irrigation (M3) 0.00 












Labor:   
Soil fertility - GML (RM/ha) 0.00 
Rice straw cleaning (RM/ha) 78.00 
Plowing (RM/ha) 120.00 
Irrigation and drainage (RM/ha) 150.00 
Rice-field mice control (RM/ha) 20.00 
Weed control (before planting) (RM/ha) 50.00 
Seed sowing (RM/ha) 50.00 
Weed control (after planting) (RM/ha) 150.00 
Replanting (RM/ha) 80.00 
Preparing working track (RM/ha) 80.00 
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Fertilizing (RM/ha) 200.00 
Weedy rice control (RM/ha) 300.00 
Harvesting (RM/ha) 500.00 
Capital:   
Tractor services (RM/ha) 300.00 
Land rental (RM/ha) 1,202.04 
Output 
Producer price support policy (paddy basis; 
dried and cleaned) (RM/Mt) 1,200.00 
























Appendix Table 2.3: Social prices of rice production system in Malaysia. 
























Seed (RM/kg)  2.43  
Fertilizer:   
Urea (kg)  1.15  
NPK (kg)  2.26  
Organic (kg) or  1.21  
Foliar (liter)  20.40  
Ground Magnesium Limestone (GML) (mt)   240.00  
Additional NPK (kg)  2.70  
Chemicals:   
Herbicide:   
Basta (Liter)  32.50  
Clincher (mililiter)  0.21  
Sindex (gram)  0.08  
Insecticide:   
Evisect (kg)  70.00  
Confidor (mililiter)  0.21  
Actara (gram)  0.14  
Fungicide:   
Score 250L (mililiter)  68.00  
Fujicone (liter)  49.00  
Pesticide:   
Matikus (kg)  18.00  
Irrigation and drainage (M3)  0.90  













Labor:   
Soil fertility - GML (RM/ha)  250.00  
Rice straw cleaning (RM/ha)  78.00  
Plowing (RM/ha)  220.00  
Irrigation and drainage (RM/ha)  150.00  
Rice-field mice control (RM/ha)  20.00  
Weed control (before planting) (RM/ha)  50.00  
Seed sowing (RM/ha)  50.00  
Weed control (after planting) (RM/ha)  150.00  
Replanting (RM/ha)  80.00  
Preparing working track (RM/ha)  80.00  
Pest and disease control (RM/ha)  150.00  
Fertilizing (RM/ha)  200.00  
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Input-Output Items RM/Unit/Ha 
  
  




Weedy rice control (RM/ha)  300.00  
Harvesting (RM/ha)  500.00  
Capital:   
Tractor services (RM/ha)  300.00  
Land rental (RM/ha)  1,202.04  
Output Import parity value at farm gate (RM/Mt)  942.51  

























Chapter III  
Self-sufficiency and International Trade Policies on Rice Sector in Malaysia: Approaches 
to Food Security using Partial Equilibrium Analysis 
 
Abstract 
While much evidence shows self-sufficiency is not an efficient policy strategy to address 
food security concerns as well as poverty alleviation, Malaysia is following a self-sufficiency 
strategy in its primary staple, rice. This study evaluates and analyzes the impact of two 
alternative approaches to achieve food security, namely, pursuing rice self-sufficiency, and 
allowing free trade in rice. The results indicate that even though Malaysia could achieve self-
sufficiency in rice, consumers are worse off, since consumer rice prices increase sharply. On the 
other hand, rice producers are better off due to higher producer prices and domestic production. 
The government welfare worsens from the self-sufficiency policy due to massive requirements 
on additional subsidies and the loss of import tariff revenues. Free trade results in lower 
consumer prices and greater rice consumption, thus favoring consumer welfare. Producer welfare 
worsens due to higher import competition and lower producer prices. With a long-held food 
security rationale, rice self-sufficiency neither guarantees nor promises food security in 
Malaysia. Pursuing self-sufficiency would effectively punish consumers, and even the 
government loses from the policy. Otherwise, self-sufficiency could also be a political strategy in 
political economic environment to become an independent region without relying on external 
food sources. This study provides useful economic insights to the government and policymakers 





1.  Introduction 
Self-sufficiency has been brought to the world’s attention and has moved to the higher 
policy agenda particularly to address food security concerns in most rice-staple and rice-deficit 
regions among developing countries. Despite the criticism for not being an efficient approach, 
self-sufficiency has been promoted and adopted as the pertinent solution to achieve food security 
objectives, especially in the aftermath of the recent global food crisis (FAO, 2016). Malaysia 
announced its intention to pursue self-sufficiency by the year 2020 and has recently been 
extended to the year 2050 (National Transformation 2020-2050). The pursue of self-sufficiency 
is not only for food security reasons, but also the result of a political economy that prioritizes 
farmers’ interests and strives to guarantee the welfare of rice farmers. Since the majority of rice 
farmers are poor smallholders, self-sufficiency may help ameliorate poverty among farmers. 
Food self-sufficiency is not a new policy strategy in Malaysia as the country has historically 
focused on supported domestic rice production to obtain a high degree self-sufficiency. As 
domestic demand for rice is growing, self-sufficiency goals become more challenging (Figure 
3.8). Intensification of rice production has been one way to improve land productivity and 
output. Currently the crop intensity of rice is considerably high, ranging between 170% and 
180%, yet domestic production remains constrained by its marginal productivity (Mailena et al., 
2014). The expansion of rice acreage is highly constrained in Malaysia. Most arable land in 
Malaysia is under permanent palm oil and rubber crops. Pursuing self-sufficiency with a 
constrained supply of land requires significant gains in productivity or otherwise will lead to 






             Source: Production, Supply and Distribution (PS&D), USDA. 
 
         Figure 3.8: Trends of domestic demand and self-sufficiency ratio for rice in Malaysia,  
1960 – 2016. 
 
Even if food self-sufficiency and food security are interconnected, the government’s 
stance on self-sufficiency is misconstrued while often interpreting to food security. According to 
the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), food self-sufficiency is referred to “The extent to 
which a country can satisfy its food needs from its own domestic production”, “Closing borders 
adopting complete autarky for food sector, and “A country producing sufficient food to cover its 
own needs” (Clapp, 2017; FAO, 2016; FAO, 1999) (Figure 3.9). Food security, on the other 
hand, pertains to food availability, accessibility, nutrition, and stability across the three 
dimensions (FAO, 2008). As such, food security makes no reference to the source of food 
(Clapp, 2014), and therefore food security and self-sufficiency are divergent and express 
different concepts. The World Bank stressed that ‘‘Food self-sufficiency should be weighed 



































































































been claimed as outcomes when a country prioritizes political decisions over economic rationale 
in food policy choices which characterize by conflict between interests that support local 
production and those that believe self-sufficiency is a costlier path and thus worsens public 









    Source: Clapp (2017) 
    Figure 3.9: The concept of food self-sufficiency. 
 
Self-sufficiency has been criticized because it embraces policies which are being 
inefficient and distort the market resulting in weakened incentives for food production, thus 
leading to higher food prices in the long run (Naylor and Falcon, 2010). Strongly emphasizing to 
the self-sufficiency goal diverts government’s attention from pressing food security concerns at 
the household level (Von Braun and Paulino, 1990). Other countries are also discovering that 
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Instead, liberalizing food trade shows many advantages to improve food security as well 
as economic growth, especially for developing economic regions. Many developing countries 
realized that the free trade was an effective approach for sustained development. For instance, 
Latin America and East Asia indicated significant economic development growth in 1985 to 
2005 when practicing the free trade (OECD, 2008), and thus there were positive relationships 
between free trade and economic growth (Von Braun and Diaz-Bonilla, 2008). The World Bank 
reviewed many studies regarding globalizing trade to poverty reduction and concluded that the 
degree of trade openness played a significant role and benefited certain countries to better 
integrate into the world economy (World Bank, 2002). In fact, a rice import tariff will not help 
local producers, and even punish local consumers (Jolly et al., 2009). 
Malaysia has been active participating free trade agreements (FTAs) in both bilateral and 
regional levels and is currently involved in 13 FTAs as well as a member of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) (Table 3.10). Nevertheless, Malaysia has excluded rice in the FTAs and 
declared as a sensitive product, which allows it to extend protection to local rice industry. Under 
ASEAN13-Australia-New Zealand Regional Free Trade Agreement, rice remains excluded from 
Malaysia’s tariff commitments until 2023, when its tariff will be bound at 30% and then reduced 
annually until it is eliminated in 2026 (Malaysian Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 
2006).  
                                                     
13 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed to promote political and 
economic cooperation and regional stability which is currently participated by 10-member 
countries – Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei, Vietnam, Thailand, Philippines, Cambodia, 





Table 3.10: Malaysia: Current bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs). 




Malaysia-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (MJEPA) 13 July 2006 
Malaysia-Pakistan Closer Economic Partnership Agreement 
(MPCEPA) 1 Jan. 2008 
Malaysia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (MNZFTA) 1 Aug. 2010 
Malaysia-India Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
Agreement (MICECA) 1 July 2011 
Malaysia-Chile free Trade Agreement (MCFTA) 25 Feb. 2012 
Malaysia-Australia free Trade Agreement (MAFTA) 1 Jan. 2013 
Malaysia-Turkey Free Trade Agreement (MTFTA) 1 Aug. 2015 
Regional 
ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) 1 July 2003 
ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Agreement (AKFTA) 1 July 2006 
ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP) 1 Feb. 2009 
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement 
(AANZFTA) 1 Jan. 2010 
ASEAN-India Free Trade Agreement (AIFTA) 1 Jan. 2010 
ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA) 17 May 2010 
Source: Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Malaysia.  
 
Despite the substantial government’s efforts to expand the areas in which rice is grown, 
upgrading technologies and research and development, developing and maintaining 
infrastructures, and investing in subsidy and incentive programs, the domestic production is still 
insufficient, covering between 60 – 65% of the total domestic demand. Malaysia has been a net 
rice importer for many years, depending on rice imports to satisfy the required domestic demand. 
Our projections to 2020 still suggest a significant reliance on imports (Figure 3.10).  Therefore, 
the government’s decision to eliminate rice trades is pondered as an extreme policy strategy as 
Malaysia is not competitive in rice production (see Chapter II). Using a massive public 
investment and implicitly taxpayers’ dollars to support a highly subsidized crop in order to 
achieve self-sufficiency goal, it is crucial to evaluate the policies and analyze the impact of a 




Source: RICEFLOW Database. 
Figure 3.10: Bilateral rice trades (in Thousand Mt) from Malaysian trading partners.  
 
From the discussion above, some of the overarching questions this study attempts to 
answer includes: 1) What are the consequences of enforcing a total rice self-sufficiency? 2) What 
are the main limitations to achieve the self-sufficiency?, and 3) Is rice self-sufficiency an 
efficient approach to pursue? Subsequently, the main objective of this study is to evaluate and 
analyze the impacts of rice self-sufficiency, as an alternative, international free trade in Malaysia.  
The specific objectives are: 
1) To simulate the impacts of self-sufficiency policy on total rice output and consumption. 
2) To estimate the subsidy and production input requirements to achieve rice self-sufficiency. 
3) To measure the government’s potential gains or losses from rice self-sufficiency. 









Vietnam Thailand Pakistan Cambodia India Myanmar United
States
ROW




2013-15 493.15 336.38 126.81 48.48 36.67 3.9 1.22 0.46
2020 579.00 373.20 139.78 52.89 33.20 3.73 1.38 0.53
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This study utilizes a spatial partial equilibrium model of the global rice economy to 
simulate two main policy scenarios; 1) rice self-sufficiency in Malaysia, and 2) the complete 
removal of import tariffs on rice in Malaysia. The self-sufficiency policy scenario is simulated 
by eliminating Malaysia’s bilateral import volume, while the free trade is simulated by removing 
existing import tariffs affecting rice imports in Malaysia.  Prior to the simulation analysis, a 
baseline for the year 2020 is established to be consistent with the policy goal timelines, and 
therefore the results would be more realistic and representative. From self-sufficiency scenarios, 
we further estimate the policy requirements on subsidy, production input, technology efficiency, 
and the government potential revenues and losses.   
2.  Materials and Methods 
2.1 Modeling Framework 
 
This study applies a spatial partial equilibrium model of the global rice economy 
(Durand-Morat and Wailes, 2010). The model simulates the behavior of the entire rice supply 
chain, from input markets all the way up to the aggregate final demand, in multiple 
countries/regions (set 𝑅) around the world. Production of endogenous rice commodities (set 
𝐶𝐸14) is specified as a weak-separable, constant return to scale production function. 
 
𝑌𝑐,𝑟 = 𝐻𝑐,𝑟{𝐺𝑐,𝑟(𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑐,𝑟), 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑐,𝑟} ∀𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝐸, 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅                                                                              [1] 
 
                                                     
14 𝐶𝐸 = {𝐿𝐺𝑃, 𝐿𝐺𝐵, 𝐿𝐺𝑊, 𝑀𝐺𝑃, 𝑀𝐺𝐵, 𝑀𝐺𝑊, 𝐹𝑅𝑃, 𝐹𝑅𝐵, 𝐹𝑅𝑊}, where LG, MG, and FR stand 
for long grain, medium/short grain, and fragrant rice, and P, B, W stand for paddy/rough, 
brown/whole, and white/milled rice. 
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Where 𝑌 represents output, 𝐻 and 𝐺 are technology functional forms, 𝐹𝐴𝐶15 is the set of factors 
of production, and 𝐼𝑁𝑇16 is the set of intermediate inputs.  
  Defining 𝐺 in [1] as a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function, the derived 
demand for factor of production, 𝑄𝐹𝐶, is: 
 





  ∀𝑓 ∈ 𝐹𝐴𝐶, 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝐸, 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅    [2]         
             









 ∀𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝐸, 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅                                           [3] 
 
Where 𝐴𝐹𝐶, 𝑃𝐹𝐶, and 𝑆𝑉𝐴 are a factor-, sector-, and region-specific augmenting technical 
change variable, factor price variable, and cost share in value added, respectively, and 𝑄𝑉𝐴 and 
𝑃𝑉𝐴 are a sector- and region-specific derived demand and price for the value-added composite, 
respectively. Finally, 𝜎𝑉𝐴 is the sector- and region-specific elasticity of substitution in value-
added.   
                                                     
15 𝐹𝐴𝐶 =  {𝐿, 𝑇, 𝐾}, where 𝐿 is land, 𝑇 labor, and 𝐾 capital. 




Defining 𝐻 in [1] as a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function, the derived demands for 
intermediate inputs 𝑄𝐼𝐶, and for the composite value added 𝑄𝑉𝐴𝑐,𝑟, are: 
 
𝑄𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑐,𝑟 ∗ 𝐴𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑐,𝑟 =
𝑌𝑐,𝑟
𝐴𝑌𝑐,𝑟
∗ 𝑆𝐼𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑐,𝑟 ∗ [
𝑃𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑐,𝑟
𝑃𝑌𝑐,𝑟
∗ 𝐴𝐼𝐶𝑓,𝑐,𝑟 ∗ 𝐴𝑌𝑐,𝑟]
−𝜎𝑌𝑐,𝑟
, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑇, 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝐸, 𝑟 ∈
𝑅                                                                                                                                                                [4]               
 
𝑄𝑉𝐴𝑐,𝑟 ∗ 𝐴𝑉𝐴𝑐,𝑟 =
𝑌𝑐,𝑟
𝐴𝑌𝑐,𝑟
∗ 𝑆𝑉𝐴𝑇𝐶𝑐,𝑟 ∗ [
𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑐,𝑟
𝑃𝑌𝑐,𝑟
∗ 𝐴𝑉𝐴𝑐,𝑟 ∗ 𝐴𝑌𝑐,𝑟]
−𝜎𝑌𝑐,𝑟
, ∀𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝐸, 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅       [5]  
      
Where 𝐴𝐼𝐶, 𝑃𝐼𝐶, and 𝑆𝐼𝑇𝐶 are input-, sector-, and region-specific input augmenting technical 
change variable, input price variable, and input cost share in total cost, respectively.  
Furthermore, 𝐴𝑉𝐴, 𝐴𝑌, and 𝑃𝑌, and 𝑆𝑉𝐴𝑇𝐶 are sector- and region-specific value-added 
augmenting technical change variable, output augmenting technical change variable, output price 
variable, and value-added cost share in total cost, respectively. Finally, 𝜎𝑌 is the sector- and 
region-specific elasticity of substitution in final output.  
The model assumes zero profits17 in production (Equation [6]) and equilibrium in output markets 
(Equation [7i] for paddy rice commodities18, and [7ii] for other rice commodities). 
                                                     
17 Zero profit conditions are used to guarantee that no extra profits exist in any production 
activity; by forcing equality between costs and revenues, these conditions ensure that factors 
receive their normal rates of return.  



















∀𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝐸, 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅                                                                                                            [6] 
 
𝑌𝑐,𝑟 = 𝑄𝐷𝑐,𝑟 + ∑ 𝑄𝐵𝑋𝑐,𝑟,𝑠
𝑠
+ 𝑄𝐾𝑐,𝑟 , ∀𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝑃, 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅                                                          [7𝑖] 
 
𝑌𝑐,𝑟 = 𝑄𝐷𝑐,𝑟 + ∑ 𝑄𝐵𝑋𝑐,𝑟,𝑠
𝑠
, ∀𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝐶𝑃, 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅                                                                       [7𝑖𝑖] 
 
Where 𝑄𝐷 represent the volume of output 𝑐 sold in the domestic market, 𝑄𝐾 is the change in 
stocks19 of good c, and 𝑄𝐵𝑋 is the volume of bilateral exports of 𝑐 from region 𝑟 to region 𝑠. 
  Import demand follows the Armington approach (Armington, 1969), by which imports by 
source and domestic production are treated as heterogeneous products. Agents first decide on the 
sourcing of imports (Equation 8) based on the relative level of prices from each source (Equation 
[9]).  





, ∀𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝐸, 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅, 𝑠 ∈ 𝑅                                  [8]              
                                                     










, ∀𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝐸, 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅                              [9] 
 
Where 𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑆 is the market price of import good 𝑐 into region 𝑟 from source 𝑠, 𝑃𝑀𝑀 is the 
composite market price of import good 𝑐 in 𝑟, 𝑄𝑀 is the demand for the composite import good 
𝑐 in 𝑟, and 𝑆𝑀𝑆 is the value-share of good 𝑐’s imports into 𝑟 by source 𝑠. 𝜎𝑀𝑐,𝑟 is the elasticity 
of substitution of imported good 𝑐 in 𝑟 by source. 
 After sourcing imports, then agents decide on the optimal mix of imported and domestic 
products (Equation [10] and [11]) based on their relative price levels (Equation [12]). 
 
𝑄𝑀𝑐,𝑟 = 𝑄𝑄𝑐,𝑟 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝑄𝑐,𝑟 ∗ [𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑐,𝑟 𝑃𝑄𝑐,𝑟⁄ ]
−𝜎𝑄𝑐,𝑟
, ∀𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝐸, 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅                                           [10]       
               
𝑄𝐷𝑐,𝑟 = 𝑄𝑄𝑐,𝑟 ∗ 𝑆𝐷𝑄𝑐,𝑟 ∗ [𝑃𝑌𝑐,𝑟 𝑃𝑄𝑐,𝑟⁄ ]
−𝜎𝑄𝑐,𝑟
 , ∀𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝐸, 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅                                                  [11]            
          
𝑃𝑄𝑐,𝑟 = [𝑆𝑀𝑄𝑐,𝑟 ∗ 𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑐,𝑟
1−𝜎𝑄𝑐,𝑟 + 𝑆𝐷𝑄𝑐,𝑟 ∗ 𝑃𝑌𝑐,𝑟
1−𝜎𝑄𝑐,𝑟]
1
1−𝜎𝑄𝑐,𝑟  , ∀𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝐸, 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅               [12]  
 
Where 𝑃𝑄 is the market price of composite good 𝑐 in region 𝑟, 𝑄𝑄 is the output of composite 
good 𝑐 in 𝑟, and 𝑆𝑀𝑄 and SDQ are the value-shares of the import composite and domestic good 
𝑐 in 𝑟. 𝜎𝑄𝑐,𝑟 is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported good 𝑐 in 𝑟.  
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  Final demand for milled rice 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝐹𝐶20 in region 𝑟, is the product of population and per-
capita demand 𝐷𝑐,𝑟, which is specified as a double log function of income and prices (Equation 
[13]). 𝑍𝑟 represents income by region, 𝜑𝑟 is the income demand elasticity, and 𝜔𝑐,𝑔,𝑟 is the 
matrix of own and cross-price demand elasticities.  
 
log 𝐷𝑐,𝑟 = 𝜑𝑟 ∗ log 𝑍𝑟 + ∑ 𝜔𝑐,𝑔,𝑟 ∗ log 𝑃𝑄𝑔,𝑟𝑔 ∈ 𝐹𝐶  , ∀𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝐹𝐶, 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅                                      [13]  
 
The supply of exogenous intermediate inputs (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, energy, and water), 
capital, and labor are specified as perfectly elastic, thus their prices (𝑃𝐹𝐶) are treated as constant, 
exogenous variables. Land is considered the only factor with limited supply. Hence, sectoral 
output 𝑌 is constrained only by the supply of land 𝐿𝑐,𝑟 used in the production of paddy rice, 
which is represented by a double log function of land rental rates 𝑃𝐿𝑐,𝑟. 
 
log 𝐿𝑐,𝑟 = 𝜃𝑐,𝑟 log 𝑃𝐿𝑐,𝑟  , ∀𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝑃, 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅                                                                                         [15]  
 
The land own-price supply elasticity 𝜃𝑐,𝑟 are calibrated following Keller (1976) to reflect rice 
supply elasticities found in the literature. 
 
                                                     





The database disaggregates rice into nine commodities across 76 regions in the world 
covering over 90 percent of global production, consumption, and trade. The nine commodities 
result from the combination of three rice types (long grain, medium/short grain, and fragrant 
rice) and three milling degrees (paddy, brown, and white rice). The database represents global 
rice market situation in 2013 – 2015. Data on rice production and stock changes come primarily 
from the USDA’s Production, Supply, and Demand database (PSD) and FAOSTAT. Rice 
production by type comes from many different sources, including national statistics offices, 
USDA’s Global Agricultural Information Network (GAIN) reports, and industry publications 
such as Creed Rice Market Report and The Rice Trader. Data on producer and consumer prices 
come from many of the sources cited above as well as FAO’s Global Information and Early 
Warning System (GIEWS). Rice trade data comes primarily from UN’s COMTRADE database. 
Information on rice trade by type comes from many sources, including Thailand’s Ministry of 
Commerce, India’s Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, and 
USDA’s Global Agricultural Trade System. Information on trade policies is compiled from 
many sources, including the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Organization of American States’s Foreign Trade Information 
System, and other national reporting agencies. The elasticities of rice supply and demand come 
primarily from the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI). The Armington 





3.  Rice Policy Scenarios 
This section describes the procedure to estimate the relevant scenarios specified in this 
study which comprise of the baseline analysis for the year 2020, self-sufficiency scenario, and 
international free trade scenario.  
3.1 Baseline Analysis for the Year 2020 
The baseline for the year 2020 is constructed by shocking the 2013-15 database with 
projected population growth and gross domestic product (GDP) growth developed by Global 
Insights (see Appendix Table 3.1 and 3.2). According to Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO), overall demand for food was affected by population growth, while economic 
development and rising incomes tend to shift diets toward more expensive and resource-intensive 
food products to produce (FAO, 2010). The projections by the International Food Policy and 
Research Institute (IFPRI, 2014) suggest that slower population growth could significantly lower 
malnutrition along with increased agricultural productivity, economic growth and investment in 
health and education. Because population trends will continue to affect the demand for food in 
future, it is important that demographic projections be incorporated into plans to improve 
agricultural production and achieve greater food security (Rosegrant et al., 2001). Furthermore, 
the FAO suggests that high malnutrition can lead to loss in gross domestic product (GDP) of as 
much as 4% to 5% (IFPRI, 2014). Therefore, the population and GDP growth are the key pillars 
to determine economic development for a region.  
3.2 Self-sufficiency Scenario 
 
Self-sufficiency scenario is defined to simulate the elimination of Malaysian bilateral 
trade of long grain rice by the year 2020.  The closure of the model is altered so as to exogenize 
the variable representing bilateral import volumes (qyb) (originally endogenous) and 
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endogenizing the variable representing the power of bilateral import policies (tys). This change 
in the closure allows us to find the power of import tariffs needed to bring import volumes to a 
target level. In this study, the target was to reduce the volume of long grain rice imports by 95%. 
Imports of medium grain and fragrant rice are not restricted since, first, they represent a marginal 
part of the total domestic rice market, and second, they are consumed primarily by high income 
households and therefore contribute little to improving food security in Malaysia.  
3.3 Free Trade Scenario 
 
Free trade scenario in this study is defined as the removal of import tariffs on rice in 
Malaysia. Malaysia applies different levels of import tariffs across trade partners (see Appendix 
Table 3.3). We incorporate free trade in the model by shocking the power of the bilateral import 
tariffs (tys) to zero (see Appendix Table 3.4). 
 
4.  Empirical Results and Discussions 
The following section presents and discusses the main results from each of the relevant 
scenarios defined above. In the baseline analysis for the year 2020, the changes in the variables 
represent their evolution relative to their state in the period 2013-15. The self-sufficiency and 
free trade scenarios used the 2020 baseline results as starting points. Thus, the changes in the 
variables resulting from these two scenarios represent the state of these variables relative to their 
state in 2020 without the shocks implied by the self-sufficiency and free trade scenarios.  
4.1 Baseline Analysis for the Year 2020 
 
The results of the 2020 baseline reveal that self-sufficiency in 2020 will be at 66.7%, 
slightly higher than the current average of 65%. In other words, given the projected market 
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conditions and levels of intervention by the Malaysian government, Malaysia is set to continue 
depending strongly on the international rice market to service a growing rice demand. 
The domestic production of long grain paddy (LGP) marginally grows at 6.8% as well as 
increase in milling industry by 6.6%. The producer prices (i.e. cost of production) are estimated 
to increase by 17.8% and 17.2% for long grain paddy and long grain white, respectively. With 
increases in producer prices, consumer prices increase by 17.6% for long grain rice. The 
aggregate demand for each type of rice is expected to grow, primarily due to the growing 
population. Imports of all rice types increase (Table 3.11 and Figure 3.11). Vietnam and 
Thailand remain the main rice suppliers to the Malaysian market (see Appendix Table 3.1). 
 






Producer price (RM/Mt) 
   
Long grain paddy  1,733.4  17.8  2,041.4  
Long grain brown  1,745.0  17.6  2,052.4  
Long grain white  1,791.3  17.2  2,099.0  
Consumer price (RM/Mt)    
Long grain white  2,908.6  17.6  3,421.4  
Medium grain white  4,873.8  10.8  5,399.0  
Fragrant white  6,193.2  31.2  8,128.0  
Domestic production (thousand Mt milled basis)    
Long grain paddy  1,764.6  6.8  1,885.0  
Long grain brown  1,837.0  6.6  1,958.0  
Long grain white  1,837.7  6.6  1,958.0  
Imports (thousand Mt milled basis)    
Long grain white  941.3  3.3  975.4  
Medium grain white  1.4  11.9  1.5  












Demand (thousand Mt milled basis)    
Long grain white 2,779.0 5.5 2,932.0 
Medium grain white  1.4  11.6  1.5  
Fragrant white  103.7  10.7  114.8  
Self-sufficiency level in long grain (%) 66.1  66.7  
 
These results suggest that Malaysia’s goal of achieving rice self-sufficiency by 2020 are 




                 Figure 3.11: Projections on Malaysia’s rice imports by 2020. 
 
4.2 Self-sufficiency Scenario  
The results of the self-sufficiency scenario for rice commodities in Malaysia are 
presented in Table 3.12. Recall that this scenario entails reducing imports of long grain rice by 









53.3%, which is only possible with a 170.3% increase in producer price. By the underlying a 
zero-profit condition21, this increase also implies the increase in cost of production that is mostly 
derived from a constraint in land factor. The higher production cost of paddy rice and 
consequential increase in the market price of paddy rice transfers to higher consumer prices.  As 
a result, the demand for long grain rice declines by 23.9%.  
Rice producers gain as a result of the self-sufficiency policy due to increases in producer 
surplus. However, rice consumers are worse off since the market prices are much higher (i.e. 
decrease in consumer surplus), hence rice self-sufficiency entails significant welfare shifts from 
consumers to producers. These results suggest that self-sufficiency will likely adversely affect 
food security objectives since the policy increases prices and limits consumption. 
Table 3.12: Results of the self-sufficiency scenario. 
Parameters Baseline 
2013-15 
Baseline 2020 Self-sufficiency 
(%) Level (%) Level 
Producer price (RM/Mt) 
     
Long grain paddy 1,733.4 17.8 2,041.4 170.3 5,516.9 
Long grain brown 1,745.0 17.6 2,052.4 168.9 5,519.3 
Long grain white 1,791.3 17.2 2,099.0 165.3 5,567.6 
Consumer price (RM/Mt)      
Long grain white 2,908.6 17.6 3,421.4 165.3 9,075.3 
Medium grain white 4,873.8 10.8 5,399.0 0.0 5,399.0 
Fragrant white 6,193.2 31.2 8,128.0 0.2 8,146.7 
Domestic production (thousand Mt)      
Long grain paddy 1,764.6 6.8 1,885.0 53.3 2,890.5 
Long grain brown 1,837.0 6.6 1,958.0 51.4 2,965.0 
Long grain white 1,837.7 6.6 1,958.0 51.2 2,959.9 
Imports (thousand Mt milled basis)      
Long grain white 9,41.3 3.3 975.4 -95.0 48.8 
Medium grain white 1.4 11.9 1.5 7.1 1.6 
Fragrant white 103.6 10.5 114.5 7.1 122.6 
                                                     
21 By virtue of the zero-profit condition, the product price by activity equals the unitary cost of 
production (Durand-Morat and Wailes, 2010). 
84 
 




Baseline 2020 Self-sufficiency 
(%) Level (%) Level 
Demand (thousand Mt milled basis)      
Long grain white 2,779.0 5.5 2,932.0 -23.9 2,231.8 
Medium grain white 1.4 11.6 1.5 7.1 1.6 
Fragrant white 103.7 10.7 114.8 7.1 122.9 
Welfare change      
Producer surplus (US$ bill.)     2.8 
Consumer surplus (US$ bill.)     -3.5 
Self-sufficiency in long grain (%) 66.1   66.7   97.8 
 
The government loses US$ 121.5 million in import tariff revenues as a result of self-
sufficiency in long grain rice, which is the difference between market price and cost, insurance, 
and freight (CIF) price of bilateral import, value US$ 652.9 million and US$ 531.4 million, 
respectively. Despite feasibly achieving rice self-sufficiency by the year 2020, the government 
would suffer from a rice import tariff revenue loss. 
Malaysia is an important player in the international rice market, and therefore the 
achievement of rice self-sufficiency is expected to have sizable spillover effects into other 
regions.  Vietnam, the main supplier of rice into Malaysia, is expected to lose the most as its 
export volume drops by 3.05%, followed by India, Myanmar, Pakistan, and the United States 
(Table 3.13). The results above show that rice self-sufficiency will generate significant welfare 
redistributions from consumers and the government to rice producers in Malaysia, and will have 
significant spillover effects onto the rice global market. The options available to counter the 
significant price spike expected under rice self-sufficiency are limited, and their assessments 
suggest that harmonizing the goals of self-sufficiency and food security through stable rice prices 
will be extremely challenging.  
85 
 
Table 3.13: Global impacts of self-sufficiency policy in Malaysia. 






United States -1.53 
ROW (Rest of the World) -1.83 
 
4.3 Output Subsidy Requirements 
 
An option to offset the rice price increase resulting from rice self-sufficiency could be to 
expand producer subsidies. The subsidy expansion would bring the consumer price down at the 
pre-self-sufficiency level, so the price becomes lower. The required subsidy and the cost of the 
subsidy program can be estimated using the producer prices and domestic production in the self-
sufficiency scenario. The total subsidy (in local currency per metric ton) is estimated at RM 
3,475.5/Mt (US$ 810/Mt). The total cost of subsidy program is estimated at RM 10.04 billion 
(US$ 2.34 billion). With the current total subsidy program is RM 1.8 billion (DOA, 2010), the 
government needs a substantial additional expenditure to realize self-sufficiency in rice while 
maintaining prices at the baseline level (Table 3.14).  
Table 3.14: Required subsidy and total subsidy program for self-sufficiency. 
Parameter 
Producer Prices (RM/Mt) 
RM/ Mt 












Domestic production (thousand 
Mt in paddy basis) 
RM (Billion) 
 









4.4 The Requirements of Production Input. 
 
The primary rice production technology is specified as Leontief production function (no 
substitution between production inputs). Additionally, all factors of production are assumed to be 
perfectly elastically supplied except for land. This specification of production and input markets 
means that the changes in the rice market will be primarily dictated by the specification of land 
markets. In the self-sufficiency scenario, the growth of domestic production (53.3%) translates 
into a 53.3% increase in land demand. Given the inelastic supply of land assumed in this study, 
such an expansion in land demand results in very large increases in land rental rates (Table 3.15). 
The increase in required land in the self-sufficiency scenario would also lead to an incredibly 
higher cost of production, subsequently would transfer to much higher consumer prices.  
Table 3.15: The required land input of production. 
Parameters Baseline 2020 Self-sufficiency 
Rice acreage at baseline (‘000 Ha) 690.0 736.9 
Growth in required land input (%) 6.8 53.3 
Required land acreage (‘000 Ha) 736.9 1,129.8 
Domestic rice production (‘000 Mt, paddy basis) 1,885 2,890.5 
  
The majority of agricultural land in Malaysia is used to produce palm oil and rubber, 
which the most important agricultural commodities for the national income, thus rice farmland is 
limited to less than 10% of the total agricultural land (Figure 3.12). The land substitution 
possibilities between an annual crop such as rice and permanent crops such as rubber and palm 




  Source: FAOSTAT (2014) 
              
Figure 3.12: Malaysia: Agricultural land use (area harvested) by commodity. 
 
Possible solutions to overcome the land constraint include the utilization of technology 
and research and development such as the development of non-irrigated farmland, but it is still 
challenging for Malaysia regarding land availability. To expand rice acreage, another way is 
through increasing rice-land-use intensity (number of rice crops produced per year on the same 
field). However, the existing crop intensity in Malaysia is relatively high, ranging from 170% to 
180%. Forcing the crop intensity to be much higher would be extremely challenging, especially 
with respect to the agronomy dimensions and crucial water resource adequacy (FAO, 2005).  
4.5 The Requirement for Technological Efficiency. 
 
Technological efficiency is based on the intensification of productivity, primarily land 
productivity. Higher yields per hectare can enable Malaysia to achieve higher output without 
increasing acreage. Therefore, the required crop yield to achieve self-sufficiency, which 
represents the needed productivity improvement, is measured. At the baseline 2020, with the 












crop yield is 2.83 Mt/ha22 (milled basis) or 4.73 Mt/ha (paddy basis). In self-sufficiency scenario, 
with the required land acreage is 736.9 (thousand ha) to produce 2,959.9 (thousand Mt, milled 
basis) rice, the required crop yield is 4.02 Mt/ha (milled basis) or 6.18 Mt/ha (paddy basis). At 
this productivity gain, domestic rice production can be achieved at the self-sufficiency level and 
consumer prices remain at the pre-self-sufficiency level, thus preventing prices from surging up 
(Table 3.16). However, these findings suggest that the challenge for Malaysia to achieve self-
sufficiency while keeping rice price stability is significant and would require yield gains of 30% 
in relatively few years. To put this in perspective, it took Malaysia around 15 years (since 1998-
2000) to increase average rice yields by 30 percent to reach the 2014-16 average yield of 4.02 
Mt/ha (paddy basis).   
Table 3.16: The required technological efficiency on productivity. 
Parameters Baseline 2020 Self-sufficiency 
Land acreage (in thousand ha) 690.0 736.9 
Domestic production (in thousands, milled basis) 1,958.0 2,959.9 
Required crop yield Mt/ha (in milled basis) 2.83 4.02 
Required crop yield Mt/ha (in paddy basis) 4.73 6.18 
 
Since most of the tropical rice-growing countries in Asia have a high population growth 
rate and limited land for rice cultivation, in order to be a food-secured nation, the productivity 
gain is crucial. Hybrid rice adoption can be a way to meet this objective (FAO, 2004). The 
hybrid rice technology aims to increase the yield potential of rice beyond the level of inbred 
high-yielding varieties (HYVs) by exploiting the phenomenon of hybrid vigor or heterosis. 
                                                     
22 The crop yield is estimated as the division of domestic production (1,885 in thousand Mt, 
paddy basis) to the land acreage (736.9 in thousand ha). 
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However, a number of challenges have been identified which affect the large-scale adoption of 
hybrid rice, including inferior grain quality, and the high cost of seed (FAO, 2004). Another 
potential technology for limited irrigated land is the upland rice, which are grown in well-
drained, non-puddled, and non-saturated soils. With good management practices, upland rice 
(aerobic rice) tends to produce at least 4-6 Mt/ha, however more species of weeds tend 
to experience in rice field that are not permanently flooded than in flooded rice, especially in the 
tropic environments. Also, soil-borne pests and diseases such as nematodes, root aphids, and 
fungi have been found to possibly occur more in upland rice (Maclean et al., 2013). Malaysia has 
ventured in both hybrid and upland rice varieties through the Malaysian Agricultural Research 
and Development Institute (MARDI) since 2005. Since the hybrid rice does not perform well 
with a direct-seeding approach, which the most applied planting approach in Malaysia, farmers 
need to apply a high-technology machinery for planting process, which is not available to most 
small rice farmers. As a result, “Earlier works on hybrid rice in Malaysia had never delivered a 
success” (GRAIN, 2008).  Aerobic rice, a combination of upland and high-yield lowland rice 
varieties (Tuong and Bouman, 2003) is another effort to achieve self-sufficiency in rice. Despite 
having been stable productivity, the aerobic rice resulted in lower crop yields than irrigated 
lowland rice, ranged 2.2 to 3.6 Mt/ha. In fact, the aerobic rice tends to expose higher weed 
infestation with a poor soil structure in adverse non-irrigated environment, which was 
consistently required higher inputs. With most rice farmers in Malaysia are among the poor, this 




4.6 Free Trade Scenario 
As described above, the free-trade scenario implies removing all existing long grain rice 
import tariffs in Malaysia (see Appendix Table 3.3 for information on the actual levels of import 
protection administered by Malaysia). With free trade, the producer price for long grain rice in 
Malaysia decreases by 11.9%, and domestic production by 5.3%, yielding a self-sufficiency level 
of 61.8%. The increased competition in the Malaysian rice market leads to a reduction in 
consumer prices of 14.74% and a consequent increase in domestic consumption of long grain 
rice of 4.44%. The higher domestic demand further expands rice imports by 19.85% (Table 
3.17).  
The results are consistent with the trade theory that reveals rice producers lose, yet 
consumers gain and better off from the international free trade policy. From the consumers’ 
perspectives, a free trade scenario appears to allow for a more food secured economy relative to 
a self-sufficiency scenario, since the free trade is not punishing consumers at the price level and 
thus, consumers gain from the free trade. However, producers would be worse off (i.e. decrease 
producer surplus), and the government will lose tariff revenues from the free trade. 
 




Baseline 2020 Free Trade Policy 
(%) Level (%) Level 
Producer price (RM/Mt) 
     
            Long grain paddy 1,733.40 17.80 2,041.40 -11.90 1,798.47 
Long grain brown 1,744.90 17.60 2,052.40 -11.81 1,810.01 
Long grain white 1,791.30 17.20 2,099.00 -11.55 1,856.57 
Consumer price (RM/Mt) 
     
Long grain white 2,908.60 17.60 3,421.40 -14.74 2,917.09 
Medium grain white 4,874.00 10.80 5,399.00 0.01 5,399.54 








Baseline 2020 Free Trade 
(%) Level (%) Level 
Domestic production 
(thousand Mt)      
Long grain paddy 1,764.60 6.80 1,885 -5.30 1,785.10 
Long grain brown 1,837.00 6.60 1,958 -5.11 1,857.95 
Long grain white 1,837.70 6.60 1,958 -5.08 1,858.53 
Imports (thousand Mt 
milled basis)      
Long grain white 941.3 3.30 975.4 19.85 1,169.02 
Medium grain white 1.4 11.90 1.5 -1.08 1.48 
Fragrant white 103.6 10.50 114.5 -1.08 113.26 
Demand (thousand Mt 
milled basis)      
Long grain white 2,779.00 5.50 2,932.00 4.44 3,062.18 
Medium grain white 1.4 11.60 1.5 -1.08 1.48 
Fragrant white 103.7 10.70 114.8 -1.08 113.56 
Welfare change      
            Producer surplus 
(US$ mill.)     -125.8 
            Consumer surplus  
            (US$ mill.)     328.0 
Self-sufficiency level (%) 66.13  66.73  61.82 
 
While self-sufficiency policy would improve welfare to rice producers, albeit a minor 
segment of total population, the policy will not only lead to a substantial increase in consumer 
prices, but also gargantuan government costs. Instead, free trade could be welfare improving to 
most of the population of the country as rice remains a primary food staple. From a policy 
perspective, the government and policymakers should gauge the implications of the policies on 
economy as a whole. The government’s stance on self-sufficiency needs to be reconsidered as 
this policy strategy is economically misguided. The significant differences in welfare allocation 
between the two scenarios described above imply that the political economy becomes even more 
crucial in deciding the policy output. Since Malaysia is pursuing self-sufficiency, the forces 
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supporting a small group of the population are winning the battle to the expense of the larger 
consumer group. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
Rice self-sufficiency has become a policy cornerstone in Malaysia, and it is a maintained 
strategy to be the best way to address food security concerns. Various strategies can be utilized 
to achieve a desired level of self-sufficiency which lead to substantial public investment to 
support domestic rice production. As a result, rice has become a highly subsidized and protected 
food crop. The government’s mandate is to seriously pursue self-sufficiency in rice and achieve 
the policy goal by the years 2020.Most recently this goal has been extended to 2050. With this 
mandate, the government aims to close all trading borders and eliminate rice imports coming 
from international markets and suppliers. As Malaysia is not a competitive rice producer, this 
extreme policy decision will require a massive additional expenditure at the production level. 
Instead, liberalizing rice trade offers positive effects on food security and implicitly economic 
growth as Malaysia has actively participated in both bilateral and regional free trade agreements.  
This study evaluates and analyzes the impact of self-sufficiency and free trade policies on 
rice sector in Malaysia at the national level using a spatial partial equilibrium model. As 
expected, the results correspond to economic theory with self-sufficiency greatly benefitting rice 
farmers at the expense of consumers. On the other hand, the free trade showed opposite policy 
impact since farmers’ welfare will be worsen while increasing consumers’ welfare. From this 
study, these two policy scenarios clearly represent the opposite direction in terms of welfare 
distribution, and the estimations of producer and consumer surplus corroborate the findings. Self-
sufficiency will create massive welfare shifts from consumers and the government to rice 
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producers. Despite improving welfare to rice producers, albeit a small group, self-sufficiency 
punish consumers, which also include rice producers, due to highly increased consumer price. As 
affordable food price is a key concepts of food security, self-sufficiency does not guarantee food 
security at the national level. The government loses from self-sufficiency, thus pursuing self-
sufficiency is highly challenging for Malaysia. As part of the ASEAN, Malaysia could 
participate in a regional approach for strengthening food security to address its rice-deficit issue. 
Instead, free trade offers a more food secured economy. With free trade, although rice producers 
are worse off, albeit a marginal degree, and the government loses from import tariff revenues, the 
consumers would be better off due to decreasing prices with a more competitive market 
environment from external rice suppliers.  
 Since this study focuses on rice in terms of final consumption, the model is not allowed 
for substitution to other sources of calories which means consumers continue to consume rice 
with no substitutions. As dictated by elasticities, consumers are not allowed to switch to wheat, 
corn, and etc. Further analysis should focus on substitution of other food sources in the final 
consumption. Also, the estimations for each parameter are based on the fact that Malaysia 
pursues total self-sufficiency goal by the year 2020, as mandated by the government in the 
national agricultural policy for 2010-2020. However, the government has recently extended the 
self-sufficiency goal to the year 2050 under the national masterplan for 2020 - 2050, and thus the 
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Appendix Table 3.1: The projections of population growth by regions. 
Regions 
In Million % % 






Argentina 42.5 43.0 43.4 43.8 44.3 44.7 45.1 45.5 43.0 5.9 
Australia 23.3 23.6 24.0 24.3 24.6 25.0 25.3 25.6 23.6 8.4 
Bangladesh 157.2 159.1 161.0 162.9 164.8 166.7 168.6 170.5 159.1 7.2 
Benin 10.3 10.6 10.9 11.2 11.5 11.8 12.1 12.4 10.6 16.6 
Bolivia 10.4 10.6 10.7 10.9 11.1 11.2 11.4 11.5 10.6 9.3 
Brazil 204.3 206.1 207.8 209.6 211.2 212.9 214.5 216.0 206.1 4.8 
Burkina 
Faso 
17.1 17.6 18.1 18.6 19.2 19.7 20.3 20.9 17.6 18.6 
Canada 35.1 35.5 35.8 36.2 36.6 37.0 37.4 37.8 35.5 6.5 
Cambodia 15.1 15.3 15.6 15.8 16.1 16.3 16.6 16.8 15.3 9.7 
Cameroon 22.2 22.8 23.3 23.9 24.5 25.1 25.7 26.3 22.8 15.6 
Chile 17.6 17.8 17.9 18.1 18.3 18.5 18.7 18.8 17.8 6.1 
China 1,362.5 1,369.4 1,376.0 1,382.3 1,388.2 1,393.7 1,398.6 1,402.8 1369.3 2.4 
Colombia 47.3 47.8 48.2 48.7 49.1 49.5 49.9 50.2 47.8 5.1 
Costa Rica 4.7 4.8 4.8 4.9 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.8 6.0 
Cote 
D'Ivoire 
21.6 22.2 22.7 23.3 23.8 24.4 25.0 25.6 22.2 15.4 
Cuba  11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 -0.1 
Ecuador 15.7 15.9 16.1 16.4 16.6 16.9 17.1 17.3 15.9 9.0 
Egypt 87.6 89.6 91.5 93.4 95.2 97.0 98.8 100.5 89.6 12.2 
El Salvador 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.1 2.0 
European 
Union 
504.3 504.8 505.3 505.9 506.5 507.1 507.7 508.2 504.8 0.7 
Gambia 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3 1.9 20.5 
Ghana 26.2 26.8 27.4 28.0 28.6 29.2 29.7 30.3 26.8 13.3 
Guatemala 15.7 16.0 16.3 16.7 17.0 17.3 17.7 18.0 16.0 12.5 
Guinea 11.9 12.3 12.6 12.9 13.2 13.5 13.8 14.1 12.3 15.1 
Guinea 
Bissau 
1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.1 1.8 14.9 
Guyana 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 3.0 
Haiti 10.4 10.6 10.7 10.8 11.0 11.1 11.2 11.4 10.6 7.6 
Honduras 7.8 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.7 8.0 8.6 
Hongkong 7.2 7.2 7.3 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.5 7.6 7.2 4.6 
India 1,279.5 1,295.3 1,311.1 1,326.8 1,342.5 1,358.1 1,373.6 1,388.9 1295.3 7.2 
Indonesia 251.3 254.5 257.6 260.6 263.5 266.4 269.1 271.9 254.4 6.9 
Iran 77.2 78.1 79.1 80.0 80.9 81.8 82.6 83.4 78.1 6.7 
Iraq 34.1 35.3 36.4 37.5 38.7 39.8 40.9 42.0 35.3 19.0 
Japan 127.0 126.8 126.6 126.3 126.0 125.7 125.4 125.0 126.8 -1.4 
Kenya 43.7 44.9 46.1 47.3 48.5 49.7 50.9 52.2 44.9 16.3 
Laos 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 7.0 7.2 7.3 7.4 6.7 10.6 
Liberia 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 5.0 4.4 14.5 
Malaysia 29.5 29.9 30.3 30.8 31.2 31.6 32.0 32.4 29.9 8.3 
Mali 16.6 17.1 17.6 18.1 18.7 19.3 19.9 20.5 17.1 19.7 
Mexico 123.7 125.4 127.0 128.6 130.2 131.8 133.4 134.9 125.4 7.6 
Myanmar 53.0 53.4 53.9 54.4 54.8 55.3 55.8 56.2 53.4 5.2 
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Regions 
In Million % % 






Nicaragua 5.9 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.4 6.0 6.7 
Niger 18.4 19.1 19.9 20.7 21.6 22.4 23.4 24.3 19.1 27.1 
Nigeria 172.8 177.5 182.2 187.0 191.8 196.8 201.7 206.8 177.5 16.5 
Pakistan 181.2 185.0 188.9 192.8 196.7 200.7 204.6 208.4 185.1 12.6 
Panama 3.8 3.9 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.2 3.9 9.4 
Paraguay 6.5 6.6 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 7.0 7.1 6.6 7.9 
Peru 30.6 31.0 31.4 31.8 32.2 32.6 32.9 33.3 31.0 7.6 
Philippines 97.6 99.1 100.7 102.3 103.8 105.3 106.9 108.4 99.1 9.4 
Rwanda 11.1 11.3 11.6 11.9 12.2 12.4 12.7 13.0 11.3 14.6 
Russia 143.4 143.4 143.5 143.4 143.4 143.3 143.1 142.9 143.4 -0.4 
Saudi 
Arabia 
30.2 30.9 31.5 32.2 32.7 33.3 33.8 34.4 30.9 11.3 
Senegal 14.2 14.7 15.1 15.6 16.1 16.5 17.0 17.5 14.7 19.2 
Singapore 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.9 6.0 5.5 9.1 
Sierra 
Leone 
6.2 6.3 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.9 7.0 7.2 6.3 13.6 
South 
Korea 
49.8 50.1 50.3 50.5 50.7 50.9 51.1 51.3 50.1 2.4 
South 
Africa 
53.4 54.0 54.5 55.0 55.4 55.9 56.3 56.7 54.0 5.0 
Sri Lanka 20.5 20.6 20.7 20.8 20.9 21.0 21.1 21.2 20.6 2.6 
Suriname 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 5.0 
Taiwan 23.3 23.4 23.5 23.5 23.6 23.6 23.7 23.7 23.4 1.4 
Tanzania 50.2 51.8 53.5 55.2 56.9 58.6 60.4 62.3 51.8 20.1 
Thailand 67.5 67.7 68.0 68.1 68.3 68.4 68.5 68.6 67.7 1.3 
Togo 6.9 7.1 7.3 7.5 7.7 7.9 8.1 8.3 7.1 16.5 
Turkey 76.2 77.5 78.7 79.6 80.4 81.1 81.7 82.3 77.5 6.2 
UAE 9.0 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.7 9.8 9.1 8.0 
Uganda 36.6 37.8 39.0 40.3 41.7 43.0 44.4 45.9 37.8 21.3 
Uruguay 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.4 2.2 
USA 317.1 319.5 322.0 324.5 327.1 329.8 332.4 335.0 319.5 4.8 
Venezuela 30.3 30.7 31.1 31.5 31.9 32.3 32.7 33.1 30.7 7.9 
Vietnam 91.4 92.4 93.4 94.4 95.4 96.4 97.3 98.2 92.4 6.2 










Appendix Table 3.2: The projections of gross domestic product by regions. 
Regions 
Billion US$ % % 






Argentina 458.1 446.7 457.5 450.0 476.3 476.3 489.9 502.0 454.1 10.6 
Australia 1357.4 1395.3 1428.9 1463.4 1537.7 1537.7 1583.1 1627.3 1393.8 16.7 
Bangladesh 137.7 146.0 155.6 166.5 188.6 188.6 200.9 213.7 146.4 45.9 
Benin 7.5 8.0 8.3 8.7 9.4 9.4 9.8 10.2 7.9 28.6 
Bolivia 23.2 24.5 25.7 26.6 28.6 28.6 29.8 31.1 24.4 27.2 
Brazil 2412.8 2424.9 2333.4 2250.5 2307.1 2307.1 2385.4 2475.5 2390.3 3.6 
Burkina Faso 10.8 11.4 11.9 12.4 13.8 13.8 14.5 15.3 11.4 34.6 
Canada 1735.2 1779.7 1796.5 1820.2 1901.6 1901.6 1945.0 1984.2 1770.4 12.1 
Cambodia 13.9 14.8 15.9 17.0 19.4 19.4 20.7 22.0 14.9 48.3 
Cameroon 27.2 28.8 30.1 31.6 34.9 34.9 36.6 38.3 28.7 33.4 
Chile 253.1 257.7 263.6 267.6 279.6 279.6 288.7 300.2 258.1 16.3 
China 7748.4 8314.0 8889.9 9485.2 10717.2 10717.2 11370.2 12062.3 8317.4 45.0 
Colombia 334.2 348.9 359.6 366.8 383.8 383.8 394.7 407.6 347.6 17.3 
Costa Rica 41.6 42.8 44.4 46.1 49.6 49.6 51.6 53.7 42.9 25.1 
Cote D'Ivoire 28.8 31.2 33.7 36.3 41.5 41.5 43.5 45.3 31.2 45.0 
Cuba  70.0 70.7 73.8 74.3 78.9 78.9 82.3 86.2 71.5 20.6 
Ecuador 83.2 86.5 86.6 84.5 87.0 87.0 89.4 91.9 85.4 7.5 
Egypt 228.0 233.1 242.9 253.6 277.3 277.3 290.9 305.3 234.7 30.1 
El Salvador 22.7 23.0 23.6 24.1 25.1 25.1 25.6 26.2 23.1 13.1 
European 
Union 
17240.3 17521.1 17895.8 18226.8 18506.3 18812.2 19110.3 19406.4 17552.4 10.6 
Gambia 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.0 25.8 
Ghana 43.0 44.8 46.5 48.1 54.4 54.4 57.7 60.5 44.8 35.1 
Guatemala 46.0 47.9 49.9 51.6 55.1 55.1 57.1 59.2 47.9 23.6 
Guinea 5.2 5.3 5.3 5.5 6.0 6.0 6.4 6.8 5.3 29.1 
Guinea 
Bissau 
0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 0.9 28.6 
Guyana 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.4 23.9 
Haiti 7.6 7.8 7.9 8.0 8.3 8.3 8.5 8.7 7.8 12.5 
Honduras 17.6 18.1 18.8 19.5 20.8 20.8 21.6 22.4 18.2 23.2 
Hong Kong 252.0 258.3 264.7 268.8 278.7 278.7 284.7 291.4 258.3 12.8 
India 1895.6 2032.1 2185.5 2336.9 2702.8 2702.8 2913.5 3137.6 2037.7 54.0 
Indonesia 897.3 942.3 987.5 1037.3 1147.3 1147.3 1208.3 1274.6 942.4 35.3 
Iran 444.5 463.8 470.5 491.4 538.0 538.0 564.2 590.6 459.6 28.5 




Appendix Table 3.2 (Cont.) 
Regions 
Billion US$ % % 





Japan 5910.5 5924.9 5998.7 6057.6 6176.2 6176.2 6218.9 6229.6 5944.7 4.8 
Kenya 46.9 49.4 52.2 55.2 61.9 61.9 65.2 68.2 49.5 37.8 
Laos 8.5 9.1 9.7 10.4 11.9 11.9 12.7 13.5 9.1 48.6 
Liberia 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.4 31.7 
Malaysia 296.5 314.3 330.0 343.6 372.9 372.9 391.1 411.2 313.6 31.1 
Mali 9.8 10.5 11.1 11.7 12.8 12.8 13.4 14.0 10.5 33.8 
Mexico 1153.5 1179.6 1210.7 1238.1 1290.9 1290.9 1327.0 1367.2 1181.3 15.7 
Myanmar 51.1 55.0 59.1 63.2 72.6 72.6 77.7 83.0 55.1 50.7 
Nicaragua 10.2 10.7 11.2 11.7 12.7 12.7 13.2 13.8 10.7 28.3 
Niger 6.8 7.3 7.7 8.1 9.1 9.1 9.6 10.1 7.3 39.0 
Nigeria 425.4 452.3 464.9 455.6 465.2 465.2 479.9 499.0 447.5 11.5 
Pakistan 193.7 202.9 214.1 226.4 250.3 250.3 263.8 277.4 203.6 36.3 
Panama 37.7 39.9 42.2 44.2 47.6 47.6 49.4 51.3 39.9 28.3 
Paraguay 23.6 24.7 25.4 26.3 27.9 27.9 28.8 29.6 24.6 20.7 
Peru 176.3 180.7 186.7 194.0 207.7 207.7 216.2 225.9 181.2 24.6 
Philippines 236.3 251.0 265.8 283.9 320.9 320.9 340.9 361.3 251.1 43.9 
Rwanda 7.0 7.5 7.9 8.4 9.4 9.4 10.0 10.5 7.5 40.6 
Russia 1783.1 1796.2 1730.0 1719.5 1759.9 1759.9 1798.7 1849.9 1769.7 4.5 
Saudi Arabia 626.8 649.6 672.2 680.6 711.3 711.3 730.8 755.2 649.5 16.3 
Senegal 14.2 14.8 15.7 16.7 18.7 18.7 19.7 20.8 14.9 39.6 
Singapore 272.5 281.4 287.0 291.2 301.0 301.0 308.3 316.7 280.3 13.0 
Sierra Leone 3.8 4.0 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.6 3.8 4.0 3.7 9.1 
South Korea 1194.8 1234.7 1266.9 1302.0 1375.5 1375.5 1413.4 1450.6 1232.1 17.7 
South Africa 406.3 412.9 418.1 419.1 432.3 432.3 443.6 456.0 412.4 10.6 
Sri Lanka 70.0 75.2 79.8 84.3 93.8 93.8 99.2 104.8 75.0 39.7 
Suriname 4.9 5.0 4.9 4.5 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.9 -0.3 
Taiwan 483.5 502.9 506.6 512.5 531.8 531.8 544.3 558.8 497.7 12.3 
Tanzania 37.8 40.5 43.3 46.2 52.3 52.3 55.4 58.6 40.5 44.6 
Thailand 378.6 381.7 392.5 404.8 429.9 429.9 443.4 458.0 384.2 19.2 
Togo 3.7 3.9 4.1 4.4 4.8 4.8 5.1 5.4 3.9 38.5 
Turkey 847.2 872.9 907.2 920.2 965.9 965.9 994.1 1024.3 875.8 17.0 
UAE 336.7 347.1 360.2 365.6 387.4 387.4 404.4 422.7 348.0 21.5 
Uganda 22.5 23.6 24.8 26.2 29.3 29.3 31.1 33.2 23.6 40.5 
Uruguay 45.9 47.4 47.8 48.1 50.3 50.3 51.7 53.3 47.0 13.3 
USA 15802.9 16177.5 16597.5 16855.7 17696.4 17696.4 18102.8 18478.7 16192.6 14.1 
Venezuela 266.9 256.5 241.7 213.5 195.2 195.2 196.9 198.7 255.0 -22.1 
Vietnam 136.0 144.1 153.7 163.0 184.3 184.3 196.1 208.7 144.6 44.3 
Source: Arkansas Global Rice Model (AGRM) 
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Appendix Table 3.3: Bilateral trades import volume and import tariffs.  





Vietnam Long grain white 548.4 20% 
  Fragrant white 30.6 
Thailand Long grain brown 0.7 20%  
Fragrant brown 0.0  
Long grain white 346.6 
  Fragrant white 25.9 
Pakistan Long grain white 125.9 40% 
  Fragrant white 13.9 
Cambodia Long grain white 20.2 20% 
  Fragrant white 32.7 
India Long grain brown 0.1 40%  
Long grain white 22.1 
  Fragrant White 11.0 
Myanmar Long grain white 3.7 20% 
United States Long grain brown 0.1 40%  
Long grain white 0.3 
  Medium grain white  1.0 
Rest of the World 
(ROW) 
Long grain white 0.0 40% 
  Medium grain white  0.5 














Appendix Table 3.4: The exogenous variables for free trade scenario. 
Regions Rice commodities 
Import Tariffs (%) 
Ad valorem Free trade 
India Long grain paddy 
Long grain brown 




1-1.40/1.40 = -28.57 
Thailand Long grain brown 
Long grain white 
20 1-1.20/1.20 = -16.67 
USA Long grain brown 
Long grain white 
40 1-1.40/1.40 = -28.57 
Vietnam Long grain white 20 1-1.20/1.20 = -16.67 
Cambodia Long grain white 20 1-1.20/1.20 = -16.67 
Myanmar Long grain white 40 1-1.40/1.40 = -28.57 
Pakistan Long grain white 40 1-1.40/1.40 = -28.57 
ROW Long grain white 40 1-1.40/1.40 = -28.57 


















The Impact of International Trade Policies on Heterogeneous Rice Farmers in Malaysia 
Using Farm-Household Model 
 
Abstract 
Despite having negotiated both bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs), 
Malaysia has excluded rice from the FTAs including the ATIGA (ASEAN Trade in Good 
Agreement) and TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) agreements because rice is regarded as a 
sensitive commodity. The government is pursuing an autarky approach as part of its national rice 
policy objectives. Although poverty mitigation has been a long-standing goal in Malaysian rice 
policy, most farmers remain living in poverty. This poverty reduction goal is why the 
government retains prohibitive barriers in rice trade as a protective measure to domestic rice 
farmers. Instead of liberalizing trade, Malaysia has decided to achieve rice self-sufficiency by 
2020 and recently extended the policy goal to eliminate bilateral rice trades by 2050. While rice 
farmers are highly protected in Malaysia, the impacts of free trade are often misconstrued to 
focus only on the negative effects on the domestic production side and rice farmers’ incomes and 
welfare. This study develops a farm household model of heterogeneous rice farmers in Malaysia 
to analyze the impact of free trade policy on rice farmers using both income and rice 
consumption poverty measures and farmers’ welfare at farm household level. The results 
indicate that even if free trade would increase poverty measured in terms of income, it would 
decrease poverty measured in terms of rice consumption. This is because of a lower price of rice 
after the introduction of free trade, which would also benefit non-farm rice consumers in 
Malaysia. However, a farm-household welfare measure shows that free trade does make rice 
farmers worse off as their welfare falls, albeit minimally. With affordability as a key pillar of 
food-security, free trade plays a significant role in Malaysia’s food security as it leads to more 
affordable rice prices. 
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1.  Introduction 
The livelihood of Malaysian farmers is an important issue in Malaysian policy since rice 
remains the key staple food and a vital commodity in addressing national food security. 
However, the majority of rice farmers, who are indigenous locals, remain poor rural households. 
The economic discrimination and ethnic segregation during British colonial rule is a major cause 
of many farmers’ socio-economic problems and a motivating factor for the government to 
continuously attempt to mitigate poverty and improve local farmers’ welfare. As a result, 
numerous programs, from output support to the marketing level of supply chains, have been 
created to support rice farmers. Other support programs include public irrigation and 
infrastructure management, input and output subsidies, credit facilities, research and 
development, and extension support services. These programs are designed to help rice farms 
recuperate costs and thus increase the farmers’ incomes. In fact, rice farmers are among the 
highest subsidy recipients in the Malaysian agricultural food sector as rice has been deemed a 
priority and has received special attention from the government for decades. In addition to the 
subsidies, the government has also imposed high rice import tariffs23 to protect the domestic rice 
market and local farmers from the international market. Nevertheless, the current socio-
economic status of rice farmers has remained controversial because poverty levels of farmers 
have been stagnant. It was reported that 54% of the total Malaysian rice-farming households 
were below the national income poverty line due to low returns, which has resulted in rice 
farmers being among the poorest agricultural producers in Malaysia (IRRI, 1985). In addition, 
the majority of rice farmers were below the national average income (Malaysian Agricultural 
Research and Development Institute, 2013). Previous studies found that farmers’ welfare largely 
                                                     
23 The most recent tariff schedule for rice imports ranges from 20% to 40% depending on the 
bilateral trade agreement (Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Malaysia, 2016) 
105 
 
drives food security in Malaysia (Siwar et al., 2013). However, rice farm activities were not able 
to generate sufficient incomes for farmers, and thus, farmers need other sources of income to 
sustain their livelihood24 (Rabu and Mohd Shah, 2013). The most recent government policy 
focused on achieving complete rice self-sufficiency under the rationale of food security, which 
would result in a substantial public investment to support domestic rice producers. Given the 
renewed focus on self-sufficiency in rice, it is timely to evaluate and determine the consequences 
of current rice trade policies on Malaysian rice farmers. 
The Malaysian rice industry provides employment to approximately 300,000 farmers. In 
fact, rice was the main source of income for the majority of rice farmers25 (92.7%). While farm 
sizes range between 0.2 and 21.4 hectares, 81.6% of farmers are small scale as they operate on 
less than three hectares. Since the 1980s, many farmers have adopted mechanized farming to 
reduce production costs, labor inputs, and the production period due to a rapid increase in labor 
supply for land preparation, seeding, and harvesting, which resulted in higher labor costs. 
Notwithstanding, mechanization did not increase yield although it reduced labor demand26 
(World Bank, 2012). The range of household monthly incomes showed quite a large gap between 
RM -99 to RM11, 397.6 (included subsidies), while the average household size was five persons 
(Malaysian Agricultural Research and Development Institute, 2013). The small-scale farmers are 
still struggling to survive. A lack of productive assets and small farm size were identified as 
primary reasons that lead to the poverty of many local rice farmers (Fahmi et al, 2013). Hence, 
                                                     
24 The data for the study was collected in two of the eight granary areas (BLS and MADA) in 
production year 2012/2013.  
25 Data was obtained from household survey in 2012/2013. 
26 During the economic structural change in 1980s, the rice sector was faced with higher wages 




the Malaysian rice policy plans to increase farmers’ incomes through support programs has not 
been an effective strategy. 
Heterogeneity in Malaysian-rice farm households is manifest in differences in land 
quality, managerial skills, input application, and consumer preferences. For example, the large 
standard deviation (sd) relative to the mean for the share of total expenditures for seed 
(sd=0.0362 and mean=0.0898), fertilizer (sd=0.0377 and mean=0.2757), and rice consumption 
(sd=0.0306 and mean=0.0434) reveal substantial differences in production and consumption 
expenditures among Malaysian farm households. The analysis in this chapter explicitly accounts 
for this heterogeneity, which plays a key role in determining the impact of trade policies on 
poverty rates and welfare of these farmers. It is crucial to evaluate the effectiveness of the rice 
trade policies at the household level as this population plays an important role in realizing the 
national self-sufficiency and food security goals of Malaysia. This chapter focuses on the impact 
of free trade policy at the rice farmers’ household level to provide useful economic insights for 
the direction of the rice sector in Malaysia. 
This study analyzes the effect of free trade policy using producer and consumer prices 
from two scenarios—base year 2020 and free trade scenario—from the RICEFLOW27 model and 
a farm household model to create a realistic policy evaluation at the micro level. Thus, this study 
builds on the national-level RICEFLOW analysis in the previous chapter by studying the impact 
of free trade for farm households. The goal of this study is to apply a farm household model and 
utilize farm-level survey data to evaluate the impact of trade policy on individual rice farmers’ 
poverty levels, welfare, and rice production in Malaysia. The specific objectives are:  
                                                     
27 RICEFLOW is a partial, spatial equilibrium model which is analyzed in Chapter III. 
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1) To develop a household model of individual rice farms. 
2) To calibrate the model to heterogeneous rice farmers in major producing areas – MADA, 
KADA, PBLS, IADA Penang, IADA Kemasin, and KETARA. 
3) To implement the model through simulation analysis to quantify the impacts of a change 
in trade policy on a) production and consumption, b) income and rice consumption 
poverty measures, and c) the welfare of Malaysian rice farmers. 
4) To provide an economic perspective of liberalizing the rice market to the government and 
policymakers.  
This research contributes to the literature by providing detailed analysis of the impact of 
international trade policies on poverty rates and welfare among Malaysian rice farmers. With rice 
largely excluded from regional trade agreements such as TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnerships) and 
ATIGA (ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement), this analysis provides key insights for Malaysian 
policymakers that pursue the autarky approach to achieve food security in rice and those that 
negotiate regional trade agreements. 
 
2.  Farm Household Model of Malaysian Rice Farmers 
The farm household model, associated with both demand and supply factors of household 
farms, is widely applied to agricultural rural economies (Taylor and Adelman, 2003; De Janvry 
et al., 1991; Singh et al., 1986). Agricultural production is mostly undertaken by a large number 
of farm households that engage in production, consumption, and factor supply activities. These 
households supply agricultural commodities at multiple levels such as local, regional, national, 
and/or international. Therefore, it is fundamental to the analysis of farm household behavior to 
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identify the production, consumption, and market strategies such that farmers derive maximum 
utility (De Janvry and Sodulet, 2016). 
A household model of heterogeneous rice farms in Malaysia is developed to analyze the 
impact of free trade policy on farmers’ production and consumption decisions, poverty rates, and 
welfare. Farmers generate utility from consumption of rice, consumption of non-rice composite 
good (i.e., manufacturing goods), and non-working hours (i.e., leisure). The farmers’ budget 
constraint sets expenditures of consumption goods equal to income which consists of profits 
from rice farming and government transfers. Rice production depends on important inputs such 
as seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and labor. Additional assumptions for the model include: 
i. Because this model uses the results from RICEFLOW on the impact of trade policies on 
market prices to analyze the effect of these price changes on poverty rates and the welfare 
of rice farmers, we assume the households are price takers, i.e., from the household 
perspective, prices are exogenous. Consequently, all farm-level consumption and 
production decisions are endogenously influenced by changes in market prices. 
ii. The total time endowment for each household is exogenous. 
iii. The supply of inputs is perfectly elastic which implies farmers can purchase as much of 
the inputs as is optimal at the given market prices. 
a. Majority of farmers own28 their land, which is a fixed factor of production. 
b. Most farmers use hired laborers to help with main farm activities29. 
                                                     
28 Owned farmland defines as owned, partially owned with rented, and partially owned with 
sharing contract.  
29 Main farm activities refer to land preparation, seed preparation, planting, plowing, fertilizing, 
pest and weed controls, and harvesting.  
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iv. The household sells all paddy rice at the farm-gate price (i.e. regulated minimum price) to 
rice millers, while purchasing milled rice at the consumer prices for their own 
consumption. 
v. All subsidized inputs and outputs are implicitly included in market prices. 
vi. Rice is a normal good in Malaysia as income elasticities of demand for rice is positive 
(i.e., the greater per capita income would induce higher demand for rice) (Tey et al., 
2009; FAPRI, 2007; Ishida et al., 2003).  
 
The household utility function, 𝑈 which is quasi-concave with positive partial derivatives is: 
𝑈 (𝑐𝑅
𝑖 ,  𝑐𝑀
𝑖 ,  𝑐𝐿
𝑖 ; 𝜶𝒊),                                                                                          [1] 
where 𝑐𝑅
𝑖  is consumption of rice,  𝑐𝑀
𝑖  is consumption of a composite non-rice goods,  𝑐𝐿
𝑖  is leisure 
or non-farming activities, 𝜶𝒊 is a vector of utility parameters, and 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛 represents 𝑛 
heterogeneous rice farmers. The utility function is maximized subject to three constraints: 
1. The cash income constraints: 
 
𝑝𝑅𝑐𝑅
𝑖 +  𝑝𝑀 𝑐𝑀
𝑖  ≤  𝑝𝑅 𝐹𝑅 ( 𝑥𝑆
𝑖 ,  𝑥𝐹
𝑖 ,  𝑥𝑃
𝑖 ,  𝑥𝐿
𝑖 ; 𝜷𝒊) −  𝑟𝑆 𝑥𝑆
𝑖 −  𝑟𝐹 𝑥𝐹
𝑖 −  𝑟𝑃 𝑥𝑃
𝑖  
− 𝑟𝐿 𝑙𝐻
𝑖 − 𝑇,                                                                                                      [2] 
 
where 𝑝𝑅 is the consumer price of rice, 𝑝𝑀 is the price of composite non-rice goods, 𝑝𝑅 is the 
farm-gate price of rice, 𝐹𝑅 (. ) is the production function,  𝑥𝑆
𝑖 ,  𝑥𝐹
𝑖 ,  𝑥𝑃
𝑖 ,  and  𝑥𝐿
𝑖  are seed, fertilizer, 
pesticide and total labor inputs, respectively, 𝜷𝒊 is a vector of parameters,  𝑟𝑆,  𝑟𝐹 ,  𝑟𝑃, and  𝑟𝐿 are 
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the respective input prices, and 𝑇 are government transfers. Since the majority of rice farmers 
own their farmland, land is held as a constant fixed factor of production.  
2. The total labor constraints: 
  𝑥𝐿
𝑖 =   𝑙𝐻
𝑖 +   𝑙𝐹
𝑖 ,                                                                                  [3] 
where total labor used in production (𝑥𝐿
𝑖 ) is equal to hired labor  𝑙𝐻
𝑖  plus family labor  𝑙𝐹
𝑖 ; and 
3. The total available time to household: 
 𝑡̅ =  𝑙𝐹
𝑖 +   𝑐𝐿
𝑖 ,                                                                                       [4] 
where 𝑡̅ is the total exogenous endowment of time to the household is equal to  𝑙𝐹
𝑖  is household 
family labor used in rice production plus leisure  𝑐𝐿
𝑖 .  
Equations [2] and [3] are combined: 
𝑝𝑅𝑐𝑅
𝑖 +  𝑝𝑀 𝑐𝑀
𝑖  ≤  𝑝𝑅𝐹𝑅 ( 𝑥𝑆
𝑖 ,  𝑥𝐹
𝑖 ,  𝑥𝑃
𝑖 ,  𝑥𝐿
𝑖 ) −   𝑟𝑆 𝑥𝑆
𝑖 −  𝑟𝐹  𝑥𝐹
𝑖 −  𝑟𝑃 𝑥𝑃
𝑖 −  𝑟𝐿 𝑙𝐻
𝑖 − 𝑇,             
 ?̃?𝑅𝑐𝑅
𝑖 +  𝑝𝑀 𝑐𝑀
𝑖 ≤  𝑝𝑅𝐹𝑅 ( 𝑥𝑆
𝑖 ,  𝑥𝐹
𝑖 ,  𝑥𝑃
𝑖 ,  𝑥𝐿
𝑖 ) −   𝑟𝑆 𝑥𝑆
𝑖 −  𝑟𝐹  𝑥𝐹






𝑖 ) − 𝑇. 
Then substituting equation [4] into the above expression yields (the simplification of the model is 
provided in Appendix 4.1): 
   ?̃?𝑅𝑐𝑅
𝑖 +  𝑝𝑀 𝑐𝑀
𝑖 ≤  𝑝𝑅𝐹𝑅 (𝑥𝑆
𝑖 ,  𝑥𝐹
𝑖 ,  𝑥𝑃
𝑖 ,  𝑥𝐿
𝑖 ) −   𝑟𝑆 𝑥𝑆
𝑖 −  𝑟𝐹  𝑥𝐹
𝑖 −  𝑟𝑃 𝑥𝑃
𝑖 −  𝑟𝐿  
( 𝑥𝐿
𝑖 −  (𝑡̅ −   𝑐𝐿





The full income constraint can be simplified by explicitly expressing profits as 
 ?̃?𝑅𝑐𝑅
𝑖 +  𝑝𝑀 𝑐𝑀
𝑖  +   𝑟𝐿 𝑐𝐿
𝑖 ≤   𝑟𝐿 𝑡̅ + 𝜋𝑖 − 𝑇                                                            [5] 
 
𝜋 = 𝑝𝑅𝐹𝑅 (𝑥𝑆
𝑖 ,  𝑥𝐹
𝑖 ,  𝑥𝑃
𝑖 ,  𝑥𝐿
𝑖 ) −   𝑟𝑆 𝑥𝑆
𝑖 −  𝑟𝐹 𝑥𝐹
𝑖 −  𝑟𝑃 𝑥𝑃
𝑖 −  𝑟𝐿 𝑥𝐿
𝑖                         [6] 
 
The left-hand side,  ?̃?𝑅𝑐𝑅
𝑖 + 𝑝𝑀 𝑐𝑀
𝑖  +   𝑟𝐿 𝑐𝐿
𝑖 , is total household expenditures on the household’s 
purchase of rice, the composite non-rice good, and leisure (i.e., the opportunity cost of not 
working on the farm). The right-hand side denotes full income; the total value of time 𝑟𝐿 𝑡̅ , 
profits 𝜋𝑖, and government transfers. Both time and profits are evaluated at market wages and 
prices.  
 
By substituting equation [6] into [5], results in the Lagrangian for this framework:  
 
ℒ =    max
𝑐𝑅,𝑐𝑀,𝑐𝐿,𝑥𝑆,𝑥𝐹,𝑥𝑃,𝑥𝐿
𝑈 (𝑐𝑅
𝑖 ,  𝑐𝑀
𝑖 ,  𝑐𝐿
𝑖 )  
+   𝜆 (  𝑟𝐿
𝑖𝑡̅ + 𝑝𝑅 𝐹𝑅 (𝑥𝑆
𝑖 ,  𝑥𝐹
𝑖 ,  𝑥𝑃
𝑖 ,  𝑥𝐿
𝑖 )  −  𝑟𝑆 𝑥𝑆
𝑖 −  𝑟𝐹 𝑥𝐹
𝑖 −  𝑟𝑃 𝑥𝑃
𝑖 −  𝑟𝐿 𝑥𝐿
𝑖   






With Constant Elasticity Substitution (CES) utility and Cobb-Douglas production functions the 
Lagrangian is: 
 


































 −  𝑟𝑆 𝑥𝑆
𝑖 −  𝑟𝐹 𝑥𝐹
𝑖 −  𝑟𝑃 𝑥𝑃
𝑖
−  𝑟𝐿 𝑥𝐿
𝑖 − ( ?̃?𝑅𝑐𝑅
𝑖 + 𝑝𝑀 𝑐𝑀
𝑖  +   𝑟𝐿
𝑖 𝑐𝐿
𝑖  ) − 𝑇 ),                      [8] 
 
where 𝛼𝑅
𝑖  denotes the share parameter of rice and non- rice consumption, 𝛼𝑀
𝑖  is share parameter 
of composite non-rice goods, 𝛼𝐿
𝑖  is share parameter of non-working hours or leisure, 𝜌 is the 






𝑖 ,  , and 𝛽𝐿
𝑖  are the share 
parameters for seed, fertilizer, pesticides, and labor, respectively, and 𝐴𝑖 is the productivity 
parameter which represents land quality and farmers’ ability to manage the farms. 


































































































































































































 −   𝑟𝑆 𝑥𝑆
𝑖 −  𝑟𝐹 𝑥𝐹
𝑖 −  𝑟𝑃 𝑥𝑃
𝑖 −  𝑟𝐿 𝑥𝐿
𝑖
− ( ?̃?𝑅𝑐𝑅
𝑖 +  𝑝𝑀 𝑐𝑀
𝑖  +   𝑟𝐿
𝑖 𝑐𝐿






Eliminating 𝜆 by dividing  
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝑐𝑅
𝑖   and 
𝜕ℒ
 𝜕𝑐𝑀
𝑖   by  
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝑐𝐿
𝑖  : 
After eliminating 𝜆 (the FOCs of eliminating 𝜆 is provided in Appendix 4.2) 



























































































































































































































−   𝑟𝑆 𝑥𝑆
𝑖 −  𝑟𝐹 𝑥𝐹
𝑖 −  𝑟𝑃 𝑥𝑃
𝑖 −  𝑟𝐿 𝑥𝐿
𝑖
− ( ?̃?𝑅𝑐𝑅
𝑖 +  𝑝𝑀 𝑐𝑀
𝑖  +   𝑟𝐿 𝑐𝐿
𝑖  ) − 𝑇 = 0                                             [23]  
 















































































































=   𝑟𝐿                                                          [29] 
 
















 −   𝑟𝑆 𝑥𝑆
𝑖 −  𝑟𝐹 𝑥𝐹
𝑖 −  𝑟𝑃 𝑥𝑃
𝑖 −  𝑟𝐿 𝑥𝐿
𝑖
= ( ?̃?𝑅𝑐𝑅
𝑖 +  𝑝𝑀 𝑐𝑀
𝑖  +   𝑟𝐿 𝑐𝐿
𝑖  ) − 𝑇.                                                [30] 
 
Equations [24] – [30] represent a system of seven equations in seven endogenous variables 
𝑐𝑅 , 𝑐𝑀, 𝑐𝐿 , 𝑥𝑆, 𝑥𝐹 , 𝑥𝑃, 𝑥𝐿. To simplify the empirical analysis, analytical solution for the input 
demand function, income, and consumer demand functions are solved for using this system of 
seven equations. Solving equations [26] – [29] simultaneously yields input demand functions: 
 
𝑥𝑆


























































                                                                 [31]  
 
 𝑥𝐹

























































































































                                                                 [33]  
 
 𝑥𝐿


























































                                                                 [34]  
 
With analytical solutions for the input demand functions, income 𝑌 is fully defined by left-hand 
side of equation [30] for given output and input prices: 
 

















−  𝑟𝑆 𝑥𝑆
𝑖 (∙) −  𝑟𝐹 𝑥𝐹
𝑖 (∙) −  𝑟𝑃 𝑥𝑃
𝑖 (∙) −  𝑟𝐿 𝑥𝐿
𝑖 (∙).                                                         [35]                                           
 
Then given income, solving equations [24], [25], and [30] simultaneously yields consumer 
demand functions: 
𝑐𝑅























(1−𝜌)                                                                          [36] 
 
𝑐𝑀




















(1−𝜌)                                                                          [37] 
 
𝑐𝐿




















(1−𝜌)                                                                         [38] 
 
The above model defines a system of 8 equations (equations [31] – [38]) in 8 endogenous 
variables ( 𝑥𝑆
𝑖 (∙),  𝑥𝐹
𝑖 (∙),  𝑥𝑃
𝑖 (∙),  𝑥𝐿
𝑖 (∙), 𝑌(∙), 𝑐𝑅
𝑖 (∙), 𝑐𝑀
𝑖 (∙), 𝑐𝐿
𝑖 (∙)) that are implemented to quantify 
the effect of free trade policy—through changes in the producer price of paddy rice (𝑝𝑅) and 
consumer price of milled rice ( ?̃?𝑅)—on individual rice farmers’ production and consumption. 
With production and consumption impacts quantified, we can analyze how free trade affects the 
poverty and welfare of farmers, which are defined next. 
Poverty is defined using both monetary and non-monetary measures through examining 
household incomes and rice consumption. Individual household income levels are compared to 
Malaysia’s current national Poverty Line Income (PLI) which is specified, for a household of six, 
as a total annual income of RM 9,600 (US$ 2,238) for poor and RM 5,520 (US$ 1,287) for 
extreme poor. However, a sole income indicator will not capture the household’s standard of 
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living when the price of rice falls under free trade; these drawbacks indicate that consumption is 
a better predictor of derivation than income (Meyer and Sullivan 2003, 2011). Thus, as a 
compliment to the income-based poverty measure, a consumption-based measure is defined as 
the quantity of rice consumed per person that is below the per capita consumption average of 
88.9 kg. We quantify the percentage of households with: a) earnings below the two income 
levels and b) per person rice consumption below the per capita average before and after free 
trade. The poverty measurements among rice farm households help Malaysia, as a developing 
country, to gauge farm program effectiveness and guide policy development strategy. Since 
neither of the individual poverty measures fully represent a household’s welfare, a complete 
welfare measurement is considered next. 
With the CES utility function defined in equation [8] being homogeneous of degree 
one,30 it gives the real income index of rice farmer household 𝑖. Calculating the percentage 
change in real income before and after the free trade policy provides the equivalent variation 
                                                     
30 The utility function is homogeneous of degree one if it satisfies the 
condition: 𝑈 (𝑆𝑐𝑅
𝑖 ,  𝑆𝑐𝑀
𝑖 ,  𝑆𝑐𝐿
𝑖 ) = 𝑆1𝑈 (𝑐𝑅
𝑖 ,  𝑐𝑀
𝑖 ,  𝑐𝐿
𝑖 ), where 𝑆 is a constant. Thus, scaling utility in 
equation [8] by 𝑆 gives: 
𝑈 (𝑆𝑐𝑅
𝑖 ,  𝑆𝑐𝑀
𝑖 ,  𝑆𝑐𝐿




































































welfare measure for each household. Equivalent variation measures the change in wealth under 
baseline prices that would have the same consumer welfare effect with free trade prices holding 
income constant at the baseline level. 
3.  Data and Model Calibration 
This section discusses data and sources, estimation of probability density functions, 
sampling technique for utility and production share parameters, and calibration method for the 
remaining parameters.  
3.1 Data Integration 
 
To parameterize and calibrate the model, this study integrates and utilizes three different 
farm household surveys on rice farming and production in Malaysia that were conducted by the 
Malaysian Agricultural Research and Development Institute (MARDI). These surveys were 
designed with different research objectives and in different production periods to help 
researchers analyze the rice policy issues of self-sufficiency and food security. In doing so, the 
studies provide key information on the heterogeneity among rice farmers. Since one of goals of 
this study is to analyze farm incomes and expenditure, these surveys are useful to calibrate the 
individual-specific parameters in the model. Focusing on major rice production areas, each 
survey details different aspects of rice farmers’ finances: farm household income and 
expenditures and farm household production expenditures. 
3.1.1 Farm Household Expenditure and Income Survey 
 
The Farm Household Expenditure and Income Survey (HIES) was conducted by research 
associates from MARDI and trained enumerators from Muda Agriculture Development 
Authority (MADA) and Kemubu Agriculture Development Authority (KADA) in 2012/2013 
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production years (Rabu and Mohd Shah, 2013). This survey covered 123 rice farmers 
represented as the head of the household in three (IADA Barat Laut Selangor, MADA, and 
KADA) out of eight major areas of rice production in Malaysia. Summary statistics from this 
survey are reported in Table 4.18. From this survey, the number of household members, 
household incomes, and household expenditure are important variables used in the model 
calibration discussed in detail below. 
 
Table 4.18: Selected variables on farm household expenditure and income survey. 



























































































3.1.2 Farm Production Expenditure Survey 
 
The Farm Production Expenditure Survey was conducted in the 2016 production year and 
focused on major production areas including MADA and the Integrated Agriculture 
Development Area (IADA) Penang. A total of 120 rice farmers from these regions were 
randomly selected. The main objective of the survey was to obtain the production costs and 
expenditures from the sampled rice farms (Table 4.19). From this survey, acreage, yield, 
production input costs for seed, fertilizer, pesticide, herbicide, labor, and land were used in the 
model calibration.  
Table 4.19: Selected variables on farm production expenditure survey. 
Regions Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev. 
 
Acreage (Ha) 
MADA 2.09 0.29 17.40 2.46 
IADA Penang 3.47 0.20 21.40 4.50 
Average 2.78 0.25 19.40 3.48  
Yield (MT/Ha) 
MADA 6.36 2.96 8.68 1.37 
IADA Penang 6.57 2.25 11.22 2.02 
Average 6.47 2.61 9.95 1.70  
Seed Cost (RM/Ha) * 
MADA 282.48 122.50 347.22 29.90 
IADA Penang  629.20 223.20 1,125.00 233.92 
Average 455.84 172.85 736.11 131.91  
Fertilizer Cost (RM/Ha) * 
MADA 85.50 30.00 156.39 35.66 
IADA Penang 87.50 38.00 156.00 49.43 
Average 86.50 34.00 156.20 42.54  
Pesticide Cost (RM/Ha) * 
MADA 298.49 207.00 478.01 95.96 
IADA Penang 447.99 200.00 953.00 237.08 




Table 4.19 (Cont.) 
Regions Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev. 
  
Herbicide Cost (RM/Ha) 
MADA 256.47 0.00 555.00 137.30 
IADA Penang 142.65 48.00 480.00 109.22 
Average 199.56 24.00 517.50 123.26  
Labor Cost (RM/Ha) 
MADA 566.20 250.00 1,014.50 239.20 
IADA Penang 722.56 250.00 2,030.00 448.40 
Average 644.38 250.00 1,522.25 343.80  
Land Rental Cost (RM/Ha) 
MADA 1,733.78 1042.50 2,780.00 372.75 
IADA Penang 883.00 159.00 1,574.00 305.67 
Average 1,308.39 600.75 2,177.00 339.21 
* Costs are excluded subsidies. 
   Source: Malaysian Agricultural Research and Development Institute. 
 
3.1.3 Farm Household Income Survey 
 
The Farm Household Income Survey (HIS) sampled 250 rice farmers from MADA, 
Integrated Agriculture Development Area (IADA) Penang, IADA Kemasin, IADA KETARA, 
and KADA and was conducted in 2015/16 production years. Key variables collected include the 
main sources of farm household income and working hours on rice farm activities, which are 
also the essential variables for model calibration (Table 4.20). 
Table 4.20: Selected variables of farm household income survey. 
Regions Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev. 



































Table 4.20 (Cont.) 
 
Regions Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev. 































*1=Rice farms, 2=Non-rice farms, 3=Own business, 4=Public service, 5=Private Service. 
Source: Malaysian Agricultural Research and Development Institute (2015/16). 
 
 
3.2 Distribution Estimations of Share Parameters 
For individual farmers, the data from the three surveys are used to calibrate the share 
parameters in the utility function (𝛼𝑅
𝑖  and 𝛼𝑀
𝑖 ) and production function (𝛽𝑆
𝑖, 𝛽𝐹
𝑖 , 𝛽𝑃
𝑖 , and 𝛽𝐿
𝑖 ). 
Share parameters in the utility function are household expenditures on consumption goods (rice 
or non-rice) divided by total consumption expenditure. Share parameters in the production 
function are farm expenditures on individual input (seed, fertilizer, pesticide, and labor) divided 
by total farm expenditures. Since observations across surveys do not track the same rice farmer 
(i.e. households) with different sample sizes, the data cannot be used directly from the surveys to 
calibrate these share parameters for each individual farmer. Therefore, the survey data is used to 
estimate the distributions for each share parameter using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). 
MLE, which finds the parameter values that maximize the likelihood of given the observed 
sample, is applied to estimate the parameters for a univariate probability density function (PDF) 
of each of the utility and production share parameters. Then, utilizing correlation matrices, the 
multivariate simulation approach developed by Phoon et al. (2004) is applied to randomly draw 




3.2.1 Probability Density Function and Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
 
For both utility and production share parameters, distributions are estimated using log-
likelihood functions and the MLE procedure. The log-likelihood functions are derived for the 
Normal, Log-normal, Beta, Gamma, truncated, and mixture distributions. Then, AIC and BIC 
statistics and graphical analysis, are employed to determine the distribution that best fits the data. 
The PDF used to estimate share parameters are as follow: 
 
(i) Normal Density Function: 
For the random variable 𝑥 ∈  [−∞, ∞], the equation for the normal distribution is: 






where 𝜇 ∈ [−∞, ∞] is the mean and 𝜎2 > 0 is the variance. 
 
(ii) Log-normal Density Function: 
For the random variable 𝑥 ∈  [0, ∞], the equation for the log-normal distribution is: 






where 𝜇 ∈ [−∞, ∞] is the mean and 𝜎 > 0 is the variance.  
 
(iii) Beta Density Function: 




𝑓(𝑥) =  
(𝑥)𝛼−1 (1 − 𝑥)𝛽−1
𝐵(𝛼, 𝛽)
 , 
where 𝛼 > 0 and 𝛽 > 0 are both shape parameters.  
 
(iv) Gamma Density Function: 







where 𝑘 > 0 is shape and 𝜃 > 0 is scale.  
 
(v) Truncated Density Function: 
A truncated distribution results from a restriction on the support of a probability density 
function. Since share parameters are restricted to values between zero and one (i.e., 0 < x < 1), 
truncated distributions are used to limit support of the densities with supports outside this range. 
Truncated distributions are also a mathematically defensible way to preserve the main features of 
distribution while avoiding extreme values for random samples where the support is infinite at 





        for 𝑎 < 𝑥 ≤ 𝑏
0                                     otherwise,
 




(vi) Mixture Density Function: 
A mixture distribution refers to a probability distribution of random variables that is 
derived from a mixture of two or more PDFs. Since some share parameters are bimodal (see 
histograms presented below), mixture density in the PDF is used. For PDFs 𝑓1(𝑥), … , 𝑓𝑛(𝑥) and 
weighting parameters 𝑤1, … , 𝑤𝑛 where 𝑤𝑖 > 0 for all i and ∑ 𝑤
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑖
= 1, the mixture distribution 
is defined as: 




Next, the MLE procedure is discussed. After the likelihood function is defined based on 
joint density functions, Newton’s method is applied to find the parameter values that maximize 
the likelihood function given the data. The joint density function for an independent and 
identically distributed sample is: 
 
𝑓(𝑥1, 𝑥2, … . . , 𝑥𝑛 | 𝜃) = 𝑓(𝑥1| 𝜃 )  ×  𝑓(𝑥2| 𝜃)  × … ..  ×  𝑓(𝑥𝑛| 𝜃),  
 
where 𝑥1, 𝑥2, … . . , 𝑥𝑛 are observed values and 𝜃 is a parameter vector.  The likelihood 
function is defined by considering the values 𝑥1, 𝑥2, … . . , 𝑥𝑛  to be fixed observations and 
allowing 𝜃 to change freely. The likelihood function is: 






The likelihood function is often applied in natural logarithm (ln), which yields the log-
likelihood function: 




This MLE procedure is applied to estimate the parameters of the probability distribution 
functions for Normal, Log-normal, Beta, Gamma, truncated, and mixture distributions for the 
utility and production function share-parameter data. 
From the results of the MLE estimation procedure, the maximized distribution estimates 
are selected using the Akaike Information Criterion31 (AIC) – the lowest AIC value represents a 
the best model (i.e., minimize the information loss). The two lowest AIC coefficients were 
identified for utility and production share parameters. 
 
3.2.2 Distribution Estimation of Utility Share Parameters 
 
Share parameters of the utility function are 𝛼𝑟 for rice consumption, 𝛼𝑎 for non-rice food 
consumption, and 𝛼𝑚 for manufacturing goods consumption. On average, the household 
expenditures are 4.3%, 37.1%, and 58.6% for rice, non-rice food, and manufacturing goods, 
respectively. However, visual inspection of histograms of the data (see Figures 4.13, 4.14, and 
4.15 below) indicate these share parameters are non-normal. In order to determine the “best-
                                                     
31 The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is a measure of the relative quality of statistical 
models for a given set of data. Given a collection of models for the data, AIC estimates the 
quality of each model, relative to each of the other models. Hence, AIC provides a means 
for model selection. 
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fitting” distribution for each utility share parameters, the other distributions are also estimated: 
Log-normal, Gamma, Beta, truncated, and mixture distributions (Table 4.21).  
Table 4.21: Distribution estimates of utility share parameters. 
Utility 
Parameters 
Normal Log-normal Gamma 
Truncated 
Normal 
    K    
𝛼𝑟 0.0434 0.0306 -3.3669 0.7065 2.3133 0.0188 0.0176 0.0453 
𝛼𝑎 0.3706 0.1417 -1.0757 0.4288 6.1568 0.0602 0.3683 0.1446 





Beta   
   k      
𝛼𝑟 -3.3670 0.7065 2.3156 0.0187 2.2133 48.603
0 
  
𝛼𝑎 -1.0662 0.4405 6.09 0.061 3.8987 6.5982   
𝛼𝑚 164.6002 10.053 2.5997 0.3779 3.1148 2.4088   
 Mixture Normal 
 1 1 1 2 1 2 Log-likelihood 
𝛼𝑚 0.9752 0.0247 0.5851 0.6212 0.1552 0.002 57.4045 
Source: Results are simulated using R. 
 
The Akaike Information Criterion32 (AICs) are calculated for each of the different 
distributions. The two distributions with lowest AIC values are selected for each share 
parameter. For 𝛼𝑟 the Gamma and Log-Normal,
33 for 𝛼𝑎 the Beta and truncated Gamma 
distributions, and for 𝛼𝑚 the normal and mixture normal have the lowest AIC and are selected 
for the analysis (see Table 4.22). 
                                                     
32 Akaike (1973) provides a way to select the “best” model determined by an AIC score:    
𝐴𝐼𝐶 = 2𝐾 − 2 ln (?̂?), where K is the number of parameter estimates (degree of freedom) and the 
log-likelihood at its maximum points of the estimated model. Note that Bayesian Information 
Criterion results are consistent with the AIC results. AIC can only be used to assess whether a 
model fits the data better relative to another model. 
33 Note that the truncated and non-truncated distributions of Gamma and Log-Normal have equal 
AIC coefficients; for simplicity, the Gamma and Log-Normal are selected while the truncated 
distributions are omitted. 
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Table 4.22: Results of AIC coefficients for utility share parameters. 
Share 
Parameters 











-561.27 -561.27 -560.65 -560.65 -560.29 -540.28 
 
-504.12 




















-109.01 -108.06 -102.80 -57.42 -15.16 16.30 
 
16.30 
Source: Results are simulated using R. 
Finally, to assure the most precise distribution estimation for each share parameter, 
graphical analysis is employed. Using the estimated parameters, the two probability density 
functions (PDFs) with the lowest AICs are superimposed onto the histogram of the data. The 
distribution that visually fits the data most accurately is used for the simulation analysis. Figure 
4.13 provides the graphical analysis for 𝛼𝑟. Based on this figure, the Gamma distribution (blue 
curve) most accurately fits the histogram, which is consistent with the AIC analysis. Therefore, 





    Source: Results are simulated using R. 
 
Figure 4.13: Probability density function for 𝜶𝒓. 
 
Figure 4.14 presents the PDFs analysis for 𝛼𝑎. The analysis reveals that the Beta 
distribution (blue curve) fits the histogram more precisely relative to the truncated Gamma 
distribution (red curve), which also is consistent with the AIC. Thus, Beta distribution is selected 





             
 
  Source: Results are simulated using R. 
 
Figure 4.14: Probability density function for 𝜶𝒂. 
 
Figure 4.15 displays the PDFs for the 𝛼𝑚 share parameter. The histogram indicates 
bimodal distributions; thus, the analysis of PDFs requires a mixture distribution. Although the 
Normal distribution (blue curve) has the lowest AIC, the mixture Normal (red curve) better 
reflects the histogram. Therefore, the mixture Normal is selected for manufacturing good 




             Source: Results are simulated using R. 
 
Figure 4.15: Probability density function for 𝜶𝒎. 
 
3.2.3 Distribution Estimation of Production Share Parameters 
 
For the rice production function, the share parameters are 𝛽𝑆 for seed, 𝛽𝐹 for fertilizer, 𝛽𝑃 
for pesticides, and 𝛽𝐿 for labor. Yield (𝑦) is also used in calibrating the productivity parameter 
and its distribution is estimated. On average, farmers spend 8.9% on seeds, 27.5% on fertilizers, 
9.3% on pesticides, 16.2% on labor, and 37.8% on land for rice production expenditure. Each 
farmer is assumed to own farmland passed on from previous generations, so land expenditure is 
excluded in the model. However, graphical analysis of histograms of the data (see Figures 4.16, 
4.17, 4.18, and 4.19 below) indicate the share parameters are non-normal. Therefore, other 
distributions are also estimated: Log-normal, Gamma, Beta, truncated, and mixture distributions 
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(Table 4.23) so that the “best-fitting” distribution for each production share parameters can be 
determined. 
Table 4.23: Distribution estimates of production share parameters. 
Parameters 
Normal Log-normal Gamma 
    k  
y 6.4614 1.7159 1.8241 0.3045 12.1589 0.5314 
𝛽𝑆 0.0898 0.0362 -2.4986 0.4451 5.6745 0.0158 
𝛽𝐹 0.2757 0.0377 -1.2976 0.1370 56.5 0.005 
𝛽𝑃 0.0932 0.0286 0.2845 -2.4142 10.8085 0.0086 
𝛽𝐿 0.1621 0.0533 -1.8737 0.3331 9.1149 0.0177 
𝛽𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑 0.3789 0.0755 -0.9895 0.1948 23.1814 0.0164 
 Truncated Normal Truncated Log-
Normal 
Truncated Gamma 
     k  
𝛽𝑆 0.0889 0.0373 -2.4986 0.4451 5.6768 0.0158 
𝛽𝐹 0.2757 0.0376 -1.2976 0.1370 29.5 0.0094 
𝛽𝑃 0.0932 0.0287 -2.4141 0.2845 11.0095 0.0085 
𝛽𝐿 0.1619 0.0536 -1.8737 0.3331 9.1165 0.0178 
𝛽𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑 0.3789 0.0755 -0.9895 0.1948 23.1813 0.0164 
 Beta     
       
𝛽𝑆 5.2815 53.4964     
𝛽𝐹 38.8578 102.0567     
𝛽𝑃 10.7790 104.6902     
𝛽𝐿 7.8203 40.3921     
𝛽𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑 15.7777 25.8290     
 Mixture Normal 
 1 1 1 2 1 2 
𝛽𝑆 0.9882 0.0117 0.0895 0.1135 0.0363 0.0001 
𝛽𝐹 0.0000 0.9999 0.2743 0.2757 0.0375 0.0376 
𝛽𝑃 0.0211 0.9789 0.0755 0.0936 0.0005 0.0287 
𝛽𝐿 0.9753 0.0246 0.1603 0.2316 0.0528 0.0006 
𝛽𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑 0.9795 0.0204 0.3780 0.4219 0.0760 0.0002 
 Mixture Gamma 
 1 1 1 2 1 2 
𝛽𝑆 0.6978 0.3021 14.7611 21.2282 0.0048 0.0066 
𝛽𝐹 0.0629 0.937 7.1201 8.9121 0.0037 0.0105 
𝛽𝑃 0.0046 0.9953 5145.0314 10.7694 0.0001 0.0086 
𝛽𝐿 0.9876 0.01234 11.5887 63.0113 0.0138 0.0049 
𝛽𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑 0.0000 1.000 1632.0971 25.1842 0.0001 0.0150 
Source: Results are simulated using R. 
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Similar to the utility share parameters, the two distributions with lowest AICs are selected 
for each production share parameter. For 𝛽𝑆 the mixture Beta and Beta, for 𝛽𝐹 the Beta and Log-
Normal, for 𝛽𝑃 the mixture Beta and Log-Normal, and for  𝛽𝐿 Log-Normal and Gamma 
distributions have the lowest AIC and are selected for the analysis (see Table 4.24).  
Table 4.24: Results of AIC coefficients for production share parameters. 
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Source: Results are simulated using R.  
Figure 4.16 provides the graphical analysis for 𝛽𝑆. Based on this figure, the mixture Beta 
distribution (blue curve) accurately fits the histogram, which is consistent with the AIC analysis. 






     Source: Results are simulated using R. 
 
Figure 4.16: Probability density function for  𝜷𝑺. 
 
The PDF of 𝛽𝐹 is shown in Figure 4.17. Because both the Beta (blue curve) and Log-
Normal distributions (red curve) indicate precisely fit the histogram, we need to select the 





Source: Results are simulated using R. 
 
Figure 4.17: Probability density function for 𝜷𝑭. 
 
Figure 4.18 displays the PDFs of 𝛽𝑃, pesticides share parameter. The graphical analysis 
indicates the mixture Beta distribution (blue curve) accurately fits the histogram which is 
consistent with the AIC results. Therefore, the Mixture Beta is selected over the Log-Normal 





 Source: Results are simulated using R. 
 
Figure 4.18: Probability density function for 𝜷𝑷. 
 
Figure 4.19 provides the graphical analysis for 𝛽𝐿. Based on this figure, both the Log-
Normal (blue curve) and Gamma (red curve) distributions accurately fit the histogram. However, 




 Source: Results are simulated using R. 
 
Figure 4.19: Probability density function for 𝜷𝑳. 
 
Since drawing from individual distributions leads to uncorrelated draws, a multi-variate 
simulation approach is applied to obtain the correlated draws that accurately represent the 
correlation among variables in the three surveys. The Phoon, Quek, and Huang (PQH) (Phoon et 
al, 2004) algorithm is applied, which leads to random draws from univariate distributions 
mimicking random draws from multivariate distribution. The PQH method provides a very 
flexible simulation approach for correlated parameters and describes a procedure for simulating 
correlated variables from mixed marginal distributions based on eigen decomposition of the rank 
correlation matrix (Anderson, Harri, and Coble, 2009; Phoon, Quek, and Huang, 2002). The 
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PQH algorithm was followed to generate 1,000 correlated random draws for individual farmer 
yields (𝑦𝑖s), production share parameters (𝛽𝑖s), and consumption share parameters (𝛼𝑗s). 
The correlation coefficients of utility and production parameters that present in Table 4.25 and 
4.26 confirm each parameter is correlated. 
Table 4.25: Correlation coefficients of utility share parameters. 
Utility Parameters 𝜶𝒓 𝜶𝒂 𝜶𝒎 
𝛼𝑟 1.0000 0.2902 -0.4679 
𝛼𝑎 0.2902 1.0000 -0.9815 
𝛼𝑚 -0.4679 -0.9815 1.0000 
Source: Results are simulated using R. 
 
Table 4.26: Correlation coefficients of production share parameters. 
Production Parameters 𝜷𝑺 𝜷𝑭 𝜷𝑷 𝜷𝑳 
𝛽𝑆 1.0000 -0.1996 -0.0176 -0.1649 
𝛽𝐹 -0.1996 1.0000 0.1090 0.0882 
𝛽𝑃 -0.0176 0.1090 1.0000 -0.0212 
𝛽𝐿 -0.1649 0.0882 -0.0212 1.0000 
Source: Results are simulated using R. 
 
3.3 Model Calibration 
With correlated random draws for individual farmer yields (𝑦𝑖s) and production (𝛽𝑖s) and 
consumption (𝛼𝑖s) share parameters from selected distribution estimates, the next step is to 
define and calibrate the remaining parameters in the model. Both the producer price of long-
grain paddy rice and the consumer price of long-grain milled rice are obtained from RICEFLOW 
model. Other data such as minimum wage, average farm size, input prices (price of seed, 
fertilizer, pesticides), average of household members, total available hours in a year (average 
number of people times 24 hours in a day multiplies by 365 days in a year) are obtained from 
household surveys.  
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Given the correlated random draws for 𝛽𝑖s and 𝑦𝑖s, prices of long-grain paddy rice and 
inputs, and analytical solution for input demand functions equations [31] – [34], the productivity 













𝑖 . The RICEFLOW analysis 
generates baseline results for the year 2020, and predicts domestic production will increase by 
6.8% by 2020. Consequently, productivity parameter is increased by 6.856% over the calibrated 
values to match this rise in production. Therefore, the baseline year in RICEFLOW and the 
baseline year in the current study are consistent. 
With the production parameters calibrated, government transfer 𝑇 is calibrated such that 
income from rice production matches the current income-based poverty rates among rice farmers 
to 16.82% (HIS, 2016). The CES parameter 𝜌 between rice, manufacturing, and leisure is 
assumed to be -2, which implies an elasticity of substitution 𝜎 =
1
1−𝜌
 of 0.33 and the 
consumption goods are imperfectly substitutable34. With total expenditures on rice and 
composite non-rice consumption reported in HIS (2016), distributions of the expenditure share of 
these consumable goods are estimated in the preceding subsection 3.2.2 Distribution Estimation 
of Utility Share Parameters. However, data on the value of leisure (and thus expenditure share 
𝛼𝐿
𝑖 ) or the consumer price of the composite non-rice good  ?̃?𝑀 does not exist. Therefore, 
assuming a common leisure share parameter among all households (𝛼𝐿
𝑖 = 𝛼𝐿), 𝛼𝐿 and  ?̃?𝑀 are 
calibrated to match two facts: the average household spends 72% (HIS, 2016) of their time at 
leisure and consumes 88.9 kg/person of rice per year (MARDI, 2014). With 𝛼𝐿 and  ?̃?𝑀 
                                                     
34 The estimation and assumption of CES parameter 𝜌 can be referred to Constant Elasticity 
Functions (Rutherford, 2002). 
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parameterized, all exogenous variables are defined, and the model can be simulated to quantify 
the effects of free trade on farm households. 
 
4.  Empirical Results and Discussions 
With the prices and exogenous parameters defined in the Data and Model Calibration 
section 3, equations [30] – [37] are simulated for the empirical analysis. The simulation analysis 
is run for each of the 1,000 individual farmers randomly drawn using the estimated univariate 
distributions and the PQH algorithm. Two scenarios are run for each farmer to quantify the 
effects of free trade policy: First, in the baseline scenario, all prices are maintained at the levels 
specified in the calibration, which results in the model closely reproducing the survey data for 
input demands, production, income, and farmers’ demand for rice, composite non-rice, and 
leisure. Second, in the alternate scenario, the effects of free trade in the Malaysian rice sector 
from the RICEFLOW analysis on the producer price of long-grain paddy rice (𝑝𝑅) and consumer 
price of long-grain white rice ( ?̃?𝑅) are imposed on the system of equations. Specifically, 𝑝𝑅 is 
decreased by 11.9% and  ?̃?𝑅 is reduced by 14.74%, as reported in the free-trade scenario in 
Chapter 3. The solutions of the baseline and alternate scenarios are then used to calculate the 
poverty and welfare measures for both scenarios. Finally, the solutions of the endogenous 
variables, poverty, and welfare measures in the baseline and alternate scenarios are compared to 
quantify the effects of free trade in the Malaysian rice sector on rice farmers. 
4.1 Production 
 The impacts of free trade policy on rice production are quantified as the percent change 
in inputs and rice yield from the baseline to the alternate scenario for each rice farmer. The 
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income is then computed for each farmer and compared to the poverty level to find the 
proportion of farmers that are poor under both scenarios. 
4.1.1 Production Impact 
 
The decline in producer price for long-grain paddy rice after the implementation of free 
trade, results in the factors of production (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and labor) decreasing on 
average by 16.16% with standard deviations of 0.77, which indicates the varied effect of the free 
trade policy among the rice farmers. While the Cobb-Douglas structure of the production 
function results in the same percentage decline in inputs, the absolute differences in input use 
vary. From the baseline, seed, fertilizer, pesticide, and total labor per hectare decline to a level of 
198.68 kg, 4.76 kg, 27.88 liters, and 22.10 hours, respectively. The reduction of inputs leads to a 
decline in rice yield by 4.84%, from 6.96 Mt/Ha to 6.62 Mt/Ha. However, the estimated yields 
effect is divergent between rice farms as the standard deviation of the percent change is 0.88 
(Table 4.27). Hence, these results show that rice farmer’s production declines from the free trade 
policy, which is consistent with the trade theory of a small country effect. 
     
  Table 4.27: The impacts of free trade policy on domestic production. 
 






Free Trade Policy Scenario 
Level % Change (Std. Dev.) 
Seed (Kg) 236.98 198.68 -16.16 (0.77) 
Fertilizer (Kg) 5.68 4.76 -16.16 (0.77) 
Pesticide (Liter) 33.25 27.88 -16.16 (0.77) 
Labor (Hrs) 26.36 22.10 -16.16 (0.77) 
Yield (Mt/Ha) 6.96 6.62 -4.84 (0.88) 
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4.1.2 Income Poverty Measure 
 
 The significant decrease in production inputs and rice yield leads to a decline in domestic 
production after the implementation of free trade. This causes rice farmers’ household income to 
fall relative to the baseline. As a result, the percent of rice farmers who generate monthly 
household income below RM 800 (the average national poverty line for poor) increased from 
16.40% to 33.20%, while those earning below RM 460 (the average national poverty line for 
extreme poor) surged from 11.30% to 22.30% (Table 4.28). Because free trade leads to more rice 
imports, the international competition for domestic rice farmers is stronger. Thus, for the rice 
farmers, free trade will negatively affect incomes leading to escalating poverty rates of both poor 
and extreme poor. However, while the farm gate price of rice and production falls, leading to 
lower income, the consumer price of rice also declines. While rice farmers experience a negative 
income shock, they could actually consume more of the staple food with a lower consumer price 
for rice. 
Table 4.28: Income poverty measures for baseline and free trade. 
Parameters Baseline (%) Free Trade (%) 
Monthly household income < RM 800 16.40 33.20 
Monthly household income < RM 460 11.30 22.30 





The impacts of free trade policy on households’ consumption are measured as the percent 
change in the average per capita rice consumption, non-rice consumption, and leisure hours, 
from the baseline to the alternate scenario for each household. The rice consumption is then 
145 
 
computed for each household and compared to the poverty level to find the proportion of 
households that are below the subsistence level of rice consumption per person under both 
scenarios. 
4.2.1 Consumer Demand Effect 
 
The decrease in consumer price for long grain rice after free trade implementation leads 
to an increase in rice consumption by 5.01% on average with a standard deviation of 0.11. The 
consumption increases from 533.40 to 560.12 Kg per household of six (or 88.9 per person) from 
the baseline to the alternate scenario level, respectively. Since rice becomes more affordable due 
to the lower market rice prices, consumers have higher purchasing power after free trade 
implementation. Both composite non-rice consumption and leisure (non-working hours) decline 
slightly by 0.42%. These results indicate that farmers reduce consumption of composite non-rice, 
but extend family working hours on the rice farm, which partially offsets the reduction in 
income.35 From the baseline, composite non-rice consumption and leisure decrease to a level of 
147.91 and 37,736.60, respectively (Table 4.29). On the consumption side, the results suggest 
that rice farmers are better off with the implementation of free trade. With affordability as a key 
pillar of food-security, free trade plays a significant role in Malaysia’s food security as it leads to 




                                                     
35 If total working hours are falling while family working hours are rising, then hired labor hours 
on the farm must be declining. 
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Table 4.29: The impacts of free trade on farm household consumption  
(per household per year). 
 
Parameters Baseline 2020 Free Trade Policy Scenario 
% Change Level (Std. Dev.) 
 























Source: Results are simulated using R. 
 
4.2.2 Rice Consumption Poverty Measure 
 
 The rice consumption poverty line is measured at 70 Kg per person (i.e. the minimum 
rice consumption per Kg per year from HIES). Free trade results in the proportion of farmers 
below 70 Kg per person to decline from 18.40% in baseline to 14.10% after the implementation 
of free trade. This suggests that poverty—measured in terms of rice consumption—will be 
alleviated for rice farmers when free trade is allowed. 
4.3 Farmers’ Welfare Measure 
With the income and rice consumption poverty measures leading to opposing conclusions 
about the poverty of rice farmers, a comprehensive welfare analysis for rice farmers is conducted 
by calculating equivalent variations for each household before and after free trade. This welfare 
measure is more comprehensive than the poverty estimates because it accounts for both income 
and price effects simultaneously. Note that the equivalent measure is for rice farm households 
only and is not a national welfare measure of free trade. After the implementation of the free 
trade policy, the index of equivalent variation welfare measure for farm households declines 
marginally by -0.42 from the baseline. Since the decrease is very marginal, less than one, the 
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results suggest that free trade causes no significant impact on individual farmers’ income and 
welfare. 
From a policy perspective, free trade will lead to a substantial increase in consumer 
surplus in rice consumption—not just for rice farmers but for all Malaysian rice consumers. 
Therefore, opening the rice market to free trade, while providing compensation to rice farmers to 
alleviate the negative impacts of free trade, could still be welfare improving for Malaysia as a 
whole. While free trade hurts rice farmers in terms of income and equivalent variation, there are 
policy combinations that can allow for free trade while leaving farmers equally well off.   
5.  Conclusions 
Poverty alleviation, especially for rural rice farmers, has been a long-standing goal in 
Malaysian national rice policy, as reflected in the government’s efforts to embark on various 
support and protective policies to enhance farmers’ livelihoods and welfare. One of the key trade 
policies that has been in place for decades is large tariffs on rice imports. In fact, the most recent 
policy review suggests prohibitive barriers in rice trades to pursue an autarky rice economy. 
Despite having participated in both bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTA), Malaysia 
excluded rice from the FTAs since it is classified as a sensitive commodity. 
This study analyzes the impact including rice in the FTAs would have on rice farmers by 
developing a farm household model for individual rice farmers in Malaysia. The model is 
simulated to evaluate the impacts of free trade—through changes in producer and consumer 
prices from the RICEFLOW analysis in Chapter 3—on rice farmers’ production, consumption, 
poverty, and welfare. The results indicate that even though free trade would hurt rice farmers in 
Malaysia due to increasing the percentage of farmers’ living below the national poverty line, 
farmers would increase their rice consumption due to the lower rice prices after the free trade, 
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which also benefits non-farm rice consumers in Malaysia. However, the equivalent variation (a 
complete welfare measure that combines both the effects of income and rice consumption) shows 
that free trade does make rice farmers worse off as their welfare falls, albeit minimally. While 
rice farmers are highly protected in Malaysia, the impacts of free trade are often misconstrued to 
focus only on the negative effects on the domestic production side and rice farmers’ incomes and 
welfare. This study provides key insights on the economic assessment of moving to a more 
liberalized rice market to the Malaysian government and policy makers.  
The welfare measures from this study focuses on rice farmers, and thus the results do not 
represent the entire rice consumer’s population and the whole economy. Given the negative 
welfare effect, an important extension of this analysis will modify the model to study the most 
efficient government transfer to make farmers equally well off, while still allowing for free trade. 
Specifically, this extension could evaluate whether bolstering current production subsidies or 
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Appendix 4.1: The simplification of utility functions. 
 
 ?̃?𝑅𝑐𝑅 +  𝑝𝑀𝑐𝑀  ≤  𝑝𝑅𝐹𝑅 (𝑥𝑆, 𝑥𝐹 , 𝑥𝑃, 𝑥𝐿) − 𝑟𝑆𝑥𝑆 − 𝑟𝐹𝑥𝐹 − 𝑟𝑃𝑥𝑃 − 𝑟𝐿(𝑥𝐿 −  𝑡̅ + 𝑐𝐿)) − 𝑇 
 ?̃?𝑅𝑐𝑅 +  𝑝𝑀𝑐𝑀  ≤  𝑝𝑅𝐹𝑅 (𝑥𝑆, 𝑥𝐹 , 𝑥𝑃, 𝑥𝐿) − 𝑟𝑆𝑥𝑆 − 𝑟𝐹𝑥𝐹 − 𝑟𝑃𝑥𝑃 − 𝑟𝐿𝑥𝐿 + 𝑟𝐿𝑡̅ − 𝑟𝐿𝑐𝐿 − 𝑇 
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𝛽𝐿 −  𝑟𝑆𝑥𝑆 − 𝑟𝐹𝑥𝐹 − 𝑟𝑃𝑥𝑃 − 𝑟𝐿𝑥𝐿 − ( ?̃?𝑅𝑐𝑅 + 𝑝𝑀𝑐𝑀  +  𝑟𝐿𝑐𝐿)




Economic Insights into Malaysian Rice Policy: Concluding Remarks 
 
 
1.  Dissertation Summary 
This dissertation research demonstrates the integration of agricultural economics and 
public policy to comprehensively evaluate and analyze a deep-rooted rice policy in Malaysia, 
primarily the impact of self-sufficiency and international trade policies at both the macro and 
micro levels. It consists of three sequential empirical studies using different quantitative 
methodologies that applies economic frameworks as the major mode of analysis. The fact that 
the Malaysia’s rice policy is a strategy of achieving self-sufficiency while the status quo of the 
national rice economy remains ambiguous, motivates this research to initially measure the 
competitiveness and comparative advantage of the domestic rice production and analyze the 
efficiency policies at the farm level. Therefore, prior to the major evaluation and analysis on self-
sufficiency and international free trade policies, we determine the current efficiency of domestic 
rice production with the self-sufficiency policy emphasis and provide foundational evidences on 
the current situation of policy consequences at the farm level. Further, the major analysis 
evaluates the impact of self-sufficiency and international trade policies on the rice sector at the 
national level in light of food security concerns. Finally, the study presents deeper evaluation and 
analyzes the impacts of the international trade policy at the farm-household level, on the 
heterogeneous rice farmers in Malaysia. While limited studies have attempted to analyze the 
Malaysian rice policies, these empirical studies establish the crucial rice policy concerns in 
Malaysia; self-sufficiency, international free trade, and food security. The specific research 
encompasses: 1) measuring the competitiveness and efficiency of rice production policy using a 
Policy Analysis Matrix, 2) evaluation and impact of self-sufficiency and international free trade 
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policies using a RICEFLOW model, and 3) evaluation and impact of international free trade on 
rice farmers using a Farm-Household model. The results of these studies also address food 
security concerns.  
1.1 The Competitiveness and Efficiency of Rice Production  
This study evaluates and analyzes domestic rice production system at farm level in 
Malaysia since the competitiveness and comparative advantage of domestic rice production has 
been distorted through high levels of intervention, protection, and subsidy supports provided by 
the government for many years. A wide range of policy programs have been implemented, most 
of which include input and output subsidies and regulated producer price with the goal being to 
achieve total self-sufficiency in rice. Even though the rice sector contributes a relatively small 
share to the national income, rice still receives special attention and has been given priority in a 
series of the national development policies in Malaysia. While subsidies have become a 
permanent policy strategy for decades and have involved substantial public investment, the 
domestic rice outcomes remain stagnant and only satisfy between 60-65% of the growing 
demand each year. In fact, the recent revised national rice policy provides more additional input 
and output subsidies which will continue to burden government expenditure. Recently, the 
government decided to more seriously pursue self-sufficiency, aiming to eliminate all rice 
imports in the future. 
This study applies policy analysis matrix approach to measure the competitiveness and 
comparative advantage of the domestic rice production system in Malaysia. The results indicate 
that while receiving substantial efforts and attention by the government, especially through 
realizing various production support programs, domestic rice is still lacking comparative 
advantage relative to rice imports. Currently, the total rice production subsidy is RM 2,571.3 (per 
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hectare) which accounts 59.1% of the total production cost (per hectare). With these substantial 
subsidies and producer price support, the average farmers’ net income is significantly low, RM 
703.36 (per hectare), which is below the national poverty line, RM 800 per household of six. If 
all subsidies and price support are removed, rice farmers would suffer from significant losses 
(RM 2,984.33 per hectare) due to high production costs for rice at the farm level.  
In addition, the protection measures also imply that the current policies are reducing the 
actual input costs while increasing the revenue through subsidizing inputs and imposing higher 
domestic prices than world market prices. The divergence is caused by the government policies 
that distort the pattern of production, moving it away from the most efficient use of domestic 
resources and international trading opportunities. The competitiveness analysis verifies that the 
government decision in pursuing self-sufficiency through highly protecting the domestic rice 
industry leads to significant policy distortion since the international rice price is lower than 
domestic rice. This study provides foundational information that domestic rice production in 
Malaysia is not competitive since the protectionist policies have failed to achieve self-
sufficiency.   
1.2 The Impact of Self-sufficiency and International Trade 
 
Self-sufficiency, often misinterpreted as food security, has become a permanent policy 
goal in the national rice development plan in Malaysia. This primarily concerns addressing the 
national food security over the past decades. The government’s mandate under the national agro-
food policy, 2010-2020, is to pursue self-sufficiency in rice and achieve total self-sufficiency by 
the year 2020. With this mandate, the government aims to close all trading borders and eliminate 
rice imports coming from international markets and suppliers. As Malaysia is not a competitive 
rice producer, this extreme policy decision would lead to massive additional expenditures at the 
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production and farm levels. This study evaluates and analyzes the impact of self-sufficiency 
policy in rice at the national level using the RICEFLOW model.  
A self-sufficiency policy scenario is defined as the removal of rice imports for long grain 
rice by the year 2020. With elimination of rice imports, domestic rice production would increase 
as well as the producer price. This increase also implies the increase in cost of production that is 
mostly derived from a constraint in land factor. The higher production cost of paddy rice and 
consequential increase in the market price of paddy rice transfers to higher consumer prices.  As 
a result, the domestic demand for consumption of long grain rice declines. These results imply 
that self-sufficiency improve rice producers’ welfare which would benefit them, however the 
policy punishes all rice consumers, which also include the rice producer as consumer, due to a 
substantial increase in consumer price. Hence, rice self-sufficiency entails significant welfare 
shifts from consumers to producers and will likely adversely affect food security objectives since 
the policy increases prices and limits consumption, especially by the poor. As affordable food 
prices are the key pillars of food security, self-sufficiency does not guarantee food security at the 
national level. The government would suffer from losses of the import tariff revenues. In 
addition, self-sufficiency burdens the government with substantial additional expenditure for the 
required output subsidies, production inputs, and technological efficiency to realize self-
sufficiency in rice while maintaining consumer prices.  
In contrast, liberalizing rice trade, which has been found to provide positive effects on 
food security, would be an alternative policy strategy, since Malaysia is a member of ASEAN, 
WTO, and has actively participated in both bilateral and regional free trade agreements for other 
commodities. With free trade, although rice producers are worse off, albeit to a marginal degree, 
and though the government loses from import tariff revenues, consumers would be better off due 
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to decreasing prices with a more competitive market environment from external rice suppliers. In 
addition, Malaysia could participate in a regional approach for strengthening food security to 
address its rice-deficit issue, and thus free trade could offer a more food secure economy. The 
results of these two policy scenarios correspond to economic theory that self-sufficiency greatly 
benefits rice farmers at the expense of consumers. On the other hand, the free trade showed 
opposite policy impacts since farmers’ welfare worsens, yet consumers’ welfare increases. From 
this study, these policy scenarios clearly represent the opposite direction in terms of welfare 
distribution. Further, the price effects of the free trade policy scenario are applied in the 
following study to measure the policy impacts at the household level among rice farmers in 
Malaysia. 
 
1.3 The Impact of International Free Trade on Rice Households 
While rice farmers are highly protected in Malaysia, the impacts of free trade are often 
misconstrued to focus only on the negative effects on the domestic production side and rice 
farmers’ incomes and welfare. Therefore, this study analyzes the impact of free trade policy that 
would have on rice farmers by developing a farm household model for individual rice farmers in 
Malaysia. The model is simulated to evaluate the impacts of free trade—through changes in 
producer and consumer prices from the RICEFLOW analysis in Chapter 3—on rice farmers’ 
production, consumption, poverty, and welfare.  
The decline in producer price after the free trade policy reduces the production input use 
(seed, fertilizer, pesticide, and total labor) among rice farmers. The significant decrease in 
production inputs also causes in decrease rice yield and further leads to decline in domestic 
production after the implementation of free trade. These consequences cause rice farmers’ 
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household incomes to fall. Because free trade leads to more rice imports, the international 
competition for domestic rice farmers is stronger. Thus, for the rice farmers, free trade will 
negatively affect incomes leading to escalating poverty rates of both poor and extreme poor. 
However, the decrease in consumer price for long grain rice after free trade leads to an increase 
in rice consumption. This suggests that poverty—measured in terms of rice consumption—will 
be alleviated for rice farmers when free trade is allowed. The decrease in consumer price not 
only benefits rice farmers, but also the entire Malaysian consumers. A complete welfare measure 
that combines both the effects of income and rice consumption shows that free trade does make 
rice farmers worse off as their welfare falls, albeit minimally.  
2.  Policy Discussions 
With the evaluations and analysis on the Malaysian rice policy, we identify crucial 
consequences of the protectionist production policy, the self-sufficiency policy, and the 
international free trade policy. The impacts of these policies provide key insights for the 
government and policy makers for future rice policy direction. 
 
2.1 Protectionist Policy Consequences  
The government’s interventionist policy instruments have significantly distorted prices 
and resource use and failed to drive competitiveness in the Malaysian rice sector. These 
distortions have induced unnecessary efficiency losses in order to realize the national self-
sufficiency goal. The government enacts distorting policies to favor particular interest groups, 
consciously trading off the consequent economic efficiency losses against equity concerns for 
special interests of rice farmers.  
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The dominant use of power in decision-making by asking how issues are suppressed, hence the 
scope of decision-making is restricted (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). While “Agenda setting is 
not just about what issues government chooses to act on, they are also about competing 
interpretations of political problems and the alternative worldviews that underlie them” (Cobb 
and Ross, 1997).  With implementing protectionist policy, the government does not only distort 
the rice market, but also each agricultural input market which includes seed, fertilizer, pesticide, 
and other chemicals.  As rice in Malaysia is mostly operated by small farmers, it would be highly 
challenging to become a globally competitive industry and would require significant financial 
supports by the government. The government policies should lead to the economic development 
at the macro level instead of stimulating policies to largely focus on rice economy. To realize 
total national self-sufficiency goal, the rice sector is largely subsidized, protected and regulated 
by the government. The policy evaluation and analysis at the production level reveals that if 
domestic support policies are removed– input subsidies and producer price – rice would be 
unprofitable to produce in Malaysia, hence an uncompetitive industry, which leads to significant 
losses at farm level. However, one of the limitations of this study is that the issue of how rice 
farming resources would be redirected to other farming activities was not explored. A high 
protection by the government causes inefficient rice production due to policy distortions, since 
domestic rice production has no comparative advantage relative to rice imports, which can be 
purchased by consumers as much lower prices than domestic rice. Therefore, the government’s 
interventionist policy instruments significantly distort rice markets while inducing unnecessary 




2.2 Self-sufficiency Policy Consequences  
Self-sufficiency has been upheld as a policy strategy in the Malaysian rice sector as a 
means to address the food security concerns of its population and to alleviate poverty among rice 
farmers, as well as their livelihoods and welfare, which have become permanent mandates in the 
national rice development policy. Although self-sufficiency is not a new strategy in Malaysian 
policy, having originated in the 1930s, the catastrophic effects of the recent global food crisis in 
2007/08 has convinced the government to mandate total self-sufficiency in its primary food 
staple, rice, by the year 2020, which has been recently extended to 2050 in the National 
Transformation (2020-2050), the national masterplan, through closing borders for rice imports in 
the future. With Malaysia is not a competitive rice producer and has no comparative advantage 
relative to rice imports, self-sufficiency constantly forces domestic production through high 
subsidies for inputs, outputs, and producer prices, hence it is not an efficient approach to pursue. 
In fact, domestic production is significantly distorted. Self-sufficiency has also been identified as 
a costlier and a counterproductive path to food security. Instead to achieve the food security 
objective, self-sufficiency could essentially threaten the overall food security of the country. 
With the evidence presented in this study, self-sufficiency in rice is more likely to be considered 
as a more political strategy rather than a solution to poverty issues. Furthermore, the food self-
sufficiency approach has been widely criticized as containing misguided policy decisions and 
seeks to achieve food security that places political priorities over economic efficiency (Clapp, 
2017). 
While the self-sufficiency policy would benefit and improve welfare to rice producers, 
albeit a minor group of the total population, the policy will not only worsen the majority of 
Malaysia’s population of rice consumers, but require large government costs, hence burdening 
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the government fiscal resources. The government’s stance on self-sufficiency needs to be 
redefined as current policy decisions are misguided. The significant differences in welfare 
allocation between the self-sufficiency and free trade strategies described above imply that the 
political economy becomes even more crucial to decide the policy output. With the pursuit of 
self-sufficiency, the forces supporting a small group (rice farmers) of the population are 
“winning” the battle at the expense of the larger consumer group. Self-sufficiency could also be a 
political strategy for the country to become an independent region without relying other 
countries’ food sources. Also, the policy decision might be connected to government favoritism 
of business interest groups. In fact, the policy decision might actually be shielding political 
interests over economic rationale. The policy agenda setting is associated with a process of 
conflict and most of politics revolve around the development and expansion of conflict 
surrounding evolving political issues (Schattschneider, 1960). Subsidy programs that are 
supposed to be an economic tool using substantial government expenditure to improve local rice 
industry might be misused as an “exchange” for political desires. In fact, members of 
government are “single minded seekers of reelection” (Mayhew, 1974). 
2.3 International Trade Policy Consequences 
  The livelihood and welfare of rice farmers have been protected by the government since 
the majority of Malaysian rice farmers are among poor households. Other than a wide range of 
domestic support policies for rice farmers, the government also imposes high tariffs for rice 
imports. In fact, the most recent policy review suggests prohibitive barriers in rice trade to 
pursue an autarky rice economy. Both RICEFLOW and Farm-Household models are applied to 
evaluate and analyze the international free trade policy impacts at the macro and micro levels, 
respectively. The results indicate consistent impacts at both levels that the international free trade 
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policy reduces producer prices, albeit at different magnitudes. At the national level, the producer 
price decreases by 11.9%, and even more at the household level, where it decreases by 16.2%. 
The reduction of producer price at the farm-household level causes in reduction of production 
inputs – seed, fertilizer, pesticide, and total labor – which decreases long grain rice yield by 
4.84%, from 6.96 to 6.62 metric ton per hectare. As a result, the domestic rice production falls by 
5.3%.  
These free trade consequences further lead to a higher poverty rate of income among rice 
farmers in Malaysia. The poverty rate of farmers who generate monthly household income below 
RM 800 (the national poverty line for poor) increased from 16.40% to 33.20%, while those 
earning below RM 460 (the national poverty line for extreme poor) surged from 11.30% to 
22.30%. Because free trade encourages more rice imports by 19.85%, the international 
competition facing local rice farmers would be much stronger. On the other hand, free trade 
reduces consumer prices of long grain rice by 14.7% which leads to higher growth of rice 
consumption by 4.4% at the national level and 5.01% at the farm-household level. Thus, the 
poverty rate of rice consumption (farmers who consume below 70 Kg per person/year) declines 
from 18.4% to 14.1% after allowing free trade. 
While rice farmers experience a negative income shock, they actually consume more of 
the staple food with a lower consumer price for rice. In addition, the declining consumer price 
not only benefits the small population of rice farmers, but also to the majority population of rice 
consumers in Malaysia. A complete welfare measure that combines both the effects of income 
and rice consumption shows that free trade does make rice farmers substantially worse off as 
their welfare falls only by 0.42%. Since Malaysia has been a net rice importer, free trade will 
negatively affect local farmers. However, the government and policymakers must consider the 
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impacts of free trade in the rice market for the overall economy and country by including the 
benefits for non-farm rice consumers. Eliminating all trade barriers while assisting farmers 
through income transfers could result in net gains from the implementation of free trade. Placing 
a heavier weight on the welfare of a small group of rice farmers (about 1% of the current total 
population) while disregarding the welfare of the majority of the population would be a 
discriminatory policy strategy. Disallowing free trade could be a political strategy to shield 
business interest groups and lobbyists that would be advantageous to political contributions, and 
hence influence policy outcomes. The institutional issues also are the main concern since the 
government largely administers the value chain of rice market, primarily in the subsidy flows, 
buffer stock policy, research and development grants, and extension services. Other than rice 
farmers, who would benefit from these public investments.  
The significant differences in welfare allocation between self-sufficiency and free trade 
described above imply that the political economy becomes even more crucial to decide the policy 
output. With Malaysia currently pursuing total self-sufficiency, the forces supporting a small 
group of the population are winning the battle at the expense of the larger consumer group. 
Instead, free trade could be welfare improving to most of the population of the country as rice 
remains a primary food staple. Malaysian rice is mostly produced by smallholders and is not a 
significant contributor to the national income. and It is not a competitive industry and the 
government continues a subsidization policy strategy consuming substantial expenditure while 
implicitly using tax payers’ dollars for decades. From public policy perspective, the combination 
of elitist, public choice, and social construction theories are strongly dominated in Malaysian rice 
policy decisions by the government and policymakers.  
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From this comprehensive policy evaluation, analysis, and impacts, this study concludes 
that the current self-sufficiency goal to be achieved in 2020 will lead to significantly detrimental 
effects to the overall rice economy in Malaysia, as the country is not only an uncompetitive rice 
producer, but also has no comparative advantage in producing rice. However, the government 
has recently extended the goal to the year 2050 under the national masterplan, therefore the 
country has another 30 years to improve primarily on research and development and 
technological efficiency to achieve self-sufficiency goal in rice while assuring welfare of both 
rice farmers and consumers. This study provides key economic insights and empirical measures 
for rice policy directions and policy decisions.  
 
3.  Reconciling the Differences of Studies 
 The empirical research presented in Chapters II, III, and IV use different data or 
databases with different methodological frameworks and therefore different model assumptions. 
In the Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM), the estimation at social price levels is based on the 
elimination of production input subsidies (seed price, fertilizers, pesticides, and chemicals) and 
producer price supports (i.e. guaranteed price). The data for the PAM have a base year of 
2014/15. Therefore, the results are stationary and applicable to that particular year, given that the 
technology, market environment, and factor prices are assumed to be constant. Since this study 
focuses on rice, the result of comparative advantage in PAM is analyzed relative to only rice 
imports. The key assumption of this analysis is that domestic and imported rice are perfectly 
substitutable. The spatial, partial equilibrium analysis of the RICEFLOW model utilizes a 
database for the average market situation in 2013-2015. To simulate RICEFLOW, the production 
technology is specified as Leontief production functions, which implies that no substitution of 
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production inputs are allowed. In addition, the model is restricted in the final consumption only 
to rice, and thus no substitution of resources to other crops and no substitution in consumption to 
other food is allowed. This is clearly a limiting assumption and must be considered in the 
evaluation of the results. The results in the PAM analysis show that the Malaysian production 
system is not competitive, with the implication that Malaysia should not produce rice on 
economic grounds. RICEFLOW on the other hand shows that 95 percent of domestic production 
remains in production when Malaysia removes tariff barriers on international rice imports. These 
differences in the outcome for domestic production occur for two reasons. First, the production 
subsidies are maintained in both the self-sufficiency and free trade scenarios for RICEFLOW, 
while the PAM analysis removes the producer’s input and product price subsidies. Second, as 
noted above, imported rice and domestic rice are considered perfect substitutes in the PAM 
analysis, however in the RICEFLOW analysis, a preference for domestic rice relative to 
imported rice is specified. Although the Farm-Household model utilizes data from rice 
household surveys, the producers’ and consumers’ price effects are applied from the 
RICEFLOW estimates, therefore the results of the Farm-Household model and the RICEFLOW 
model are consistent. 
 
4.  Recommendations for Future Research 
The Policy Analysis Matrix analysis can be extended to measure the comparative 
advantage of rice sector relative to other potential crops in Malaysia such as specific fruits and 
vegetables. In addition, with the changes in production input from the Farm-Household model, 
we could apply those changes to analyze policy transfers at the level of production.  Given the 
negative welfare effect on local rice farmers, it is important to extend the farm-household model 
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to identify the most efficient government transfers to make such that farmers are equally well off, 
while still allowing for free trade. Specifically, this extension could evaluate whether bolstering 
current production subsidies or shifting to decoupled direct payments would be the most cost-
effective policy. One might also consider shifting the government expenditures toward a more 
robust research and development approach on improving rice productivity. Therefore, future 
research should focus on identifying the most applicable subsidy mechanisms for domestic rice 
producers in Malaysia, for example 1) pursuing self-sufficiency without punishing (decoupling) 
consumer prices, or 2) allowing free trade without hurting local rice farmers by providing direct 
income payments. This research would provide non-distortionary policy approaches for the 
government and policymakers for sequencing strategy of the national rice development in 
Malaysia. The results of this research will encourage the Malaysian government to continue to 
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